

ACADEMIC PAPER

A GENDER SENSITIVE APPROACH TO EMPOWERING WOMEN FOR PEACEFUL COMMUNITIES



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GLOSSARY

Allahu Akbar	“Allah is the greatest” – a common Islamic Arabic expression, used by Muslims in various contexts, including prayer.
Aurat	Naked / genitalia
Dakwah	Proselytization or missionary work
Fitnah	Slander / sedition / seduction
Hadith	Traditions or sayings of Prophet Muhammad
Haram	Profane/proscribed
Hijab	Veil / head covering
Imam	Islamic term for religious leader
Jemaah Islamiyah	An Indonesian violent extremist group with links to al-Qaeda, responsible for a series of attacks, including the Bali bombings of 2002.
Jihad	Striving or struggling in Arabic. Often a struggle or fights against the enemies of Islam or alternatively, an internal struggle against sin.
Khosidah	Poetry

Liqo	Recitation
Madrassa	Religious school
Majelis Taklim	Religious discussion group
Mujahid	Martyr
Mudjahida	A term for a female active in jihad (in the Philippines)
Muslimah	A Muslim woman
Nikah Muda	Early marriage (child marriage)
Niqab	Veil
Purdah	Veil
Ridho/Ridha	Pleasure
Sunnah	Deeds of the Prophet Mohammad
Syahid	Martyr
Taaruf	Arranged marriage between families
Toril	Religious boarding schools
Ushra	A study circle

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This report presents research findings on gender and violent extremism in the Philippines, Bangladesh, and Indonesia for a project led by Monash Gender, Peace and Security Centre for UN Women Regional Office for Asia and the Pacific (2018-2019). The aim of the research is to examine women's roles in supporting, countering, and preventing violent extremism and how gender identities and relations may be used to garner support for intolerant social attitudes and groups as well as recruitment to violent extremist groups.

The research has generated novel findings – possibly the first such robust findings to date – on the relationship between support for misogyny, violence against women, and extremist violence:

- There is a positive and significant correlation in survey responses in all three countries and for both genders between support for violent extremism and their support for violence against women;
- Attitudes about violence against women explain more of the variation in support for violent extremism than other factors (such as age/youth, education level) commonly theorised to explain individual support of violent extremism. The results of an ordered logit regression model reveal that support for violence against women and the prevalence of hostile sexist attitudes are both better predictors of support for violent extremism than religiosity;
- Misogynistic attitudes *among women* are also strongly correlated with support for violent extremism;
- Where a male relative – a partner, son or brother supports or is a member of a violent extremist group - women are more likely to support violent extremism.
- Most survey respondents and qualitative research participants in all three countries reported having come across online media supporting violent extremism or jihad;
- Baseline attitudes can be sexist, especially among men; anti-women's rights "backlash" is politicised by extremist groups on platforms aimed at men and women members;

- In Indonesian online spaces, male leadership and wifely obedience are promoted by violent extremists.

Comparing the studies conducted in 2017-8 and 2018-9 in Indonesia and Bangladesh suggests that:

- Shifting labor patterns threaten male hegemony. Ideas of male protection, breadwinner and soldiering masculinities are deployed in recruitment strategies and messaging by violent extremists;
- Education institutions are sites where extremist recruitment occurs, and gender norms are politicised, including by extremist groups;
- Recruitment happens simultaneously among the impoverished and the educated middle classes;
- In Bangladesh, corruption and unemployment continue to fuel resentment.

Comparative findings across the three country cases including the Philippines suggest that:

- Women who seek male protection from conflict can be recruited by violent extremist groups;
- Women can be effective actors in preventing violent extremism, but mothers' perceived roles in supporting or preventing violent extremism often relies on idealised notions of women and femininity as inherently peaceful.
- "Caring fathers" are overlooked as actors in preventing violent extremism.

INTRODUCTION

This report presents research findings on gender and violent extremism in the Philippines, Bangladesh, and Indonesia for a project led by Monash Gender, Peace and Security Centre for UN Women Regional Office for Asia and the Pacific (2018-2019). The aim of the research is to examine women's roles in supporting, countering and preventing violent extremism and how gender identities and relations may be used to garner support for intolerant social attitudes and groups as well as recruitment to violent extremist groups. The research, thus, focuses on the diverse roles that that women can and do play in promoting or preventing violent extremism, as well as men's roles.

This research builds on an earlier research project in Indonesia and Bangladesh (True et al. 2019; also True and Eddyono 2017). The present research explores the role of gender identities and norms in supporting and preventing violent extremism. Constructions of masculinity and femininity and misogynistic attitudes are investigated to determine the extent to which they are used by violent extremist groups to radicalise and recruit both men and women in the Philippines, Bangladesh, and Indonesia. Mixed-method research involving both quantitative and qualitative analysis reveals the role that gender identities and norms can play in mobilising support for violent extremism, alongside the complex range of factors that may drive people to engage in violent extremism. The focus on fathers, in particular, aims to build on research by True

et al. (2019), which demonstrated the often overlooked, but important role of mothers in preventing violent extremism, while indicating that the father's roles is considered within communities to be less critical because of gender norms and divisions of labour.

To examine closely the relationship between gender and violent extremism in Asia, the report studies three country cases: The Philippines, Bangladesh, and Indonesia. After describing the mixed-method approach, data collection and analysis, each country case study is analysed. Factors affecting the form and occurrence of violent extremism are studied in each section. They include; male leadership and gender relations, women's participation in religious extremism, veiling and dress, recruitment, education and socio-economic, and the role of parents.



METHODOLOGY

The research team employed grounded, interpretivist and feminist research methods, to foreground the voices of the research participants in examining the gender dynamics of violent extremism. The research design is based on a mixed-method approach, comprising of quantitative (survey analysis) and qualitative research (FGDs, Key Informant Interviews and Observations), as described below. The key research questions are:

1. How and why are societal gender identities and relations drivers of violent extremism, both enabling and countering ideological fundamentalism and political violence?
 2. How are constructions of masculinity and femininity used by violent extremist groups to radicalise and recruit men and women, specific in the Asia and Pacific region?
 3. In what ways – through what initiatives – and why do women support, counter and/or prevent fundamentalist ideologies and practices?
- The primary research hypotheses include:

TABLE 1
Research hypotheses for qualitative study

Hypotheses on the relationships of gender and violent extremism: Qualitative study
Violence against women and curtailment of the rights of women are indicators of rising intolerance and the vulnerability of communities to violent extremism.
Community efforts and programmes that address violence against women and promote gender equality, directly contribute to environments that are more resilient and able to prevent violent extremism.
Experience of being a victim or perpetrator of violence against women can mobilise women and men to join violent extremist groups
Extremist groups are recruiting men and women online in gender-specific, targeted ways.
Women and women’s civil society groups play a key role in preventing and countering violent extremism, (though policymakers often underestimate or overlook their roles).
Families and communities have a critical role to play in preventing and countering violent extremism; they are at the frontline of efforts to prevent and counter the threat posed by violent extremism.
Women are less confident than men in participating in preventing violent extremism or knowing what to do to respond to warning signs of extremism ¹ and violent extremism: Their confidence can be increased through women’s and community empowerment programmes.

1 For the purposes of this paper, **extremism** is defined as, “The adoption of extreme political, social, or religious ideals and aspirations that reject or undermine the status quo and/or reject or oppose other contemporary ideas and norms that are generally agreed upon including human rights, especially women’s human rights, freedom of expression, democracy and so on.”

Delving deeper into the gender drivers of violent extremism, the hypotheses for the quantitative research focused on the interaction of sexism and violent extremism. Scholars have pointed to the mutually constitutive nature of misogyny and conservative politics in violent right-wing groups (Cohen et al. 2018) and religious fundamentalist groups (Ji and Ibrahim 2007).

“Gender regressive” in this study describes how institutions, individuals, or laws may promote, uphold and implement sexist and misogynistic attitudes and practices, and gender inequitable norms that result in the reduction and limitation of gender justice (Vijayarasa 2019). Individuals may hold gender regressive views and attitudes that collectively comprise a “gender regressive ideology”. Gender regressive contrasts with gender responsive or gender sensitive.

Gender-regressive ideology is also more pronounced in religiously conservative groups more broadly (Seguino 2011). Conservative ideology and religious fundamentalism play a key role in the ideology of violent extremist groups in Indonesia, the Philippines, and Bangladesh. But how can scholars understand the complex relationships among gender ideology, extremism and fundamentalism?

Glick and Fiske (1996) propose that that overt misogyny (hostile sexism as outlined in Appendix B), defined as

the hatred and fear of women, is coupled with views of women that are not uniformly negative (benevolent sexism). Open hostility or misogyny (comprising *inter alia*: an unwillingness to accept women’s equality or leadership, a distrust of women and their motives, the view that violence against women can be justified) can be accompanied by or replaced with paternalistic attitudes about women that seem superficially positive (protecting women, recognising women as life-givers), but nonetheless reinscribe gender stereotypes that are damaging to women. Hostile sexism then, is open antipathy to women, or misogyny. Paternalist sexist stereotypes women and views women in restricted roles. Drawing on the global research on attitudes about women, we expected many people, women, and men, to hold benevolent sexist attitudes, and a smaller number to be misogynist. We also expected significant differences between rates and intensity of support for the two forms (hostile and benevolent) between men and women, and across countries (Glick et al. 2000). We hypothesised that one of the two types of sexism would be conducive to supporting or proscribing violent extremism, depending on the individual’s gender. Given the pervasiveness of gender bias against women and the common observation that violent extremist groups promote sexist beliefs and practices, the survey sought to differentiate between different types of sexism and how men and women purport them.

TABLE 2:
Hypotheses for the quantitative study

Hypotheses on the relationship of sexism to support for violent extremism
H1. Men who have hostile sexist attitudes are more likely to support violent extremism
H2. Women are more likely to support “benevolent sexism”, because they seek safety and protection in the face of hostile sexism
H3. Women who have benevolent sexist attitudes are more likely to support violent extremism
H4. Women who have hostile sexist attitudes are more likely to support violent extremism
H5. Women and men who accept violence against women are more likely to support violent extremism

1.1

SITES

The research encompassed twelve sites across the three countries, taking in urban and rural sites, as well as sites with UN Women programming and sites without.

In the Philippines, qualitative research was conducted in four sites in the Southern part of the country: Basilan, Maguindanao, Zamboanga and Lanao del Sur. Basilan and Maguindanao are rural, whereas Zamboanga and Lanao del Sur are urban sites. Notably, the capital of Lanao del Sur is the city of Marawi where the five-month siege between Government forces and Islamic State occurred in 2017, which resulted in the death and injury of hundreds of people and the displacement of 1.1 million civilians (Brimelow 2017). Both Basilan and Maguindanao are rural sites with histories of extremist violence and state counter-insurgency. Basilan has seen high levels of activities by both the Abu Sayyaf Group and Islamic State (Jones 2018). Maguindanao was a stronghold of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front and is one area in which

the Muslim minority population has experienced massacres and abuses (Tuminez 2008). All four sites are part of the Bangsamoro Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao (BARMM), thus references to ‘the Philippines’ or ‘Filipino/a/s’ in this paper should be understood only to represent this autonomous region and not the entirety of the country.

In Bangladesh, there were four qualitative research sites: Satkhira, Joypurhat, and two university sites; one independent university in Dhaka and one Islamic university in Kushtia. The focus on universities builds on the research in the previous project that suggested universities and education were areas of political action, recruitment, and resistance to violent extremism. Dhaka, as the capital, has been a site of extremist violence, political mobilisation

TABLE 3:
Sites in three countries

Country											
Bangladesh				Indonesia				Philippines			
Satkhira	Joypurhat	Dhaka	Kushtia	Depok	Klaten	Cirebon	Medan	Basilan	Magindanao	Zamboanga	Lanao del Sur
Rural	Rural	Urban	Urban	Urban	Rural	Rural	Urban	Rural	Rural	Urban	Urban
UN Women	UN Women	Non-UN Women	Non-UN Women	UN Women	UN Women	Non-UN Women	Non-UN Women	UN Women	UN Women	Non-UN Women	Non-UN Women

and militarised counter terrorist violence by the state. Satkhira has a history of political movements against the East India Company, some of which were religious based. Satkhira has experienced lethal attacks by violent extremists, chiefly Jemaat-e-Islami Chhatra Shibir (the student wing of Jemaat-e-Islami), which have resulted in police crackdowns. Militarization and violence are apparent in Satkhira. Joypurhat, a majority Muslim area with a significant (around 10 per cent) Hindu minority, comprises agricultural communities on fertile land. JMJP (the Awakened Muslim Masses of Bangladesh) has been reported as active in Satkhira and Joypurhat (Ahsan and Banavar 2011).

In Indonesia, three of the qualitative research sites were in Java (Depok, Cirebon, Klaten) and one was in North Sumatra (Medan). Depok has a mixed history of intolerance, with many populist groups promoting the primacy of ethnic Betawi residents (Setara Institute 2015, Wilson 2016). The mayor of Depok is a member of the right-wing Islamist Prosperous Justice Party, (PKS), and there is a high level of extremist activity, as well as militarisation, in Depok (Machmudi 2006). In 2017, the government of Depok closed a mosque used by the Jamaah Ahmadiyah minority (Komnas Perempuan 2017). In 2018, around 50 suspected extremists were imprisoned

in Indonesian Special Forces headquarters in Depok, only to break out into violent rioting (IPAC 2018). Klaten, located in Central Java Province has a strong Muslim majority (Statistics Indonesia 2019). The mayor of Klaten is a religious woman from the political party Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle. Local leadership also supports community cultural and religious activities, which have become key spaces where people of different religious and cultural backgrounds can interact. Yet, poverty and unemployment rates are high in Klaten, while education rates are low (Statistics Indonesia). Klaten has seen arrests of terrorist suspects by the special anti-terrorism squad and was a key site of the 1965 anti-communist killings (Detik.com 2019, Cribb 2000, 121). The district of Cirebon in Java has a strong Islamic culture, and a diversity of Islamic boarding schools. Previous research in Cirebon established the spread of Salafi and Wahabism in Islamic early childhood education and women's prayer groups (True and Eddyono 2017).² Medan is the largest city on the island of Sumatra, with a multi-religious, multi-ethnic populations with extensive trade links with the region (Statistics Indonesia 2019). Medan was the site of religious extremist violence around the case of "Meliana", who was accused spuriously of religious hate speech in 2016 and imprisoned.³

2 In 2018, police arrested a man affiliated with violent extremist group *Jamaah Ansharut Daulah* for bombing a mosque in Cirebon in 2016 (*tribunnews.com* 2018).

3 Meliana, a Chinese Indonesian woman, was accused of religious hate speech and imprisoned due to an alleged statement to her neighbour that the local mosque loudspeaker in front of her house was too loud. The public responded by burning five Buddhist Temples, vihara, in Tanjung Balai (BBC 2016).

1.2

FIELD RESEARCH PARTICIPANTS

Qualitative field research across all sites in the three country cases involved 94 FGDs, 32 key informant interviews and 22 community observations. FGDs involved groups of only women, only men and mixed groups. Participants were selected to obtain a broad sweep society, with many ordinary citizens, as well as civil society members, women’s group members, activists, LGBTIQ participants, students. People with direct experiences of violent extremism were interviewed, as well as a few members of extremist groups. Religious minorities and members of ultra-religious and moderate discussion groups also participated.

Key informant interviews in Indonesia included interlocutors from religious conservative and moderate groups, academics, and staff at Wahid Foundation. In the Philippines, selection of key informants was based on their knowledge and experience of violence, violent extremism and related gender issues and included religious and

women’s rights experts, as well as staff from The Moropreneur. In Bangladesh key informant interviews were held with eight participants, including women’s rights experts and staff from the NGO BRAC. Interviews with 5 women’s rights activists also provided context for issues relation to gender and intolerance.

TABLE 4:
Number of Focus Group Discussions

Field Data FGDs	Country												Total
	Bangladesh				Indonesia				Philippines				
	Satkhira	Joypurhat	Dhaka	Kushtia	Depok	Klaten	Cirebon	Medan	Basilan	Maguindanao	Zamboanga	Lanao del Sur	12 Sites
FGD Women	4	5	6	6	3	5	3	3	3	2	2	2	44
FGD Men	5	4	4	4	2	1	1	3	2	1	2	2	31
FGD Mixed	1	1	0	0	0	0	1	1	2	5	4	4	19
Total Number of Groups	10	10	10	10	5	6	5	7	7	8	8	8	94

TABLE 5:
Number of Key Interviews and Observations

Field Data Key Informant Interviews & Participant Observations	Country												Total
	Bangladesh				Indonesia				Philippines				
	Satkhira	Joypurhat	Dhaka	Kushtha	Depok	Klaten	Cirebon	Medan	Basilan	Maguidanao	Zamboanga	Lanao del Sur	12 Sites
KII Women	6	0	5	0	3	2	3	0	3	0	1	2	25
KII Men	2	0	0	0	1	1	1	0	0	1	1	0	7
Total Number of Participants	8	0	5	0	4	3	4	0	3	1	2	2	32
Participant Observations of community meetings & programmes	5	6	2	0	2	2	0	0	8	0	0	0	25

1.3

RESEARCH PROCESS

Two semi-structured question protocols were developed for the qualitative research. The overarching themes of the research were devised during an inception workshop held in Indonesia. The same methodological guidelines were applied for all three country cases based on the semi-structured questionnaires for FGDs and for key informant interviews that were to be used as a menu of questions to address gender and violent extremism.

Qualitative fieldwork was conducted, transcribed, translated, and collated by research country teams. This data was then filed, sorted, coded and analysed using NVivo qualitative research software. Analysis was carried out to address the research questions. The data was coded according to seven overarching themes which fieldwork had explored:

Following the Validation Workshop in each country with relevant stakeholders and research participants, a Research and Analysis Workshop was convened in Australia in February 2019 with lead researchers from each of the three countries to validate the research as well as identify and compare the findings across the three countries and research sites within them. All participating researchers affirmed the findings of the analysis and endorsed the preliminary country reports. However, the research does not suggest that there is an exclusive connection between Islamic religion and violent extremism, rather the research focused on Muslim-majority areas and recognises that violent extremism has different sources and characteristics. All participants greatly value the opportunity to contribute to novel research on gender and preventing violent extremism and hoped that this research will inform policy and practices and lead to future initiatives on gender and preventing violent extremism.

TABLE 6:
Table 6: Themes coded in Nvivo

Major Theme	Sub-themes, questions
Women's empowerment	Varieties of violence, household decision making, political and religious leadership, veiling, women's mobility
Mothers and fathers	Gender roles; gender division of labour, connections with violent extremism especially kinship
Gender identities and links with violent extremism	Ideal men and women, soldiering identities, women's roles in violent extremism, gender and recruitment
Gendered recruitment messaging	Social media use, violence and intolerance in media landscapes, links with violent extremism
Marriage	Marriage payments, ideal marriage, child marriage
Youth	Schools, madrassa, education as preventing violent extremism, young people and impressionability
Continuum of intolerance, violence, and violent extremism.	Definitions, ideology, what links between extremism and violent extremism, religions,

1.4

SURVEY RESEARCH

The overall research questions investigated how gender ideologies and roles are used by violent extremist groups to radicalise and recruit men and women in Bangladesh, Indonesia and the Philippines. The quantitative survey aimed to examine the extent to which societal gender identities and relations are drivers of violent extremism across the three countries, and how these differed for men and women.

To that end, researchers conducted a survey of 3,052 people (1479 women and 1527 men) with ages ranging from 18-25, 25-35, 35-45 and >45 across the Philippines, Bangladesh and Indonesia.

TABLE 7:
Quantitative Survey Respondents

Age	Country and Gender (by male, female or other identity)											
	Bangladesh				Indonesia				Philippines			
	Male	Female	Other	Total	Male	Female	Other	Total	Male	Female	Other	Total
18 - 25	200	206	8	414	181	187	1	369	186	185		371
col%	40%	44%	73%	42%	35%	37%	100%	36%	37%	36%		36%
%row	48%	50%	2%	100%	49%	51%		100%	50%	50%		100%
25-35	224	206	1	431	195	196		391	191	215		406
col%	44%	44%	9%	44%	38%	39%		39%	38%	42		40%
%row	52%	48%		100%	50%	50%		100%	47%	53		100%
35-45	52	38		90	95	91		186	89	82		171
col%	10%	8%		9%	19%	18%		18%	18%	16%		17%
%row	58%	42%		100%	51%	49%		100%	52%	48%		100%
More than 45	24	18	2	44	39	26		65	37	24	1	62
col%	5%	4%	18%	4%	8%	5%		6%	7%	5%	100%	6%
%row	55%	41%	5%	100%	60%	40%		100%	60%	39%	2%	100%
No Information	6			6	3	1		4	5	4		9
col%	1%			1%	1%	0%		0%	1%	1%		1%
%row	100%			100%	75%	25%		100%	56%	44%		100%
Total	506	468	11	985	513	501	1	1015	508	510	1	1019
col%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
%row	51%	48%	1%	100%	51%	49%	0%	100%	50%	50%	0%	100%

The survey questions examined social media use, religiosity and sought to measure self-reported levels of masculinity.⁴ Masculinity, sexism, and violence against women were considered part of the construction of gender identities, and therefore used as variables in the survey.

The items on masculinity measure were devised using a sex role inventory (Choi, Fuqua, and Newman 2009). The sexism scale was after Glick and Fiske (1996), which allowed researchers to examine the multidimensional nature of sexism.⁵ The hostile end of the sexism scale was also amplified using items from a misogyny measure (Piggot 2004). The sexism scale has been extensively tested across cultures and countries (Glick et al. 2000). The attitudes to violence against women scale was devised using Flood (2008) and items selected from the Violence Against Women Community Attitudes Survey (Taylor and Mouzos 2006).⁶ The gendered identities and violent extremism items were devised based on research conducted in the related research project (True et al. 2019).

The quantitative research survey was carried out in October and November 2018. Survey responses were on a five-point scale:

1	Strongly Disagree
2	Disagree
3	Neutral
4	Agree
5	Strongly Agree

In the analysis, frequencies describe a population's attitudes towards perceptions of and/or support of violent extremist views, as well as support for sexism and violence against women. To strengthen the scale "supporting violence against women", researchers went over the results using a reliability factor analysis and split the questions between those attitudes supportive of physical and sexual violence against women, and those attitudes supportive of practices that harm women and girls (female genital mutilation (FGM), child marriage, bride-price, and so-called honour-based violence).

The study then used the Pearson correlation coefficient ('r') to show the strength and direction of the association between the variables (Gujarati 2009, 23). The magnitude of the Pearson correlation coefficient determines the strength of the correlation. Correlations between masculinity, education, religiosity, age, gender, sexism, benevolent sexism, support for violent extremism and support for violence against women were tested.

Bivariate regressions examined the relationship between each variable (hostile and benevolent sexism, preference for male leadership, education, religiosity, gender, support for violence against women, support for practices harming women and girls, age, and degree of masculinity) and the support for violent extremism. The analysis was strengthened and explored using ordered logit regression modelling of all variables (Williams 2016).⁷

4 The form of masculinity measured in the scale is "hegemonic". There are multiple potential constructions of masculinity.

5 Hostile sexism scale comprised 8 items and the paternalist (benevolent) sexism scale comprised 8 items (See Appendix B: Survey Scales)

6 The Supporting Violence Against Women scale comprised seven items

7 The model chi-square is 1203.52 with 25 degrees of freedom. This is highly significant; the independent variables in the model has a significant effect on the support for violent extremism

1.5

ONLINE CONTENT ANALYSIS: INDONESIA

A content analysis of Indonesian extremist websites was conducted. Quantitative and qualitative text analysis was used to examine websites (“sources”) of extremist and violent extremist groups. Several resource and data constraints meant that this work could only be carried out for Indonesian websites.

Quantitative text analysis was used to establish major themes, common associations and associational concepts, an appropriate method with which to examine propaganda materials, such as those produced by extremist websites (Riff, Lacy, and Fico 2014). Text analysis does not measure causality in the real world, however, media is assumed to have effects on the consumer, making analysis of content important (Krippendorff 2004).

The websites were sampled purposively from work discussing violent extremist, extremist, and fundamentalist groups in Indonesia (Wilson 2006, Wilson 2016, Rahman Alamsyah and Hadiz 2017, Hadiz 2013, IPAC 2015, 2018). Due to the increasing control and blocking of such content, many websites are no longer accessible, but several were still online (IPAC 2018). Websites were mined using the R software environment. To mine websites, researchers used the *rvest* and *rcrawler* packages to extract textual data such as title and content of webpages and tweets, as well as hyperlinks to external websites and social media accounts. The textual data was cleaned and analysed in R using the *tm* package.

The online sources examined have links to extremist or violent extremist groups in real life. Muslimdaily.net and Arrahman.com were started in 2005-7 as websites with a missionary purpose or proselytizing (“*dakwah*”) and socialising support for jihad (“*tahrid*”) across Indonesian society. Arrahman.com was set up in 2005 by a man with family connections with Jemaah Islamiyah, an Indonesian violent extremist group, and involved with its above ground branch, Majelis Mujahadeen Indonesia. The son of Abu Bakar Bashir, a Jemaah Islamiyah leader,

started Muslimdaily.com. These are professionally run sites, producing and publishing books, magazines and videos with salaried staff, and widely read by the radical community (IPAC 2015, 9). Kdi.wordpress.com (KDI stands for Kabar Dunia Islam, or Islamic World News) is a media wing of Islamic State in Indonesia, for a time run by a woman administrator, Siti Khadijah (IPAC 2015). Its published content included material in support of jailed Indonesian extremist preacher, Aman Abdurrahman. Voa-Islam.com and Panjimas.com are tabloid news websites. They are associated with the Arrahman and Muslimdaily sites (Jurnal Islam.com 2018)⁸, and both are providers of local jihadi news and were banned by the Indonesian authorities (IPAC 2015). In 2016, the Indonesian police arrested Panjimas journalist, Ranu Muda. Ranu was jailed for five months for participating and promoting vandalism and assault by the Islamist militia, Laskar Umat Islam Surakata, (the Surakarta Islamic Army), in which nine people, including three young women were injured (Detik.com 2016; Coconuts.co 2016)⁹. Voa-Islam is a local jihadi extremist site, for example regularly promoting activities by the Dewan Sharia Kota Surakarta (the Sharia Council of the City of Surakarta), which is in turn linked to the Laskar Umat Islam Surakata (Mudhoffir 2017, 507).

Both Voa-Islam and Panjimas websites had a section of their website for a “muslimah” (Muslim women) audience. These women-specific sections were mined for the study. In addition, a random sample of webpages from Arrahman.com and Muslimdaily.net was mined in order to compare “general-audience content” with “women-specific content”.

8 “Still Blocked, 12 Managers of Islamic Media Sites Urge Kemkominfo to Normalize in 24 Hours”

9 “Considered to have joined “Sweeping” Solo [in order to spread] Propaganda, Panjimas Tabloid Journalists Arrested”.

TABLE 8:
List of Online Sources

Source	URL	Type	Audience	No of pages
Arrahman	https://www.Arrahman.com	Website	General	598
kdi.wordpress	https://kdiweb.wordpress.com/	Website	General	410
Muslimdaily	http://www.Muslimdaily.net/	Website	General	1000
Panjimas	https://www.Panjimas.com/category/muslimah/	Website	Women	293
Voalslam	http://www.voa-islam.com/rubrik/muslimah	Website	Women	952

COUNTRY-
COMPARATIVE
ANALYSIS: PHILIPPINES,
BANGLADESH
AND INDONESIA

Across all three countries in Asia, there were distinct similarities but also notable differences. The level of support for violent extremism in the Philippines is considerably higher than in Indonesia (men 16 per cent and women 16 per cent), and comparable with Bangladesh (27 per cent men and 23 per cent women), a finding that likely reflects the greater levels of extremist violence in both the Philippines and Bangladesh. Philippines is 10th highest on the Global Terrorism Index, Bangladesh ranked 25th and Indonesia is ranked 42nd (Institute for Economics and Peace 2018).

Economic drivers of violent extremism were present across all the cases. In the Philippines in particular, while many research participants agreed that violent extremist groups play on people’s weaknesses, most agreed that extremists came from many different socio-economic backgrounds. There was a tension between the idea that violent extremist groups recruited those with limited education or knowledge, but a recognition that some of those engaged in violent extremist groups were also educated. Poverty and financial incentives were drivers, yet there was widespread recognition that many of those involved were middle class. Poverty, and the grievance it can cause as well as the opportunity it creates for exploitation, is clearly a driving factor behind recruitment to violent extremist groups. Indeed, this research has demonstrated that across the three Asian countries,

there is a complexity of causes of and responses to violent extremism. Until now, what has received little attention are the gender dimensions of violent extremism and preventing violent extremism.

Variations in the traditional gender roles assigned to women, with space for negotiation of power, at least within the home, increasingly recognised in Philippines and Indonesia, in contrast to Bangladesh, are crucial in understanding the politics of supporting and preventing violent extremism. Shifting gender norms in the Philippines and Indonesia create opportunities both for women (and men) and preventing violent extremism. However, shifting gender norms have also been blamed across all three sites for rising violent extremism; in the Philippines, for instance, women entering the job market

TABLE 9:

Q46. If groups are fighting for their religious ideals and way of life, they are justified in using violence, even if it breaks the law and injures civilians

Q46	Country											
	Bangladesh				Indonesia				Philippines			
	Male	Female	Other	Total	Male	Female	Other	Total	Male	Female	Other	Total
Strongly disagree	43%	41%	20%	42%	57%	62%		59%	39%	44%		41%
2	14%	17%		15%	12%	10%		11%	9%	14%		11%
3	17%	18%	20%	17%	15%	12%	100%	14%	23%	23%	100%	23%
4	13%	9%	10%	11%	9%	9%		9%	18%	12%		15%
Strongly agree	14%	14%	50%	14%	6%	7%		7%	11%	7%		9%

is perceived by some as exposing the family to instability and exposed children to the threat of violent extremism recruitment without the mother's moral guidance and close vigilance.

Social media was identified as research gap in the first iteration of research, and it was confirmed as an increasingly important mode of recruitment and movement building in both Indonesia and the Philippines. In Bangladesh and Indonesia, despite women's lower incidence of internet use, they identified online material as 'incitement to jihad' more frequently than men did. This indicates a possible intervention point in the online space in Indonesia and Bangladesh. Comparing online incitement to violent jihad with the other countries, Indonesia had a slightly lower score of 33 per cent of people reported seeing such content very or extremely often; this was lower in Philippines with only 20 per cent of people reporting that they have seen such content.

Not enough data was available from Bangladesh on this topic, due to a clampdown on internet activity. In Indonesia, social media activity among extremist and violent extremist groups was shown to be extremely gendered. There were separate spheres for men and women. Moreover, gender regressive ideology including violence against women used to mobilise support. In the online spaces of recruitment, contradictory messages (the empowered woman, the vulnerable woman in need of protection, and the sexualised woman available for the gratification of men) highlight the complexity of gendered messaging. Evidently, seemingly contradictory gendered messaging are used to target different audiences and are exploited by violent extremist groups. Victimisation narratives feature in recruitment messaging, exploiting feelings of marginalisation and discrimination among both men and women. Contradictions and political mobilisation can also be exposed and leveraged by those seeking to counter or prevent violent extremism. Finally, intolerance and online violent extremist imagery formed an ethnic nationalist backdrop for political mobilising. Imagery and stories promoting male aggression, terrorist acts, Muslim victims of violence, flag burnings, and violence against women were all used to promote the violent defence of the Muslim faith.

The Philippines case of women's participation in violent extremism presents an interesting paradox, and potentially a curious tension managed by some violent extremist groups

in the region, with traditional gender norms (dominant men, obedient women) attracting (predominantly) men, while at the same time perceived opportunities for adventure, liberation and revenge attracting men as well as those women who might want to challenge traditional gender norms (or at least escape some of the constraints imposed by such norms in their lives).

Male control over the public (political and religious) sphere was under challenge, and a hot-button issue for politicians, populist movements and extremists alike in all three countries. Gender differences between men and women on leadership were significant across all three countries. Women agreed with male supremacy in leadership to a lesser degree, however, with a difference of 8 percentage points in Bangladesh, 14 percentage points less in Indonesia and 17 percentage points in the sample from the Philippines.

Overall, masculinity in all three countries is defined by male leadership and earning power, as well as violence and male protection. While around half of both men and women agreed that men should sacrifice their wellbeing to financially support women in their lives in both Indonesia and the Philippines, this notion had significantly less support in Bangladesh, where gender norms of male breadwinner and female homemaker are more rigidly enforced, with perhaps the expectation that women rather than men self-sacrifice even with regard to financial support and moreover that women serve men rather than vice versa. In Bangladesh, 53 per cent of women and 40 per cent of men disagreed with male self-sacrifice for the family. These gender differences had far less salience in Indonesia and the Philippines, where women supported male self-sacrifice strongly and to a similar extent as men.

Our results in Indonesia showed that in the deep structure of communities is a doctrine of male leadership in private and public spheres—most often justified by referring to religion, although male leadership is also codified in the 1974 Marriage Law (Republic of Indonesia 1974). Religious-backed male supremacy is increasingly used to justify a variety of gender inequalities, including coercive control and, in some cases, violence against women, a finding supported in other research on Indonesia (Eddyono 2018). Coercive control under the

doctrine of male leadership was present in women's relationships with men belonging to violent extremism groups and can help to explain women committing acts of extremist violence. Gender regressive ideology and practices plausibly motivate some people to support extremist and violent extremist organisations, as we clarify below using quantitative analysis. In Bangladesh, the use of violence to force women out of the public sphere was a significant part of the way women's behaviour and mobility was controlled (which was less prevalent in the Philippines and Indonesia). This violence against women in the public sphere leaves little room for women's leadership or other public roles. In Bangladesh and Indonesia, Islamist politicians and extremist groups have been able to effectively mobilise around issues such as inheritance laws, polygamy, divorce, alimony, and FGM.

Support for violence against women increases the likelihood of support for violent extremism

Quantitative analysis of the survey data drills deeper into the nexus between support for violence against women and support for violent extremism (see table 10). Our results show a positive and significant correlation between the variables "Supporting Violent Extremism" and "Supporting Violence Against Women" in the three countries and both genders. Variables consisted of single questions and groups of questions (scales) (see Appendix A Survey Scales). Among men there is a positive and strong relationship between "Supporting Violent Extremism" and "Supporting Violence Against Women" variables in Indonesia ($r = .5516, p < 0.05$) and Philippines ($r = .5273, p < 0.05$). For men in Bangladesh, the correlation between support for "Supporting Violence Against Women" and support for violent extremism is moderate at ($r = .3469, p < 0.05$)

The results show that attitudes in support of violence against women explain more of the variation in support for violent extremism than other factors that we theorise might explain individual support of violent extremism, such as youth (UNESCO 2018, 2017, Ghafar 2016, Cachalia, Salifu, and Ndung'u 2016, Bourekba 2017), education (UNESCO 2018, Mokbel 2017), socio-economic background (Hadiz 2008, 2013) or religiosity (Pedahzur 2013).

Quantitative analysis (ordered logit regression) demonstrates that violence against women and violent extremism are strongly connected. Modelling several independent variables and controlling by country, shows that support for violence against women increases the likelihood of support for violent extremism. One unit increase in the degree of "Supporting Violence Against Women" the odds of high "Supporting Violent Extremism" (5) versus the category 1 (lowest support) are 3.015 times greater, when the other variables in the model are held constant. Supporting "Supporting Violence Against Women" means a person is three times more likely to support violent extremism. However, the relationship declines at a certain point. Those with the highest levels of support for violence against women support violent extremism, but those with low levels of support for violence against women do less. People with a higher degree of support for violence against women are less likely to put themselves in category or low support for violent extremism. Similarly, those who supported harmful practices against women and girls were more likely to support violent extremism, but only 1.083 times more likely.

At some level, the relationship of men to violence against women and extremist violence is intuitive, given the research showing that violence exists on a continuum. There are gendered relationships between private violence, public violence and war and conflict (Caprioli 2000, True 2012). Moreover, empirical studies have shown men who perpetrate physical violence against other men are more likely to perpetrate intimate partner violence (Ozer et al. 2004, Fleming et al. 2015).

Surprising and noteworthy, however, was that women in certain contexts, who supported violence against women, also supported violent extremism. The strength of association between "Supporting Violent Extremism" and "Supporting Violence Against Women" for women is stronger and higher than for men in both Bangladesh ($r = .6412, p < 0.05$) and Indonesia ($r = .5923, p < 0.05$). Whereas this association for women in the Philippines is moderate ($r = .4599, p < 0.05$), and women in the Philippines reject violence against women more emphatically and in greater numbers.¹⁰

10 72 per cent of women in the Philippines strongly disagree that a husband would be entitled to use physical force if his wife argues with him, or refuses to obey him (Indonesia 64% and Bangladesh 44%)

TABLE 10:

Generalized ordered logit model regression of relationship of strong support for violent extremism with ten independent variables¹¹

Supporting violent extremism	Odds Ratio	Std. Err.	z	P> z	[95% Conf. Interval]	
1 - Strongly disagree						
Hostile sexism	1.401	0.085	5.560	0.000	1.244	1.578
Benevolent sexism	0.926	0.088	-0.810	0.419	0.768	1.116
Support for violence against women	3.015	0.209	15.930	0.000	2.633	3.454
Support for harmful practices against girls	1.083	0.080	1.080	0.278	0.937	1.251
Support for male leadership	0.918	0.053	-1.460	0.143	0.820	1.029
Education	0.984	0.061	-0.250	0.801	0.872	1.112
Religiosity	0.996	0.042	-0.090	0.930	0.917	1.082
Gender	1.224	0.101	2.440	0.015	1.041	1.439
Age	0.980	0.005	-3.990	0.000	0.970	0.990
Masculinity scale	1.028	0.008	3.480	0.001	1.012	1.045
Constant	0.030	0.018	-5.730	0.000	0.009	0.098
2 -Disagree						
Hostile sexist	1.401	0.085	5.560	0.000	1.244	1.578
Benevolent sexist	1.096	0.107	0.940	0.347	0.905	1.327
Support for violence against women	3.037	0.211	15.980	0.000	2.650	3.480
Support for harmful practices against girls	1.121	0.087	1.480	0.139	0.964	1.305
Support for male leadership	0.918	0.053	-1.460	0.143	0.820	1.029
Education	0.984	0.061	-0.250	0.801	0.872	1.112
Religiosity	0.996	0.042	-0.090	0.930	0.917	1.082
Gender	1.224	0.101	2.440	0.015	1.041	1.439
Age	0.984	0.005	-3.080	0.002	0.973	0.994
Masculinity scale	1.053	0.009	6.150	0.000	1.036	1.071
Constant	0.003	0.002	-9.120	0.000	0.001	0.011

11 Variables are described in Appendix “Survey Scales”

Supporting violent extremism	Odds Ratio	Std. Err.	z	P> z	[95% Conf. Interval]	
3 - Neutral						
Hostile sexist	1.401	0.085	5.560	0.000	1.244	1.578
Benevolent sexist	1.723	0.189	4.970	0.000	1.390	2.135
Support for violence against women	1.781	0.135	7.630	0.000	1.536	2.065
Support for harmful practices against girls	1.456	0.131	4.180	0.000	1.221	1.736
Support for male leadership	0.918	0.053	-1.460	0.143	0.820	1.029
Education	0.984	0.061	-0.250	0.801	0.872	1.112
Religiosity	0.996	0.042	-0.090	0.930	0.917	1.082
Gender	1.224	0.101	2.440	0.015	1.041	1.439
Age	0.987	0.006	-1.990	0.047	0.975	1.000
Masculinity scale	1.081	0.011	7.680	0.000	1.060	1.103
Constant	0.000	0.000	-12.900	0.000	0.000	0.001
4 - Agree						
Hostile sexist	1.401	0.085	5.560	0.000	1.244	1.578
Benevolent sexist	1.510	0.204	3.040	0.002	1.158	1.968
Support for violence against women	1.248	0.121	2.280	0.023	1.032	1.510
Support for harmful practices against girls	1.359	0.154	2.700	0.007	1.088	1.697
Support for male leadership	0.918	0.053	-1.460	0.143	0.820	1.029
Education	0.984	0.061	-0.250	0.801	0.872	1.112
Religiosity	0.996	0.042	-0.090	0.930	0.917	1.082
Gender	1.224	0.101	2.440	0.015	1.041	1.439
Age	1.007	0.008	0.870	0.387	0.991	1.023
Masculinity scale	1.078	0.015	5.460	0.000	1.049	1.108
Constant	0.000	0.000	-12.080	0.000	0.000	0.001

Violence against women likely plays a key role in violent extremist movements

The finding that women are complicit or support violence against themselves/other women, and that these women are more likely to support violent extremism speaks directly to the lacuna surrounding women's role as agent or victim. Gendered violence likely plays a role in women's maintenance and transmission of extremist movements in ways researchers and practitioners do not yet understand. We argue that violence against women plays a role in the ideology, recruitment and support of violent extremist groups. However, further research is needed to investigate the correlation of women's support of violence against women and violent extremism?

Misogynistic attitudes among women are strongly correlated with support for violent extremism

The support for violence against women is not only about a support for violence, but also about sexism. Linked to the above results, modelling showed increased misogynistic attitudes among women are strongly correlated with support for violent extremism. There was a strong and positive correlation between women with hostile sexist attitudes and support for violent extremism in Bangladesh ($r = .5829, p < 0.05$) and Indonesia ($r = .4687, p < 0.05$). For Filipino women, this relationship was positive, but moderate ($r = .3268, p < 0.05$). For men, the correlative relationship is moderate, not strong (around $r = .3$). Following the generalized ordered logit model, with a one unit increase on the hostile sexism scale, the odds of an individual's high support (5) for violent extremism versus the other categories (4 to 1) are 1.401 greater. Hostile sexism is related to increased support for VE for both men and women, but particularly for women.

In line with expectations and empirical work, women and men have different attitudes to women, and different levels of hostile sexism. The hypothesis that men and women will exhibit hostile and benevolent sexism in different degrees was supported in the

data. As shown in Graph 1 below 32 per cent of women in Bangladesh placed in the bottom category (not hostile), double the number of men in that category (14 per cent). Also, in Bangladesh, nearly 21 per cent of men expressed misogynistic attitudes to women (21 per cent) compared to 14 per cent of women. Likewise, while 17 per cent of Filipino men could be categorised as hostile sexists, only 9 per cent of women exhibited hostile sexist attitudes.

Women across all three countries were more supportive of benevolent sexist attitudes (25 per cent of women in the very benevolent category) than they were of hostile sexist attitudes (10.7 per cent). However, men across all three countries exhibited greater levels of hostile sexism (24 per cent of men in the very hostile category) and benevolent sexism (34 per cent) than women.

As with other studies of attitudes to Violence Against Women (Flood and Pease 2009), our study showed significant gender differences with men more likely to support violence against women than women. As expected, men in all three countries had greater support of men's violence against women (see table 11). The majority of women (77 per cent) in Indonesia disagreed with men's use of violence against their wives,¹² while a majority (63 per cent) of men also disagreed with men's use of physical violence, there was a difference of 14 percentage points. In Philippines, the difference in anti-domestic violence views between men (48 per cent) and women (72 per cent) was greatest, with a difference of 24 percentage points.

Sexist attitudes aligned with support for violence against women. There was a strong and positive relationship between women with high scores on hostile sexism and support for violence against women. In other words, misogynistic women also supported violence against women. For men, hostile sexist attitudes were moderately correlated with support for violence against women in the Philippines and Indonesia, and strongly correlated in Bangladesh. The findings support other empirical work showing that men with sexist attitudes are also more likely to commit acts of violence against women (Flood and Pease 2009).

12 Q 69. A husband would be entitled to use physical force if his wife argues with him, or refuses to obey him

GRAPH 1:

Hostile sexist attitudes according to category, gender disaggregated




TABLE 11:

Responses to “A husband would be entitled to use physical force if his wife argues with him, or refuses to obey him”

Q 69	Bangladesh				Indonesia				Philippines			
	Male	Female	Other	Total	Male	Female	Other	Total	Male	Female	Other	Total
Strongly disagree	41%	44%		42%	49%	64%		56%	48%	72%		60%
2	13%	15%		14%	14%	13%		14%	11%	7%		9%
3	19%	15%		17%	19%	11%		15%	18%	12%		15%
4	10%	12%		11%	12%	6%		9%	16%	6%		11%
Strongly agree	17%	15%		16%	6%	6%		6%	7%	4%		5%
col%	489	460	11	960	505	497	1	1,003	502	507	1	1,010

Between countries there was variation in attitudes to violence against women, as other cross-cultural comparisons have found (Nayak et al. 2003). In Bangladesh, for instance, 16 per cent of people strongly supported a man's right to use physical violence against his wife, whereas only 6 per cent did so in Indonesia, and 5 per cent in the Philippines.

One area of concern amongst all countries was the significance of educational institutes for recruitment and a development of intolerance – particularly as many institutions or *madrasa* are not regulated and there is little oversight of what their curriculum entails. The research noted that public universities in Indonesia and Bangladesh were sites of recruitment for extremist groups, with women members crucial to the functioning of the extremist groups. The focus on youth in the research was a productive one. In Indonesia, research was able to identify that youth recruitment to extremist and violent extremist organisations was extensive, structured and had strong connections to various groups with extremist, Islamist and fundamentalist agendas. Crucially, research identified that as women gain status and positions in campus religious organizations—that rely heavily on their labour—these women progress into ever tighter gendered control. As women gain power and status in the organization, the organization exercises increasing control over female members contact with men, their sex lives, their clothes, and even their gaze.

Increased or decreased levels of education do not affect a person's support for violent extremism or for violence against women

Increased or decreased levels of education do not affect a person's support for violent extremism in our ordered logit regression modelling. For women in Bangladesh and Philippines, education does not have any significant relationship with the other variables included in the analysis. Exceptionally, for women in Indonesia, education has a significant, positive but extremely small correlation with hostile and sexism and support for violence against women. This

finding, though slight, is surprising and should be confirmed with further research. For men in all three countries, there is a significant, negative but very small correlation between education and Violence Against Women; that is, support for violence against women decreases when the education of men increases.¹³ This is in line with other global studies that show education does not alter men's and women's attitudes to violence against women. We therefore conclude that support for violence against women is a greater predictor and may have a causal relationship to violent extremism.

Relatedly, being young did not increase the likelihood of supporting violent extremism, rather the model indicates the reverse is true. For every one-year increase in age (that is, as people get older), the odds of high support for violent extremism versus categories with low support for violent extremism (3 to 1) are 0.98 greater, given that all of the other variables in the model are held constant.

All three countries have also shown the role of religion to be crucial in violent extremist recruitment. Paradoxically, many participants argued a lack of religious knowledge or faith played into recruitment, however, many participants recognized that people were motivated for religious or ideological reasons. Of course, religious and educational institutions also play a key role in preventing violent extremism. Religious institutions' as well as affiliated youth groups, women's groups, schools and prayer groups' role in recruitment must be considered because they are places where many people frequent. Often those who might be particularly vulnerable are present in religious affiliated institutions, such as the orphans in Filipino *Toril* boarding school. Because of their age or because they seek solace, belonging or purpose in religion or, indeed, education, the vulnerable might be at higher risk. Religious institutions are also places where leaders can possess and can exert significant power. In and of themselves, neither religion nor education pose threats; it is those who seek to usurp their power and manipulate others that pose the threat.

13 Using the coefficient of determination (that is the proportion of variance in one variable that is explained statistically -not causally- by the other variable) we can verify that education in males only explains 1 per cent of the variation of support for violence against women in Bangladesh and 2 per cent in Indonesia and Philippines.

There was no consistent link between levels of religiosity and support for violent extremism

Quantitative analysis using a generalised ordered logit regression model supported the finding from the qualitative FDGs that there is no consistent link between levels of religiosity and support for violent extremism. Overall, our model finds support for violence against women, and hostile sexist attitudes are both better predictors of support for violent extremism than religiosity.

Finally, this research has shown the role of the mother is critical to effective preventing violent extremism. The case of the Philippines showed this especially clearly. Recognizing the role of the mother and her moral authority in the home should legitimise her engagement in community and broader societal matters when it comes to discussions on how to prevent and counter the threat posed by violent extremism. Hitherto, this has been overlooked as policy and practice inadvertently marginalised women into the domestic

sphere recognising their important role as a mother in preventing violent extremism without considering a range of issues. Engagement with mothers must take into account women's wider engagement, burdens, and capacities, and avoid excluding women who are not mothers. Participants reiterated a gender bias that violent extremism is fed by the apparent breakdown in traditional family life—a tradition reliant on a stay-at-home, ever-vigilante and self-sacrificial mother—and undermined by women's paid work, especially overseas. Efforts to promote peaceful communities must avoid consigning women's roles to the domestic sphere only and, inadvertently, undermine efforts to promote gender equality interventions. Not least because this can, in fact, increase the threat of violent extremism as well as other forms of insecurity. For, while the role of the mother at home was highly regarded by research participants, both male and female, many also saw the father's role as equally important and were also advocates of the principle of gender equality. Analysis of the survey data supports this finding, especially because caring fathers tended to be slightly important than strong fathers.



TIME-COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS

The research for this year reiterated some important findings from the research conducted in 2017-2018. The initial research findings that parenthood, education, and socio-economic issues were confirmed as important.

Eighty-seven per cent of Bangladeshis thought that violent extremism was a big or very big problem in their country in 2017 (see table 12). In 2018, when asked about whether they were worried about violent extremism, 48 per cent of respondents were worried (see table 13). In Indonesia, figures had increased. In 2017, 65 per cent of people thought violent extremism was a big or very problem in Indonesia. In 2018, this number had climbed to 66 per cent of people.

The research in its second phase conducted research in sites where middle-class participants were based (in university contexts) and further explored the different socio-economic backgrounds of people vulnerable to recruitment by violent extremist groups. Processes of recruitment were shown to be deeply gendered in all three countries, with gender segregation and control vital to female university student's participation in extremist groups identified solely in Indonesia (see Country Analysis: Indonesia).

While the first project highlighted the important roles of mothers in preventing violent extremism, the second focussed on both mothers and fathers and highlighted

the important role both parents have in either promoting intolerance as well as creating a permissive and peaceful environment for their children. The most recent research highlighted the important role of fathers in ensuring that their daughters can enjoy access to rights, education and opportunities for work. Conversely, it also showed that male control over women and the household remained entrenched (see each Country Analysis on Male Leadership and Gender Relations below).

Previous research (True et al. 2019) showed that women are less confident than men in participating in preventing violent extremism or knowing what to do to respond to warning signs of extremism and violent extremism, but that this confidence can be increased through women's empowerment programmes, such as the one delivered by UN Women. The current research project investigated the flipside of empowerment, gender bias and sexism. Previous research had not looked in depth at violence, misogyny (hostile sexism), and ideology, and findings in this area are likely to contribute significantly to debates on women's extremist participation and social, political and economic drivers of sexism connected to extremism, as we explain in the final section.

TABLE 12:
2017 Data: How much of a problem do you think violent extremism is in your country?
Indonesia and Bangladesh

2017 Data	Bangladesh	Indonesia	Total
Not a Problem at all	2%	3%	2%
Somewhat of a problem	4%	10%	8%
Neither a problem or not a problem	8%	23%	16%
A big problem	17%	29%	23%
A very big problem	70%	36%	51%

TABLE 13:

2018 Data: I am worried about violent extremism in my country: Three Countries

Q 69	Bangladesh				Indonesia				Philippines			
	Male	Female	Other	Total	Male	Female	Other	Total	Male	Female	Other	Total
Strongly disagree	15%	19%	18%	17%	10%	6%	100%	8%	5%	4%	100%	4%
2	14%	12%	9%	13%	9%	8%		8%	9%	7%		8%
3	20%	23%	18%	22%	18%	17%		18%	25%	24%		24%
4	15%	13%	9%	14%	25%	29%		27%	25%	30%		28%
Strongly agree	35%	33%	45%	34%	38%	41%		39%	37%	35%		36%
col%	489	460	11	960	505	497	1	1,003	502	507	1	1,010

COUNTRY ANALYSIS: THE PHILIPPINES

4.1

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Violent extremism remains a contentious term with no single, shared definition. It is not often used within communities in the Philippines.¹⁴ Beyond those directly engaged in peacebuilding or interfaith dialogue, people tend to interchangeably use such concepts as fundamentalism, radicalism, extremism and violent extremism. Significant events – notably the Marawi Siege – were widely agreed to be a form of violent extremism among research participants, however. Most participants also agreed that violence was antithetical to their religion.

Despite ambiguity around the term of violent extremism, the survey revealed that the majority of people were worried about violent extremism in their country (63 per cent), with men and women equally worried about it (see table 14). Slightly

more women than men were worried about violent extremism in their country (65 per cent compared with 61 per cent), although slightly more men than women were very worried about it (37 per cent compared with 35 per cent).

TABLE 14:
Q55: I am worried about violent extremism in my country

Q 55	Bangladesh				Indonesia				Philippines			
	Male	Female	Other	Total	Male	Female	Other	Total	Male	Female	Other	Total
Strongly disagree	15%	19%	18%	17%	10%	6%	100%	8%	5%	4%	100%	4%
2	14%	12%	9%	13%	9%	8%		8%	9%	7%		8%
3	20%	23%	18%	22%	18%	17%		18%	25%	24%		24%
4	15%	13%	9%	14%	25%	29%		27%	25%	30%		28%
Strongly agree	35%	33%	45%	34%	38%	41%		39%	37%	35%		36%

¹⁴ For the purposes of this paper, **Fundamentalism** is defined as: The belief of an individual or a group of individuals in the absolute authority of a sacred religious text or teachings of a particular religious leader, prophet, and/ or God. **Extremism:** The adoption of extreme political, social, or religious ideals and aspirations that reject or undermine the status quo and/or reject or oppose other contemporary ideas and norms that are generally agreed upon including human rights, especially women's human rights, freedom of expression, democracy and so on.

For the purposes of this paper, **Violent extremism** is defined as: The use of violence by a non-state actor, often targeted at civilians, intended to pursue an ideological and political cause. For a more extensive review of the definition of extremism from a gendered lens, see True and Eddyono (2017)

4.2

MALE LEADERSHIP, GENDER RELATIONS AND VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN

The qualitative research revealed clear links between gender identities (masculinities and femininities) with intolerance, violence, and violent extremism. Dominant societal gender identities in Philippines include notions of masculinity, which are associated with being a provider for his family, a protector, and a leader (dominant and strong). In contrast, femininity is typically associated with being “nurturing”, “motherly”, being a “good mother”, giving “her full support to her family and husband”,¹⁵ being “obedient” ‘following’ (rather than leading), being “emotional”, and also doing domestic chores.¹⁶ However, many participants also commented that “a good man” can also do household chores and “plays a vital role in raising the children”.¹⁷

Research participants commented that the expectation that men must provide for their family, feeds violent extremism recruitment, because violent extremist groups provide financial incentives. Concepts of masculinity and being a good father or a good husband are closely associated with financially providing for the family:

*If I'm the breadwinner of the family I would accept what they will offer to me especially when you are not financially stable.*¹⁸

While a woman’s “soft heart” or love for family can be seen as a key factor in explaining women’s engagement in violent extremism, love also plays a role in mobilising men. While not explicitly referred to as love, a man’s desire to provide for his family, a desire

to belong or be part of a brotherhood, or a desire for sexual gratification were also mentioned as factors which motivate men to join violent extremist groups. Survey data showed that most people agreed that “Men should be willing to sacrifice their own well-being in order to provide financially for the women in their lives” (56 per cent) with only 16 per cent disagreeing or strongly disagreeing (see table 15).¹⁹

Support for male leadership of the public sphere was mixed, with significant gender differences. It is important to emphasise, however, that qualitative and quantitative data suggested that most Filipino respondents in Mindanao consider women have the skills to make good leaders, and that a leadership role is not just for men. The survey material indicates broad support for women’s leadership in

15 Women-only focus group discussion (o64) in the Philippines: Basilan, October 2018 (See Appendix for details of all primary sources cited)

16 Mixed gender focus group discussion (o71) in the Philippines: Zamboanga, October 2018

17 Women-only focus group discussion (o64) in the Philippines: Basilan, October 2018

18 Mixed gender focus group discussion (o72) with Philippines Civil Society Members: Zamboanga, October 2018

19 Q37: Men should be willing to sacrifice their own well-being in order to provide financially for the women in their lives.

TABLE 15:

Men should be willing to sacrifice their own well-being in order to provide financially for the women in their lives

Q 37	Bangladesh				Indonesia				Philippines			
	Male	Female	Other	Total	Male	Female	Other	Total	Male	Female	Other	Total
Strongly disagree	14%	28%		21%	5%	6%		6%	6%	7%		7%
2	11%	13%		12%	10%	9%		9%	8%	11%	100%	9%
3	22%	18%	27%	20%	27%	28%		27%	27%	27%		27%
4	15%	16%	36%	16%	30%	32%	100%	31%	29%	26%		27%
Strongly agree	37%	24%	36%	31%	29%	24%		26%	30%	29%		29%

the Philippines, with around 56 per cent of people surveyed agreeing that women have the skills to lead the country, with more women than men supporting the notion of women’s leadership, and far more young people than older people supporting this idea do.²⁰ Filipino women strongly supported female leadership in the political sphere (57 per

cent), a much smaller group of men supported female political leadership (27 per cent). With even divisions, the slightly more popular view was men should lead religious communities, but whereas 43 per cent of men agreed or strongly agreed with male religious leadership, only 28 per cent of women did (see table 16).²¹

TABLE 16:

Q35. The religious leadership of a community should be largely in the hands of men

Q 35	Bangladesh				Indonesia				Philippines			
	Male	Female	Other	Total	Male	Female	Other	Total	Male	Female	Other	Total
Strongly disagree	20%	22%		21%	8%	10%		9%	12%	26%		19%
2	11%	12%	18%	11%	9%	13%		11%	13%	18%		16%
3	20%	24%	9%	21%	21%	25%		23%	31%	28%	100%	30%
4	15%	13%	18%	14%	22%	26%	100%	24%	25%	16%		21%
Strongly agree	35%	29%	55%	32%	40%	26%		33%	18%	12%		15%

20 Q42: Women joining politics: that’s good. Women know how to manage households and families and have education now to manage the country. How much do you agree with the statement?

21 Q35. The religious leadership of a community should be largely in the hands of men.

There is also, however, a sizeable proportion of women (24 per cent) and, particularly, men (42 per cent) who believe that political leadership of a community should remain predominantly in the hands of men (see table 17). Nonetheless, this is considerably less than those who have the same views in Indonesia (51 per cent men and 37 per cent women) and Bangladesh (50 per cent men and 42 per cent women).

Correlations from the countrywide survey in the Philippines show a strong link between gender regressive views and violent extremism. For men in the Philippines, there was a weak to moderate relationship between having hostile sexist views (as defined in the

annex), and support for violent extremism ($r = .313$). Relatedly, there was a very strong relationship between men ($r = 0.527$) and women ($r = .459$) who agreed that men have the right to physically or sexually assault their wives and men who supported violent extremism.

Somewhat surprisingly, analysis shows that the relationship between gender regressive views, especially attitudes to violence against women, and support for violent extremism is even stronger for women in the Philippines than men. Hostile sexist views in Filipina women were strongly and positively correlated with support for violent extremism ($r = .468$).

TABLE 17:
Q34. The political leadership of a community should be largely in the hands of men

Q 34	Bangladesh				Indonesia				Philippines			
	Male	Female	Other	Total	Male	Female	Other	Total	Male	Female	Other	Total
Strongly disagree	24%	25%	9%	25%	11%	16%		13%	13%	27%		20%
2	10%	15%		12%	11%	19%		15%	14%	20%		17%
3	19%	21%	18%	20%	27%	28%		27%	32%	30%		31%
4	17%	15%	18%	16%	24%	23%		24%	23%	16%		19%
Strongly agree	30%	23%	55%	27%	27%	14%	100%	20%	19%	8%		14%

4.3

WOMEN'S EXTREMIST PARTICIPATION

In the Philippines, women's participation in extremist groups has been extensive and visible. Several research participants reported on the roles of female combatants "Mudjahida" (the name for a female active in jihad) and violent extremists:

During the Zamboanga Siege, the sniper/top shooter is a woman, a wife of the commander. It goes like this: I must protect my husband and my husband will also be protecting me.²²

Many research participants knew of women who were engaged in or supportive of violent extremist groups (as well as the critical role they play in preventing violent extremism). Research participants referred to women in violent extremist groups as "suicide bombers, combatants, snipers and spies",²³ as well as fulfilling support roles such as providing first aid or cooking for combatants, or engaging in public information and recruitment campaigns, particularly through the use of social media.²⁴ Research has suggested that women play a key role as recruiters for violent extremist groups because of their physical appearance and 'because of the way they talk; they are the ears and eyes, for communication purposes... and they know how to engage people in discussion'.²⁵ They are particularly likely to be recruiters for other women as they can understand and play on their needs. Women also play roles as couriers where men are unable to move around certain areas without raising suspicion.²⁶

Women's marital relationships can lead to their support for violent extremism

Attracting men can, in turn, ensure their wives and children also support or join violent extremist groups. One woman who was recruited to an extremist group by a female friend described the expectations for women's combat and non-combat roles, and the role of family ties in recruitment to violent extremist groups:

I have a friend whose family are all involved in this group [Islamic State]. I was recruited by her, but I am not a part of ISIS. They were doing shooting training somewhere in Marantao. They had an ISIS flag inside their house. Women in Islam are not obliged to carry a gun during a fight or join the men in a fight, but they are responsible to provide medical care to the group, and to provide food. However, if they have no other option, women are obliged to join the fight. My friend who is my classmate from the Madrasa, she has two siblings that are part of the ISIS [affiliated] group. At first, she was against ISIS, even though her husband is one of them. But as time passed, she eventually joined ISIS.²⁷

Survey results from the Philippines showed that nearly one third of male respondents agreed or strongly agreed that a man had forced a woman to join a violent

22 Focus group discussion with young women (064) in the Philippines: Basilan, October 2018

23 Women only focus group discussion (066) in the Philippines: Basilan, October 2018

24 Participant Observation (008) from the Philippines Research Report, November 2018

25 Mixed gender focus group discussion (086) in the Philippines: Maguindanao, October 2018

26 Mixed gender focus group discussion (086) in the Philippines: Maguindanao, October 2018

27 Mixed gender focus group discussion (079) in the Philippines: Lanao del Sur, October 2018

TABLE 18:

Q 48. When women join a violent extremist group, it is because they are forced or pressured by male family members or their religious leader

Q 48	Bangladesh				Indonesia				Philippines			
	Male	Female	Other	Total	Male	Female	Other	Total	Male	Female	Other	Total
Strongly disagree	19%	24%	9%	21%	32%	25%		28%	20%	23%		22%
2	15%	18%		16%	13%	16%		15%	16%	20%		18%
3	21%	18%	18%	19%	23%	29%		26%	33%	32%	100%	33%
4	17%	18%	18%	17%	20%	18%	100%	19%	20%	14%		17%
Strongly agree	29%	22%	55%	26%	12%	13%		12%	11%	11%		11%

extremist group compared with 25 per cent of women did (see table 18).²⁸ By contrast, one third of all survey respondents (34 per cent) agreed or strongly agreed that many women join violent extremist groups because they feel empowered to support what they see as a just cause.²⁹

The expectation that a woman supports, follows or obeys her husband can lead to her supporting violent extremist groups when her husband becomes involved, even if she knows it is wrong. Wifely devotion was also mentioned by some research participants as able to be exploited by violent extremist groups, who might accept the ideology presented by violent extremist groups (because they were “easily swayed”,³⁰ or “easily convinced by their husbands”).³¹ A woman’s love for her children (needing to provide for them) or her husband (wanting to follow him, or at least fulfil the promises she made to follow him) were mentioned frequently as reasons for women becoming involved in violent extremist groups:

“we have learned from Marawi: women are pushed to join their partner out of love promises”.³² Following loved ones if involved in violent extremist groups was also because of a woman’s “soft heart” as well as her sense of duty, loyalty and devotion, according to a group who had experienced the Marawi Siege:

*Women are soft hearted. If one of their loved ones are involved in this group, they couldn't have a choice but to be part of it because of the love you have for your husband or your child.*³³

Woman’s weakness in matters of the heart might lead her to support or engage in violent extremist groups as stated by some FDG participants in two sites:

*Young women are involved because they fell in love with that person to point that they could kill a person for them.*³⁴

Extremist groups sugar-coat their language to bait young people and women. Sometimes they marry

28 Q48: When women join a violent extremist group, it is because they are forced or pressured by male family members or their religious leader.

29 Q49: When women join a violent extremist group, it is because they feel empowered to support what they see as a just cause.

30 Mixed gender youth focus group discussion (080) in the Philippines: Lanao del Sur, October 2018

31 Focus group discussion with young men (078) in the Philippines: Zamboanga, October 2018

32 Mixed gender focus group discussion with Civil Society members (072) in the Philippines: Zamboanga, October 2018

33 Mixed gender focus group discussion, some participants were victims of the Marawi siege (079) in the Philippines: Lanao del Sur, October 2018

34 Focus group discussion with young women (080) in the Philippines: Lanao del Sur, October 2018

women. When that happens, these women become their ardent supporters.³⁵

In some, women's obedience to violent extremist husbands was considered by significant numbers of both survey participants and focus group participants to explain women's involvement in violent extremist groups.

As described above, it is broadly perceived that many women often support violent extremist groups only out of duty to their husbands if they have joined violent extremist groups and following one's husband is what constitutes being 'a good woman'. One research participant said that women are like 'mother hens' who will protect her husband and children under any circumstance, even if it means killing people.³⁶ While most participants suggested that women follow their husbands out of love or duty, a few people suggested that some women who believe in gender equality also engage in violent extremist groups, believing they should be able to do what men can do and also equally thrive on the adventure and freedom it can bring. In such instances, it was perceived that women have an active, rather than just a support role, in violent extremist groups. References were made throughout key informant interviews and FGDs to female snipers during the Marawi Siege and to several other women, known to research participants, who have been attracted to violent extremist groups in order to find freedom or adventure. The survey also revealed that violent extremist groups enjoy significant support among women. A sizable proportion of women (19 per cent) said that they believe groups are justified in using violence if they are fighting for religious ideals, although men were more likely to have this belief (29 per cent).³⁷

Many research participants commented that women also seek belonging and adventure, and this can motivate women to join violent extremist groups. One research participant recalled how one young woman she knew joined a violent extremist group because she wanted to escape her parents who were very controlling, and find freedom.³⁸ Another male research participant said that the allure of the gun is as powerful for women; "holding gun is a sign of empowerment for women".³⁹ Two research participants also suggested that participation in gender equality seminars has emboldened (or 'over powered') those women to join violent extremist groups, believing they can now do what men can do.⁴⁰ Of course, this may simply be an effort to understand how and why women assume roles traditionally seen to be the preserve of men – there are many stories about women snipers in the Marawi Siege being the four best snipers (the ones with the most kills).⁴¹

It should be mentioned that while men were expected to be the breadwinner, poverty – exacerbated by the conflict – has meant that many women now must work full-time outside the home. Some research participants commented that women may also be recruited because of poverty, especially mothers, if they need to provide for their children, and indeed, poverty appears to be the main driver for violent extremism in the Philippines.⁴² As the later section on parents and preventing violent extremism suggests, the mother's absence from the family home due to work obligations has been interpreted by some people as a factor driving children towards violent extremist groups.

Women also play important roles as fundraisers in violent extremist groups. In the Marawi Siege, it was the

35 Key interview (010) with a Senior Male Religious Leader in the Philippines: Maguindanao, October 2018

36 Mixed gender focus group discussion (070) in the Philippines: Basilan, October 2018

37 Q46: If groups are fighting for their religious ideals and way of life, they are justified in using violence, even if it breaks the law and injures civilians

38 Focus group discussion with mothers (080) in the Philippines: Lanao del Sur, October 2018

39 Mixed gender focus group discussion (071) in the Philippines: Zamboanga, October 2018

40 Mixed gender focus group discussion (071) in the Philippines: Zamboanga, October 2018

41 The significant participation of women in the Marawi siege has also been commented upon in other research (for instance, (Casey and Pottebaum 2018, Jones 2018). Women's participation in violent extremism more broadly in Philippines has also been briefly mentioned by Agara (2015) in an analysis of women's roles in non-state militia groups globally that has spanned decades, rather than being a recent phenomenon as often depicted in the media.

42 Other research has also noted the role that poverty plays in insecurity in Philippines highlighting, for instance, the vicious circle of marginalisation, poverty and protracted violence in Mindanao (Conciliation Resources, 2015). Other research, however, comments that there is little empirical evidence to support the links between poverty and violent extremism (see Jones, 2018, for instance, although Jones does refer to the beliefs expressed by her research participants that poverty is a driver of violent extremism, as well as grey literature which highlights the links between armed violence and shadow economies in Philippines). Other research suggests poverty is not a key driving factor, at least in Mindanao, but rather factors such as 'community marginalization, the social factors of revenge, and the gun culture that underlie persistent conflict in the region, and the lack of self-efficacy amongst certain young people' (Casey and Pottebaum 2018, 13)

TABLE 19:

Q43 I respect these women who sent money to support these fighters. Women can't fight, but they can help support fighters in these areas

Q 43	Bangladesh				Indonesia				Philippines			
	Male	Female	Other	Total	Male	Female	Other	Total	Male	Female	Other	Total
Strongly disagree	19%	25%		22%	19%	15%		17%	16%	15%		16%
2	10%	16%	27%	13%	13%	8%		10%	12%	13%		13%
3	24%	21%	9%	22%	32%	32%		32%	28%	27%	100%	27%
4	16%	13%	18%	14%	21%	27%	100%	24%	25%	23%		24%
Strongly agree	31%	25%	45%	28%	15%	18%		17%	18%	22%		20%

mother of the Islamic State affiliated Maute brothers who procured fighting funds. While female violent extremists may be shocking to many participants, women's monetary support for "just causes" was accepted by many. In response to the statement: 'I respect these women who sent money to support these fighters. Women can't fight, but they can help support fighters in these areas', nearly half of respondents agreed or strongly agreed (see table 19).⁴³ Around 28 per cent of people disagreed with this statement; almost the same number as women as men.

Women can be effective actors in preventing violent extremism

Some research participants suggested that women can make particularly effective actors in preventing violent extremism because of their communication and diplomacy skills; referencing stereotypical female attributes. However, others highlighted less traditionally female attributes and referred to women's determination and perseverance as making them effective leaders. One research participant commented that, for example, women are better at resolving tense situations because they are less likely to have a weapon to such a situation and more likely to rely on her communication skills.

Others spoke of the ability of women to listen and

support, which can be effective in preventing those who have been traumatised by conflict or violence from becoming extremist in their views or engaging in violence themselves:

Women in the society. We should be organized. We should organize women in any kind of society... For me, women must be organized... and empowered... Give her the work... women can do that, just talking to them—a group of women going to them, talking to the victims, it's already relieving. I will tell you, you could no longer think of to become an extremist.⁴⁴

Nonetheless, in terms of preventing violent extremism, a woman's role is generally perceived to be consigned to the domestic sphere, as the next section on the role of mothers and fathers in preventing violent extremism outlines. Of course, as well as being supporters or detractors, women are also often the direct and indirect victims of violent extremism:

I evacuated Manila. I was hurt when I heard a child calling his mom and saying "Mama she is a Muslim. Is she a terrorist?" This may be because of what the media is portraying in the television where it shows that this violent group also wear veils. They may be thinking that we are dangerous, though they didn't know that we are the one who are affected by this situation.⁴⁵

43 Q43: I respect these women who sent money to support these fighters. Women can't fight, but they can help support fighters in these areas. How much do you agree with the statement?

44 Key interview with a female kidnapping victim of Marawi Siege (017) in the Philippines: Lanao del Sur, October 2018

45 Mixed gender focus group discussion some victims and participants of the Marawi Siege (079) in the Philippines, Lanao del Sur, October 2018

4.4

RECRUITMENT

Many research participants said that violent extremist groups play on people's weaknesses in order to recruit, whether this is because they lack money or a sense of belonging, have been discriminated against (or feel their religious or ethnic group are being oppressed), or have suffered injustice and abuse.

Women who seek male protection from conflict can be recruited

Conflict dynamics also play a key role in violent extremism in Philippines, whether because of the trauma people have suffered, the grievances they have, the exposure to heightened and sustained levels of violence, the lack of hope for the future, or distrust or lack of confidence in the state and its institutions to provide for or protect them. Conflict also increases poverty, which also increases the likelihood of people joining violent extremist groups. Similarly, experiences of discrimination or oppression can lead to anger, a desire for revenge, or a search for the means of self-defence and protection. Violent extremist groups can respond to these strong emotions:

Because of the [lack of] peace and order in Mindanao, many of the young generations are lost. They have lost hope that they can still achieve their rights as a Muslims. So, when there are groups of people that will promise hope, they become easily attracted without knowing that there is ideology on terrorism... ISIS convinces the youths to join them by harping on wrong-doings of the government... The nagging fear of Muslims that a day would come where the military would just barge in our doors without permission and kill us, that is the reason many of us are armed for self-defence. This has happened in the past, this can happen now and in the future.⁴⁶

Additionally, several research participants described how both women and men would join violent extremist groups for a sense of security or protection; whether because of the allure of the gun, or because they face threats as a result of family feuds, political rivalries or general insecurity. The survey drew out that almost half of all respondents (47 per cent women and 42 per cent men) agree or strongly agree that women need a male guardian to ensure their security and protection. This perceived need for protection can be manipulated through the messaging of violent extremist groups if women are alone or their husbands have joined violent extremist groups.⁴⁷ Many spoke of violent extremist groups also threatening individuals if they didn't join them and, of course, this threat extends to their families also:

In the case of the Maute-ISIS, most of their recruits are member of their family. Their relatives, specifically the immediate family like the Maute brothers⁴⁸

For example, if the other part of the family did not want to be involved in such group is in need to hide. It is because the other members will surely recruit and haunt them⁴⁹

...we have no choice sir. For now, we are safe, but when you leave, we are no longer safe. Because those who comes here, threatens us, they have guns, what can we do? We'll just join them, like "if you cannot fight them, join them."⁵⁰

46 Key interview with a Moro Woman Leader (011) in the Philippines: Zamboanga, October 2018

47 Q39: Women need a male guardian to ensure their safety and protection.

48 Focus group discussion with mothers (080) in the Philippines: Lanao del Sur, October 2018

49 Focus group discussion with mothers (080) in the Philippines: Lanao del Sur, October 2018

50 Mixed gender focus group discussion with security sector workers (076) in the Philippines: Zamboanga, October 2018

Notions of masculinity and femininity are exploited by violent extremist groups

Research has shown that notions of masculinity and femininity can also be exploited by violent extremist groups to radicalise and recruit men and women. Specifically, violent extremist groups exploit the desire of men to be financial providers for their families, and the desire of women to be loyal or “obedient” to their husbands and other family members (fathers, brothers, others), in order to be regarded as a ‘real man’ or “a good Muslim wife”, respectively:

The main reason why women join groups like ISIS or Abu Sayyaf Group is because they are related to the already recruited member of their family (either the spouse, father, brother or any relative).⁵¹

Around half of the Filipinos surveyed said that gender regressive ideology (women’s obedience, keeping women in the home) was not a reason men joined

violent extremist groups.⁵² However, around 23 per cent of people agreed that it could be a reason for men joining, with more men (26 per cent) than women (19 per cent) supporting the idea. On the other hand, a significant number of Filipinos (44 per cent) were worried about religious fundamentalism impeding women’s rights, with around 22 per cent not worried about the gendered impacts of religious fundamentalism (see table 20).

Violent extremist groups can also exploit women’s appearance, with a small number of research participants suggesting that sexual exploitation of women as “partners of convenience and comfort” is used by violent extremist groups to attract men.⁵³ A larger number of research participants suggested that women’s attractiveness is exploited by violent extremist groups, who use women (particularly those considered to be pretty) to run errands (carry ammunition), fundraise, or engage in bombing activities because they would not ordinarily be suspected. Attractive women are also used by violent extremist groups for recruitment purposes.

TABLE 20:

Q54: I am afraid that religious fundamentalism will impede women’s rights (e.g. ability to work, voicing their opinion in public)

Q 54	Bangladesh				Indonesia				Philippines			
	Male	Female	Other	Total	Male	Female	Other	Total	Male	Female	Other	Total
Strongly disagree	26%	21%	18%	24%	17%	11%		14%	9%	9%		9%
2	13%	15%	9%	14%	16%	13%	100%	14%	15%	11%	100%	13%
3	22%	21%	18%	21%	28%	27%		27%	34%	34%		34%
4	15%	14%	18%	15%	22%	25%		23%	26%	26%		26%
Strongly agree	24%	30%	36%	27%	18%	24%		21%	16%	19%		18%

51 Key interview with a Moro Woman Leader (011) in the Philippines: Zamboanga, October 2018

52 Q54: I am afraid that religious fundamentalism will impede women’s rights (e.g. ability to work, voicing their opinion in public).

53 Mixed gender focus group discussion with security sector workers (076) in the Philippines: Zamboanga, October 2018

54 Mixed gender focus group discussion some victims and participants of the Marawi Siege (079) in the Philippines, Lanao del Sur, October 2018

55 Q13: How often have you seen violent extremist groups trying to recruit members through social media?

56 Women only focus group discussion (066) in the Philippines: Basilan, October 2018

57 Focus group discussion with young men (078) in the Philippines: Zamboanga, October 2018

Conversely, violent extremist groups also play to the desire for adventure and belonging on both women's and men's part. Some participants also said that their female members were used to shame men into joining violent extremist groups. Referring to the female snipers in the Marawi Siege, one said:

*... these women were used as source of pride. The men would preach on how people don't take pride, with hatred on how these women were not taken care of.*⁵¹

The present research confirms that violent extremist groups in the Philippines have their own social media accounts and use the internet for recruitment purposes. In KILs and FDGs, some research participants said that online games and social media apps, including YouTube, have shown violent extremist recruitment message, while only 24.31 per cent of all survey respondents said they had never seen a recruitment message from a violent extremist group on social media:⁵⁵

*I had an experience while chatting in my messenger apps, a flash message appeared advertising and inviting people to join a sort of violent extremist group.*⁵⁶

Violence is commonly used to increase online and offline support for violent extremism

For men, reasons other than poverty and the prospect of being able to financially provide for their families included: "Brotherhood, belongingness and power. Especially if one is able to hold a gun".⁵⁷ Others also mentioned being a "frustrated soldier" or wanting "adventure" as driving factors, especially for young men. Some also said the promise of power over women and the sexual exploitation of women were used by violent extremist groups to attract men.

Violent images and videos are used by violent extremist groups on social media. In line with findings on extremism worldwide (Conway and Courtney 2018), participants said these violent images and videos are used as a means of recruitment, and also to encourage violence, notably against members of the LGBTIQ community as well as ethnic and religious minorities:

*Posting violent video showing an act of violent extremism in the social media and there were numbers of people who sympathized and joined the group.*⁵⁸

Violent images cited by research participants included beheading people opposing the views or beliefs of violent extremist groups, suicide bombings, killing of people of other faiths, burning alive hostages or refugees, and extreme torture. Participants also said that high-powered weaponry is purposefully shown to attract men. Some suggested that to attract women, women were shown bearing firearms and shouting *Allahu Akbar* to convey a message that women can be powerful like a man (as people sometimes associate empowerment with violence).

Almost half of all survey respondents (44 per cent) said that they often or extremely often saw intolerant content posted in social media (approximately the same proportion of men and women).⁵⁹ A little over a third (32 per cent) said that they have often or extremely often seen social media content inciting violence towards religious minorities (again a similar proportion of men and women) (see table 21).⁶⁰ Just over a quarter of survey respondents (28 per cent) said that they had seen social media content inciting violence against women and girls (slightly more women at 29 per cent compared with men at 27 per cent) (see table 22).⁶¹ Focus groups tended to believe that young people were both more exposed to social media, and savvier about "fake news".⁶²

58 Women only focus group discussion (o66) in the Philippines: Basilan, October 2018

59 Q8: How often have you seen intolerant content posted in social media?

60 Q9: How often have you seen social media content (e.g. Post, tweets, videos, etc.) inciting violence towards religious minorities?

61 Q11: How often have you seen social media content (e.g. posts, tweets, videos, etc.) inciting violence towards women and girls?

62 Mixed gender focus group discussion (o93) in the Philippines: Maguindanao, October 2018

TABLE 21:

Q9. How often have you seen social media content (eg. Post, tweets, videos, etc.) inciting religious violence towards religious minorities?

Q9	Country and Gender											
	Bangladesh				Indonesia				Philippines			
	Male	Female	Other	Total	Male	Female	Other	Total	Male	Female	Other	Total
Never	7%	4%		6%	7%	4%		5%	5%	6%		5%
1	13%	8%	10%	11%	14%	10%		12%	14%	10%		12%
2	17%	14%	10%	16%	13%	15%	100%	14%	20%	20%	100%	20%
3	12%	13%	10%	13%	24%	24%		24%	29%	32%		31%
4	8%	12%	10%	10%	23%	27%		25%	16%	18%		17%
Extremely often	32%	34%	60%	33%	21%	21%		21%	16%	14%		15%

TABLE 22:

Q11. How often have you seen social media content (e.g. posts, tweets, videos, etc.) inciting religious violence towards women and girls?

Q11	Country and Gender											
	Bangladesh				Indonesia				Philippines			
	Male	Female	Other	Total	Male	Female	Other	Total	Male	Female	Other	Total
Never	19%	16%		17%	12%	7%		10%	10%	7%		9%
1	16%	9%	18%	12%	17%	13%		15%	16%	13%		14%
2	16%	14%	27%	15%	15%	15%	100%	15%	20%	23%	100%	22%
3	13%	13%		13%	24%	25%		24%	27%	27%		27%
4	11%	12%	9%	12%	17%	23%		20%	17%	17%		17%
Extremely often	26%	35%	45%	30%	14%	17%		16%	10%	12%		11%

So-called fake news, and vulnerability to it, was referred to by research participants in the context of discussions about violent extremism. The “fake news” was not always linked to or perceived to be disseminated by violent extremist groups, it was recognised. Likewise, other research has shown that violent images used to terrorise, generate hatred or manipulate the viewer in some other way have also been used by groups other than those commonly regarded as violent extremist groups, for instance

to broadcast and generate anti-Muslim sentiment (Quimpo 2016).

Participants mentioned the threat posed by social media to family and community. Participants argued children are not getting the discipline, moral guidance, love and attention from their parents (particularly their mother). This view that mother put their children at risk of being manipulated or recruited by violent extremism and other violent or criminal groups online, is pervasive as well as gender-biased.

4.5

EDUCATION AND SOCIO-ECONOMIC FACTORS

Offering financial incentives (including scholarships for children, especially *Toril* religious boarding schools) is an effective means of recruiting men, particularly impoverished men.

In interviews and focus groups, very few research participants suggested that being unable to afford a dowry would encourage men to join violent extremist groups, with some research participants actively disagreeing, although one research participant in Zamboanga said this could be a driving factor. Survey data, however, showed that just under a quarter of all respondents agreed or strongly agreed that young men join extremist groups to pay dowry, bride-price or to cover similar expenses associated with weddings and marriage. Survey data also showed significant minority support for the right of fathers to receive bride-price for their daughters, and this support was greater among men (22 per cent men and 11 per cent women).

Education institutions are sites where extremist recruitment occurs

Regarding the education sector and the role of educational establishments in the radicalisation of youths, participants referred to the role of the *Madrassa*, *Toril*, the university, and *Ushra* (a study circle) as being important sites where violent extremist recruitment occurs. Moreover, schooling and recruitment of the poor appear to be linked. One participant reported teenagers were recruited at a “live-in” *Toril* boarding school:

That is how recruitment began, after reading the Koran, they were taught how to use a gun. They are learning how to use guns and about the Koran according to a schedule. Like four days is for Koran and three days for military training. But the parents have no idea. Toril schooling was free. The parents only have to go to the school to give the pupils food.⁶³

Toril schools had a reputation as schools for the poor and disenfranchised, as well as “problem children” in Lanao del Sur. The recruitment of orphans being cared for at *Toril* schools to violent extremist groups was also noted. The same participant described *Toril* as a new phenomenon, different from the ordinary *madrassa* in the Southern Philippines. There was a perception that students from devotional schools might be targeted. A young female Islamic leader said that the violent extremists’ groups;

.... prefer to recruit the students coming from the Islamic institution like the Islamic institution where I studied because we know what the importance of Jihad is (also called the holy war)⁶⁴

However, participants also recognised that not all those who are radicalised are educated. Moreover, educational establishments can be sites and sources of discourses that challenge extremist ideologies and offer critical or alternative discourses.

Despite these apparently complex and conflicting drivers, there was broad agreement that those who are most vulnerable to being recruited or exploited by violent extremist groups were poor and young; young because they are more likely to be poor, seeking adventure, possibly more naïve, and more likely to be seduced by weapons or a sense of belonging to improve their self-image and self-confidence. Some suggested seeking revenge for what they and their family have suffered, or wanting to rebel against their family, can also motivate youths to join violent extremist groups. Several people also agreed that violent extremist groups take advantage of women who are poor with low levels of education, as well as those who are dissatisfied with their lives in some way.

63 Focus group discussion with professional women (082) in the Philippines: Lanao del Sur, October 2018

64 Key Interview with female Islamic youth leader (016) in the Philippines: Lanao del Sur, October 2018

4.6

THE ROLE OF PARENTS

Research explored the role of mothers and fathers in preventing violent extremism, building upon previous research conducted in Indonesia and Bangladesh (True et al. 2019), which demonstrated the often-overlooked importance of the role of parents and especially mother in preventing violent extremism. This research, therefore, sought to further test the role of mothers in preventing violent extremism as well as explore the role of fathers in preventing violent extremism, given the previous research had indicated that the father's role is regarded as less critical because they are less likely to be at home as much as the mother, partly because they are more likely to work outside the home.

Field research conducted in the Philippines showed that while “good men” were also considered to be “good fathers”, mothers continue to be regarded by many participants as the major factor affecting whether children are vulnerable or not to extremist ideologies. This is because many see the role of the mother as being critical to educating her children and teaching them right from wrong. These sentiments were notably prevalent among men:

*Women, specifically mothers, played an essential role in motivating children to be good citizens in society*⁶⁵

*Mothers are influential to their children. When the need arises, she would encourage her children to fight for revenge against perpetrators who have committed violence against the family*⁶⁶

*They teach their children what is right or wrong. There are lots of young recruited men who listen directly when their mother says something. The mothers don't exactly say to join this kind of [violent extremist] group but they go step-by-step in encouraging their children to join. For example, mothers explain to their children that they can benefit if they join these groups such as giving them education, the family will be one and won't separate*⁶⁷

*Mothers are responsible for educating as well as the formation of moral upbringing of the children. She can infuse values in her children whether good or negative, like hatred/anger and revenge.*⁶⁸

Most survey respondents from the sample (69 per cent) also agreed or strongly agreed that mothers can watch for signs that a son might join a violent extremist group, with slightly more women (72 per cent) than men (66 per cent) agreeing (see table 23). Most survey respondents (85 per cent) also agreed that it was important or extremely important to have a “strong mother” in a household.⁶⁹ More women (90 per cent) than men (82 per cent) agreed with this statement. Even more respondents consider it important or extremely important to have a caring mother in the household (87 per cent), with only 3.67 per cent considering it to be not important or not important at all.⁷⁰ Slightly more women (91 per cent) than men (84 per cent) agreed with this statement.

65 Male only focus group discussion (067) in the Philippines: Basilan, October 2018

66 Male only focus group discussion (067) in the Philippines: Basilan, October 2018

67 Mixed gender focus group discussion, some victims of the Marawi siege (079) in the Philippines: Lanao del Sur, October 2018

68 This was also reported in focus groups. For example, men only focus group discussion (067) in the Philippines: Basilan, October 2018

69 Q59: How important is it to have a strong mother in a household?

70 Q62: How important is it to have a caring mother in a household?

TABLE 23:

Q.63. For instance (...), told us: caring mothers know where their children are, and can watch for signs a son might join a violent extremist group. How much do you agree?

Q63	Country and Gender											
	Bangladesh				Indonesia				Philippines			
	Male	Female	Other	Total	Male	Female	Other	Total	Male	Female	Other	Total
Never	6%	9%	9%	7%	4%	1%		3%	6%	5%	100%	5%
2	4%	9%		6%	4%	1%		3%	4%	5%		5%
3	12%	14%	27%	13%	13%	12%		13%	24%	18%		21%
4	17%	18%	9%	17%	23%	30%		26%	28%	30%		29%
Strongly agree	62%	50%	55%	56%	56%	56%	100%	56%	38%	42%		40%

Mothers’ perceived roles in supporting or preventing violent extremism often relied on “hegemonic femininities”

The notion of the important role of the mother in preventing violent extremism often relied upon “hegemonic femininities” which saw the place of the mother as in the home, in complementary but subordinate position to her husband (Charlebois 2011).⁷¹ Some research participants attributed poverty or even advances towards gender equality with women increasingly working outside the home, as reasons for the increased radicalisation and violent extremism. So, while the agency and influence of the woman is recognised, it is sometimes only considered to be legitimate within the confines of her own home. These sentiments of hegemonic femininity and traditional gender roles as a bulwark against extremism were more common in older, male participants. As a group of older men stated:

When we go to the home, my mother was more powerful than my father was, she was the one telling and influencing all of us in the house. She was the one who is telling us to go to the school. We recognized very strongly the role of women in the situation that we are in now. It is very dangerous for women, not to play their role. Why our children are going way-ward, it’s because the absence of the mother in the house. Now, if the mother will not be around that is where the danger begins⁷²

Because the woman’s place was generally considered to be at home, being vigilante or observant (noticing any changes in behaviour or disquiet among children) and listening (given “children would normally open up to mothers rather than to fathers”⁷³) were important. Equally, it is often considered that a mother’s role is to provide moral guidance and loving support, so children know right from wrong and, so they do not attempt to find the sense of belonging outside the home.

71 Hegemonic femininity, according to Charlebois (2011, 30) is associated with domestic labour and caregiving in a complementary but subordinate relation to hegemonic, breadwinning masculinity. It is hegemonic in the reproduction of essentialized sex difference as natural but unequal social order

72 Focus group discussion with older men (073) in the Philippines: Zamboanga, October 2018

73 Key interviewee with a male Ulama (073) in the Philippines: Zamboanga, October 2018

Again, many participants but particularly men, suggested that challenges to the family (because of poverty, social media, as well as the absence of the mother) has contributed to the increased threat from violent extremism: “because there is no more love in the house, so they will bring their hatred outside”;⁷⁴ or “if there is a kind of a happy family life, there is less chance of extremism; the family that is well guarded and well provided for by parents will have less chances involving in violent extremism.”⁷⁵ Indeed, research has revealed that older, male participants perceived a link between motherly nurturing (or the lack thereof) and resilience against violent extremism (or vulnerability to extremist ideologies). These perceptions may not reflect reality at all, however, they are fuelling sexist and misogynistic attitudes in society. Broken families are also regarded as increasing the likelihood of children joining violent extremist groups:

*Some of the young people who get attracted and join violent extremism groups are those who come from a broken family. They are looking for care and love.*⁷⁶

“Caring fathers” are overlooked as actors in preventing violent extremism

A large number of participants said that men are more authoritative and influential, and this includes in the family home. For example, many participants said that in their home they follow the decision of the father rather than the mother. Many, however, agreed that both parents have a role to play in preventing violent extremism, including in the home in educating and guiding their children:

*The father is given the responsibility to ensure safety of the family and to prevent their son in joining violent group. This can be done by giving them proper education – while he spends quality time with the children, too.*⁷⁷

Survey material also indicated that people in the Philippines sample overwhelmingly support the notion of a strong father, with 83.04 per cent agreeing or strongly agreeing that a strong father is important in the household.⁷⁸ A similar proportion of respondents (84 per cent) also agreed or strongly agreed that caring fathers are important in the household (see table 24).⁷⁹ Interestingly, this is almost the same as the number of respondents who consider it extremely important or important to have strong mothers (85 per cent) and caring mothers (86.96 per cent) in the household. Of note, however, is that more people *strongly* agree that a caring father is important (68 per cent) than a strong father (64 per cent). Slightly more women than men *strongly* agree that it is important to have a strong (66 per cent compared with 62. per cent) and a caring father in the home (71.96 per cent compared with 65 per cent).

When asked whether they agree with the statement that “if a father is strong, and rules his family well, then his children won’t disobey him and join a violent extremist group”, most survey respondents agreed or strongly agreed (61 per cent), with almost identical proportions of men and women agreeing.⁸⁰

While many agreed educating and guiding children is a shared parental responsibility, many also recognised that domestic matters, including childcare, are still generally considered to be the responsibility of women. Nonetheless, research indicated an openness within the community to the concept of men participating

74 Mixed gender focus group discussion (071) in the Philippines: Zamboanga, October 2018?

75 Mixed gender focus group discussion civil society members (072) in the Philippines: Zamboanga 2018, October 2018

76 Key interview with a male Ulama (073) in the Philippines: Zamboanga, October 2018

77 Key interview with a male Ulama (073) in the Philippines: Zamboanga, October 2018

78 Q58: How important is it to have a strong father in a household?

79 Q60: How important is it to have a caring father in the household?

80 Q63: A number of people suggested that the presence of a strong father in the household would prevent his children from joining violent extremism groups. For instance, told us: “if a father is strong, and rules his family well, then his children won’t disobey him and join a violent extremist group”.

in domestic matters; coupled with guidance and education on good parenting, this may be achieved. In a discussion in Zamboanga, for instance, when asked how to prevent extremist beliefs, one woman said “we need to constantly monitor the activities of our family and our children”, while another said fathers need to “be sensitive, observant and responsible”.⁸¹ Participants also said the responsibility to check on children, during mealtimes, for instance, was the responsibility of both parents – as well as community leaders. The participation of men in domestic roles

may also be reinforced by the changing family social landscape where many of the women now leave home to work – either locally or abroad.

The important role of both parents in preventing violent extremism also appears to be recognised by some extremist groups, with some research participants recounting how some *madrassa* prevented children from returning to their families for holidays and turned them against their families if they weren’t supportive: “if your parents are against you, they are our enemy”.⁸²

TABLE 24:

Q 60. How important is it to have a caring father in the household?

Q60	Country and Gender											
	Bangladesh				Indonesia				Philippines			
	Male	Female	Other	Total	Male	Female	Other	Total	Male	Female	Other	Total
Never	3%	3%	9%	3%	1%	1%		1%	1%	1%		1%
2	2%	6%		4%	3%	0%		2%	4%	2%		3%
3	7%	12%	36%	10%	8%	7%		7%	13%	9%		11%
4	7%	12%		9%	16%	15%		16%	16%	15%		15%
Strongly agree	80%	67%	55%	74%	72%	77%	100%	74%	66%	73%		70%

81 Focus group discussion with older, educated women (074) in the Philippines: Zamboanga, October 2018

82 Men only focus group discussion (084) in the Philippines: Lanao del Sur. Clearly, the role of the family is critical in violent extremism and preventing violent extremism. This has also been identified in other research, which has referred to “radicalization as a deeply social process that is embedded in social relations, in feelings towards and connections with one’s family and community” (Casey and Pottebaum 2018)



COUNTRY ANALYSIS: BANGLADESH

Most focus group participants in Bangladesh had not encountered what they saw as violent extremism in their own lives. Survey results showed that a large percentage of respondents (48 per cent) were worried about violent extremism in their country. Participants in focus groups and interviews saw other forms of violence such as political and personal violence as relatively common, although they did not identify them as forms of extremism.⁸³ Religion was identified as being present within the spheres of radicalism, fundamentalism, extremism and violent extremism.

Definitions of extremism and extremist violence varied greatly, and included discussions of extremism, intolerance, unequal gender relations and other feelings of (gendered) insecurity. Within the discussions, terrorism, extremism and fundamentalism are used interchangeably to discuss violence as well as undesirable social forces. While most participants stated that extremist violence did not occur in their immediate surroundings, those who did respond to these questions discussed a variety of types of violence. Some mentioned the burning of houses of either Hindus or Muslims.⁸⁴ Others spoke of the ideology motivating extremists, in which “*Jongi* activity [militant or terrorist activity] is like imposing their own thoughts on other people”.⁸⁵ Some participants highlighted incidents of political violence during elections.⁸⁶ Political violence occurs, for example, in Satkhira province: “[a] few days back an elected Chairman was brutally killed by his opponents and then the people of the chairmen also killed the man behind that killing. This is also violent extremism”.⁸⁷ As such, we see that some participants also classified political violence as extremism.

Securitisation is experienced differently by men and women, with men assumed to be targets of scrutiny or arrest. One participant stated:

*I think boys get affected by this rather than girls. After several incidents related to extremism in recent years, we saw many boys cut off their beards to avoid any police harassment”.*⁸⁸

Another told a story of the targeting of young Muslim men in particular: “Recently a Hindu friend was arrested by the police; he had beard. When he disclosed his religious identity, they released him”.⁸⁹ This was reflected in the survey. Many participants in Bangladesh were worried about violent extremism, but men were slightly more worried (50 per cent) than women (46 per cent) (see table 25).⁹⁰

In some focus groups, by contrast with responses to the survey, gender equality was sometimes seen as form of extremism. At least one women’s rights activist interviewed in the study reiterated this view. A male participant, moreover, stated: “The girls are doing extreme things. Now we observe that girls have many boyfriends; they chat with different boys and have relationships with different boys in quick succession. These are bad practices”. One participant argued that fathers are also responsible for their daughters’ acts, “fathers who bought dresses for their daughters; they are supplying indecent dress

83 Key interview with a man and a woman, NGO workers (019) Bangladesh: Satkhira, November 2018

84 Women only focus group discussion (036) in Bangladesh: Satkhira, November 2018

85 Women only focus group discussion (047) in Bangladesh: Joypurhat, November 2018

86 Focus group discussion with married women (035) in Bangladesh: Satkhira, November 2018

87 Key interview with a man and a woman, NGO workers (019) Bangladesh: Satkhira, November 2018

88 Focus group discussion with young women (058) in Bangladesh: Kushtia, Islamic University, November 2018

89 Focus group discussion with young men (052) in Bangladesh: Dhaka Independent University, November 2018

90 Q55. I am worried about violent extremism in my country

for their daughters”. Another activist stated: “[A] factor is perception of people around women and girls. Intolerance is increased, when someone is out of traditional practice, she is also accused as extremist,”⁹¹ showing the use of the ‘extremism’ label to denote

women stepping outside the bounds of traditional feminine roles. Participant views in the qualitative field research provide some support for our survey findings on the connection between sexist and misogynistic attitudes and violent extremism.

TABLE 25:
Q55. I am worried about violent extremism in my country

Q55	Country and Gender											
	Bangladesh				Indonesia				Philippines			
	Male	Female	Other	Total	Male	Female	Other	Total	Male	Female	Other	Total
Strongly disagree	15%	19%	18%	17%	10%	6%	100%	8%	5%	4%	100%	4%
2	14%	12%	9%	13%	9%	8%		8%	9%	7%		8%
3	20%	23%	18%	22%	18%	17%		18%	25%	24%		24%
4	15%	13%	9%	14%	25%	29%		27%	25%	30%		28%
Strongly agree	35%	33%	45%	34%	38%	41%		39%	37%	35%		36%

⁹¹ Key interview with a female CEDAW expert and NGO leader (o23) in Bangladesh: Dhaka, February 2019

5.1

MALE LEADERSHIP AND GENDER RELATIONS

The concerns about women's mobility and male leadership shape women's opportunities outside the home, in both workplaces as well as political spaces. One young man raised the concern as a key barrier to women's participation in politics, saying: "Usually, if a woman works in a party (political or social organization) she may need to work until nightfall, which is a problem regarding safety and security. It is not suitable for a woman in the social context. I [as a man] can go anywhere, anytime, but a woman cannot".⁹² Therefore, when women wish to participate politically, they face approbation, violence, and risks.

Exclusion of women from public space is violently policed

The hostility to women in the political sphere is supported in survey data. Nearly half (46 per cent) of Bangladeshi men, and 38 per cent of Bangladeshi women surveyed agreed or strongly agreed that political leadership should largely be in the hands of men (see table 26).⁹³

Responses to the idea of women's participation in public spaces, including in politics and leadership positions, ranged from support in principal to strong objections. Some people outright rejected the idea. "Women should not be involved in politics; at best they can vote".⁹⁴ Responses from young men, were ambiguous, and seemed to rely on whether the participant had personal experience of women in his life being involved in leadership and political activities. Others seem to indicate that while there is no problem with women's participation in politics in a moral sense, women were simply not equipped with the skills or education to take part in such activities because of their confinement and/or association with the private sphere. Such

restrictions concur with findings from other research that some women are largely prevented from accessing the political sphere by family. Family members threaten or enact psychological and financial violence if female relatives attempt to vote or participate in politics (Paasilinna, Palmer-Wetherald, and Ritchie 2017).

Violence or insecurity was of particular concern to young women, who voiced concerns over personal safety in a variety of contexts outside the home: "Women are not safe"; "One of the major problems in Bangladesh is woman's safety. Girls have to be accompanied by a boy", otherwise they face frequent incidents of harassment, including stalking ("eve teasing") at universities as well as on public transport.⁹⁵ While participants did not link these feelings of insecurity to violent extremism, women's safety and security in public spaces is linked to political and religious notions of acceptable gender norms. It was also communicated through interviews with women's rights activists that when religious figures make public statements against women's mobility in public spaces, there are no official reactions against these statements.

92 Focus group discussion with young men (o43) in Bangladesh: Joypurhat, November 2018

93 Q34. The political leadership of a community should be largely in the hands of men

94 Focus group discussion with young men (o44) in Bangladesh: Joypurhat, November 2018

95 Focus group discussion with young women (o49) in Bangladesh: Dhaka Independent University, November 2018

TABLE 26:

Q34. The political leadership of a community should be largely in the hands of men: Three Countries

Q34	Country and Gender											
	Bangladesh				Indonesia				Philippines			
	Male	Female	Other	Total	Male	Female	Other	Total	Male	Female	Other	Total
Strongly disagree	24%	25%	9%	25%	11%	16%		13%	13%	27%		20%
2	10%	15%		12%	11%	19%		15%	14%	20%		17%
3	19%	21%	18%	20%	27%	28%		27%	32%	30%		31%
4	17%	15%	18%	16%	24%	23%		24%	23%	16%		19%
Strongly agree	30%	23%	55%	27%	27%	14%	100%	20%	19%	8%		14%

Baseline attitudes can be sexist, especially among men; “backlash” is politicised by extremist groups

More broadly, it is worth noting that gender politics are burning issues in Bangladesh and have been for decades (Kabeer 1991). There have been contestations over women’s access to the public sphere and resources. A popular Islamist grouping, Hefazat-e-Islam “was established in 2010 precisely to oppose government plans to give women the same rights of inheritance as men” (Griffiths and Hasan 2015). One women’s rights activists said that preachers often take an anti-women agenda, with some even spreading “hate speech” against women.⁹⁶ Backlash at women’s rights was observed in some focus groups. For instance, one young man at the Islamic University complained that women were not adhering to Islamic dress codes, abusing their new freedoms, and in general had more advantages than men:

Bangladesh is a Muslim dominated society; it is not possible to adopt western culture in our society. We can move forward maintaining our religious

values. Discrimination is on both sides. Woman misuses the freedom; Muslim women are advised to dress in purdah (veil) but they are not following the instructions. They are enjoying many more amenities than men. There are laws on violence against woman but where should a man go if he is abused?⁹⁷

Anti-women sentiments are prevalent, with significant gender differences in the survey data, with 44 per cent of men and 34 per cent of women agreeing or strongly agreeing that many women are seeking special favours, such as preferential treatment or alimony after divorce that favour them over men, under the guise of asking for “equality” (see table 27).⁹⁸ Bangladeshi (32 per cent) and Indonesian women (41 per cent) disagreed with this sexist sentiment, whereas Bangladeshi men (32 per cent) agreed with the statement.

Such views have historically been promoted by fundamentalist groups such as Jemaat-i-Islami, finding resonance in broader social and political struggles (Shehabuddin 2008). As one women’s rights activist said:

96 Key Interview with a women’s rights activist (o23) in Bangladesh: Dhaka, February 2019

97 Focus group discussion with young men (o59) in Bangladesh: Kushtia, Islamic University, November 2018

98 Q30. Many women are actually seeking special favors, such as preferential treatment or alimony after divorce that favor them over men, under the guise of asking for “equality”

TABLE 27:

Q30. Many women are actually seeking special favours, such as preferential treatment or alimony after divorce that favour them over men, under the guise of asking for “equality”: Three Countries

Q30	Country and Gender											
	Bangladesh				Indonesia				Philippines			
	Male	Female	Other	Total	Male	Female	Other	Total	Male	Female	Other	Total
Strongly disagree	16%	31%	9%	23%	12%	20%		16%	7%	10%		9%
2	16%	14%	18%	15%	14%	21%		17%	12%	18%		15%
3	25%	21%		23%	30%	29%		29%	34%	34%	100%	34%
4	18%	17%	36%	18%	24%	19%	100%	22%	29%	23%		26%
Strongly agree	26%	17%	36%	22%	21%	11%		16%	18%	15%		17%

The main challenge is ideology, fundamentalist ideology is spread in the society, spread everywhere. When we do fieldwork, people say, “beating wives is granted in the religion”. How can we challenge this? They even said: “Heaven lies under the foot of husband”, or “Four marriages are allowed in the religion.” Religious references are always made to justify individual interests. The main challenge of development sector is to work with marginalized women who are facing religious extremism.

Women’s rights also seem to be understood as a threat in the face of expanding women’s rights. As one women’s rights activist detailed: “When we talked with a minister... he said, ‘I also support the equal rights in inheritance, but you know it is a Muslim majority country, I cannot go on something which will create serious repercussions’”.⁹⁹ Thus, there are overlaps between Islamist and/or religious mobilization against women’s rights.

Women’s rights activists see a clear connection between violent extremism, fundamentalism, and conservative gender norms. The idea that violent extremists do mobilise on gender issues has some salience in the

wider population too. While most people are sceptical of these motivations, 34 per cent of male respondents, and 31 per cent of female respondents agree that men join violent extremist groups because these groups support ideas like women should be obedient to their husbands, and, women should prioritise their families, not paid work.¹⁰⁰

Women’s rights activists also pointed to a larger issue of the (at times violent) mobilization of religious groups in the face of progress on women’s rights issues. Further, they pointed to a “politics of compromise” when it comes to women’s rights, in which the inaction on gender inequality or the adoption of international norms and treaties (like lifting reservations from CEDAW commitments) is justified by saying that “society isn’t ready”.¹⁰¹ While many people in Bangladesh (41 per cent) are worried about the effect of rising religious fundamentalism on women’s rights, many people also think that women’s rights activists are seeking for women to have power over men. Women across all three countries were more afraid of shrinking women’s rights than men were, by about five percentage points (see table 28).

99 Key interview with a women’s rights expert (o21) in Bangladesh: Dhaka, February 2019

100 Q47. Men join violent extremist groups because these groups support ideas like women should be obedient to their husbands, and, women should prioritise their families, not paid work

101 Key interview with a women’s rights expert (o25) in Bangladesh: Dhaka, February 2019

Men across all three countries, on the other hand, were more worried that women’s rights activists were seeking for women to have power over men. In Bangladesh, the gender differences within the country were more marked, with 46 per cent of men suspicious of activists, while 45 per cent of women disagreed or strongly disagreed that women’s rights activists promoting female supremacy (see table 29). For some women’s rights activists on the other hand, majority opinion can endanger women’s rights:

The majority are violent towards the minority; not only for religion but also for their opinions. We have seen how the bloggers were hacked to death; these bloggers are also in fear. Women are getting involved in the job market and politics and that is why some forces are trying to push them back.¹⁰²

TABLE 28:

Q54. I am afraid that religious fundamentalism will impede women’s rights (e.g. ability to work, voicing their opinion in public) Three Countries

Q54	Country and Gender											
	Bangladesh				Indonesia				Philippines			
	Male	Female	Other	Total	Male	Female	Other	Total	Male	Female	Other	Total
Strongly disagree	26%	21%	18%	24%	17%	11%		14%	9%	9%		9%
2	13%	15%	9%	14%	16%	13%	100%	14%	15%	11%	100%	13%
3	22%	21%	18%	21%	28%	27%		27%	34%	34%		34%
4	15%	14%	18%	15%	22%	25%		23%	26%	26%		26%
Strongly agree	24%	30%	36%	27%	18%	24%		21%	16%	19%		18%

TABLE 29:

Q28. Women’s rights activists are seeking for women power over men: Three Countries

Q28	Country and Gender											
	Bangladesh				Indonesia				Philippines			
	Male	Female	Other	Total	Male	Female	Other	Total	Male	Female	Other	Total
Strongly disagree	20%	34%	10%	26%	17%	21%		19%	13%	16%		15%
2	12%	11%	10%	12%	20%	24%		22%	12%	20%		16%
3	23%	20%	10%	21%	29%	25%	100%	27%	33%	29%		31%
4	17%	16%	10%	16%	20%	19%		20%	25%	26%		26%
Strongly agree	28%	19%	60%	24%	14%	11%		12%	16%	9%		13%

102 Key Interview with women’s rights activists (o22) in Bangladesh Dhaka: February, 2019

Masculinity comprises paid work but shifting labor patterns threaten male hegemony

Gender divisions of labour between men and women makes up an important part of cultural identity and informs the roles that men and women play within households as well as within society at large. While these norms are changing in new generations, the survey results show that conservative views regarding behaviour, mobility and codes of dress are still mainstream, especially among men. Male breadwinners were endorsed more strongly by men in Bangladesh, with 53 per cent of male survey respondents supporting men as self-sacrificing breadwinners, compared to only 40 per cent of female respondents (see table 30).

Most concepts of masculinity rested on traditional notions, including being able to provide financially for the family as described above. Men were also understood to be physically stronger. When asked about ideal husbands (for themselves or for their daughters), some of the women responded that the man should be educated, well-mannered,¹⁰³ and (some said) religious.

In FGDs, a significant number of both male and female participants considered the gender division of labour acceptable within their families. One female participant commented, “not everyone can do everything, this is normal. My father works outside the home and my mother at home. My father cannot do child rearing like my mother”. In the data on relationships and roles between men and women within households, many of the participants (both men and women) discussed the division of labour, in which men are in principle, the primary breadwinners and women are managers of the household, which includes household expenditure. Some said:

*Men’s responsibility is to earn for the family and the woman’s duty is to manage the family.*¹⁰⁴

Men’s responsibility is to bring money from outside and women’s responsibility is to produce the usefulness of their income.

*Household work is mother’s main task and outside work is father’s main task.*¹⁰⁵

There is also ambiguity to these statements, where men controlled the money, even if women earned it: “Who else! Our husband! We have to put it in their hands; the ‘women cannot keep the money’ with them”.¹⁰⁶

TABLE 30:

Q. 37 Men should be willing to sacrifice their own well-being in order to provide financially for the women in their lives: Three Countries

Q30	Country and Gender											
	Bangladesh				Indonesia				Philippines			
	Male	Female	Other	Total	Male	Female	Other	Total	Male	Female	Other	Total
Strongly disagree	14%	28%		21%	5%	6%		6%	6%	7%		7%
2	11%	13%		12%	10%	9%		9%	8%	11%	100%	9%
3	22%	18%	27%	20%	27%	28%		27%	27%	27%		27%
4	15%	16%	36%	16%	30%	32%	100%	31%	29%	26%		27%
Strongly agree	37%	24%	36%	31%	29%	24%		26%	30%	29%		29%

103 Focus group discussion with young women (038) in Bangladesh: Satkhira, November 2018

104 Focus group discussion with young women (038) in Bangladesh: Satkhira, November 2018

105 Focus group discussion with young men (032) in Bangladesh Satkhira, November 2018

106 Focus group discussion with young women (038) in Bangladesh: Satkhira, November 2018

The research participants highlighted that extremists use existing notions of masculinity that society and religious institutions support. In other words, the image of a good man that the society creates is also used by the extremists. For instance, participants stated that the extremist who was killed in the cross fire in Joypurhat by the law enforcing agency, was pious and very well-behaved person.¹⁰⁷ As well as providing materially, men ought to provide physical security: “men are the protectors of their families” and “men protect their families. I really felt it after my husband died.

Moreover, participants also highlighted that the situation was changing because of the demands of a modern economy. In Joypurhat, for instance, women were heads of households while their husbands worked away, largely in the Gulf States (Bundeszentrale fuer politische Bildung, 2015). Changing gender roles was viewed either negatively or positively, largely correlating to the generational status of the participant. As one young female participant said: “girls are not confined in the house anymore”. However, their ability to engage in opportunities outside the home, or to not veil, depended very much on permission of a head of household (usually male). Some of the older women lamented changes in younger generation, as manifested in the behaviour of daughters-in-law.

In discussions regarding decision-making within households, most participants stated that while fathers were pre-eminent, decisions were largely made in consultative manner, with the opinions of the mother and father, and at times the children, being considered. Some participants did stress that the “male takes the decision”, or the “father or oldest son”, but again with advice from the other parent, as well as others in the family.¹⁰⁸

Some participants suggested male control over the household was due to men’s greater skills or a different “mentality”. One young woman at the Islamic university suggested that male decision making was rational and religiously condoned: “According to the Islamic view, a woman’s emotional state is different from the male, so they depend on their partner in major issues”.¹⁰⁹ Several women and men used religion to justify women’s subjugation and men’s dominance:

*From a religious perspective, according to the Hadith, before making any major decision you must discuss it with women, but men will take the decision. According to one Hadith the community will be destroyed if women lead. As a Muslim, as much as I believe in Koran, I must believe in the Hadith.*¹¹⁰

107 Focus group discussion with young men (043) in Bangladesh: Joypurhat, November 2018

108 Focus group discussion with young men (034) in Bangladesh: Satkhira, November 2018

109 Focus group discussion with young women (049a) in Bangladesh: Dhaka Independent University, November 2018

110 Focus group discussion with young men (060) in Bangladesh: Kushtia Islamic University, November 2018

5.2

WOMEN'S EXTREMIST PARTICIPATION

Some participants mentioned the role of women in extremist or terrorist activity. The role of women in extremist groups was discussed into two ways: as active participants and as supporters. The first role was raised as a growing phenomenon. Some stated that women can engage in these groups because women members of extremist groups get the benefit of the doubt when “they wear ‘Burqa’ or ‘Hizab’”.¹¹¹

One participant shared an anecdote which detailed the active nature of women’s roles in violent extremist groups and the specific access women could get into people’s homes:

In 2001, I saw a girl in Shyamnagar, Satkhira, walking with a laptop, she was going door to door to talk to the women and showing them religious videos.¹¹²

Others also explain how women are less likely to be checked by security forces on the street than men, and that this is commonly understood by people.¹¹³ Participants frequently acknowledged seeing news reports of women’s involvement in violent extremist groups, but struggled to explain the women’s motivations.¹¹⁴ Survey results from Bangladesh are split between those who think women are forced to join violent extremist groups by male relatives (42 per cent) and those who think women join of their own volition (36.26 per cent).¹¹⁵

Other participants also discussed how women may not be active in their extremism, but rather help these groups in different ways. Interestingly, a young man in Satkhira told the story of a wife who pushed her husband to attend a Jamaat meeting. Activists also outlined the coercive way in which some women may

find themselves working in support of violent extremist groups, which would come as a result of gender norms that emphasise obedience in wives and daughters:

Both males and females are vulnerable. But for women, just think of a girl who has a father or husband believing in fundamentalism and the girl does not have information. These girls or women are in more vulnerable situation as they cannot get out of the situation easily.¹¹⁶

111 Focus group discussion with young men (o51) in Bangladesh: Dhaka Independent University Dhaka, November 2018

112 Key Interview with a women’s rights activist, (o24) in Bangladesh: Dhaka, February 2018

113 Focus group discussion with young women (o53) in Bangladesh: Dhaka Independent University Dhaka, November 2018

114 Focus group discussion with young women (o61) in Bangladesh: Dhaka Independent University, November 2018

115 Q48. When women join a violent extremist group, it is because they are forced or pressured by male family members or their religious leader.

116 Key interview with a women’s rights expert (o22) in Bangladesh: Dhaka, February 2019

5.3

MARRIAGE, VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN AND GIRLS, AND EXTREMIST VIOLENCE

Little is known about the role of marriage in violent extremist recruitment, networking or financing strategies in Bangladesh. By their nature, marriages are considered private matters, and violent extremists do not openly discuss their lives. However, it is plausible that groups do provide support to members to get married, as these costs are significant in Bangladesh.

In terms of networking, for example, a newspaper did note that “JMB Militants Use Marriage as Survival Tool” wherein polygamous marriages gave the men up to four wives’ houses to hide at, according to a former member (Benarnews.org 2016). Finally, the role of marriage as a recruitment tool for women violent extremism is little understood beyond the headlines (News.com.au 2018). Interviewees from women’s rights NGOs pointed to the practice of multiple marriages in quick succession for women within violent extremist groups (after the death of a husband/fighter) as a sign of violence against women or rape. This also points to a practice in which there is the continued guarantee of a spouse as part of the membership of a violent extremist group:

ISIS is using girls as sex slaves, the same thing here. In Azimpur (an area of Dhaka city, Bangladesh) we have seen recently that one woman, after his husband was dead, she married another member of the group; she was married 3 or 4 times to the people of the same extremist group. She was a sex slave. People may have motivated her that she will reach ‘heaven’ through this kind of acts and she did not have proper information.¹¹⁷

This may play a part in the recruitment of both men and women into violent extremist groups. Deeper research is needed to understand the gender dynamics of marriage and violent extremism in Bangladesh.

Most participants across all four research sites stated that child marriage very rarely occurred, though there were some disagreements about which age was ideal for marriage for both boys and girls. This ranged from 16 years of age up to 23 or 24.¹¹⁸ The consensus that early marriage is decreasing is also belied by the statistics showing little change, with 22 per cent of girls married before they turn 15, and a majority (59 per cent) before they are 18 years old (UNFPA 2018). The survey showed that although two thirds of Bangladeshi people disagreed with marrying a daughter under 16 years old, 22 per cent of people supported a father’s right to so.¹¹⁹ Support for father’s right to marry-off his daughter was higher among Bangladeshi women than men (see table 31).

Attitudes to dowry varied. Some said that it is deemed as a gift or a contribution to the new household (in the form of furniture or appliances). Others suggested that dowry must be in the form of gifts because the practice has been outlawed

117 Key interview with a women’s rights activist (023) in Bangladesh: Dhaka, February 2018

118 Focus group discussion with married women (035) in Bangladesh: Satkhira, November 2018

119 Q76. A father is entitled to marry his daughter to a man of his choosing, even if his daughter is under 16 years old

TABLE 31:

A father is entitled to marry his daughter to a man of his choosing, even if his daughter is under 16 years old: Three Countries

Q76	Country and Gender											
	Bangladesh				Indonesia				Philippines			
	Male	Female	Other	Total	Male	Female	Other	Total	Male	Female	Other	Total
Strongly disagree	56%	49%	9%	52%	54%	61%		57%	54%	73%		63%
2	9%	12%	9%	10%	14%	13%	100%	13%	10%	6%		8%
3	14%	15%	18%	14%	16%	14%		15%	18%	12%	100%	15%
4	9%	10%	27%	10%	9%	7%		8%	12%	6%		9%
Strongly agree	12%	14%	36%	13%	7%	5%		6%	7%	4%		5%

in Bangladesh since 1980: “If they want directly it will be defined as dowry which is a crime. If you can manage as a gift it is safer. So, there are hidden stories behind [dowry]”.¹²⁰

Education and dowry costs (Shahidul 2014), as well as fear of young girls being sexually harassed or assaulted increase the rates of child marriage in Bangladesh. Several male participants pointed to the economic causes of early marriage.¹²¹ Younger brides have lower dowry costs for their parents (Shahidul 2014). The same group of young men suggested some men like to marry younger girls as they can “dominate and control [them]”.¹²² There was also a very wide range in what was expected as dowry payment. At least one lac (USD \$1,191) was cited a few times, with one participant saying poor families had to pay at least one lac and rich families demanding 3-5 lac (USD \$3,500 to \$6,000), although higher sums were also mentioned.¹²³ Another point to highlight is the policing of gender

roles and norms regarding dowry, behaviour and mobility, and the significant role that older women (the bride’s mothers-in-law) play in ensuring these norms are adhered to.¹²⁴

A significant number of people highlighted dowry as a catalyst for abuse and domestic violence. For instance, one participant said that dowry must be given to protect girl children: “girl’s parents must give dowry to the boy’s family. Sometime girls are pressurized to suicide, some get divorced, some face violence.” Even more explicitly, one young woman said:

Naturally one does not ask for anything, then after certain period of the marriage, the husband will be disrespectful towards his wife. Sometime husband abuses the wife and pressure her to bring money from her father. In some case, they don’t ask for dowry at first but after marriage they pressurize the bride’s family for money.¹²⁵

120 Focus group discussion with young women (046) in Bangladesh: Joypurhat, November 2018

121 Focus group discussion with young men (041) in Bangladesh: Joypurhat, November 2018; and focus group discussion with young women (045) in Bangladesh, Joypurhat, November 2018

122 Focus group discussion with young men (041) in Bangladesh: Joypurhat, November 2018

123 Focus group discussion with young men (043) in Bangladesh Joypurhat, November 2018

124 Focus group discussion with married women (036) in Bangladesh: Satkhira, November 2018

125 Focus group discussion with young women (046) in Bangladesh: Joypurhat, November 2018

Another young woman participant said:

*Each and every parent knows that their daughter may be at a risk of getting abused because of dowry. Everyone tries to provide dowry according to their means. Whatever the law is, dowry and child marriage become a tradition or norm in our society.*¹²⁶

Women in Bangladesh have minimal access to shelter from family violence. One woman described how the daughter-in-law of the family she lodges with faced ongoing domestic violence. The victim had no way to leave, “Where does an adult woman seek shelter, how will we look at this aspect? Who is at fault?”¹²⁷

Correlations from the countrywide survey in Bangladesh extend and strengthen the empirical connection between gender regressive views and

violent extremism. For men in Bangladesh, there was a weak to moderate relationship between having hostile sexist views (as defined in the annex), and support for violent extremism ($r = .316$). Relatedly, there was a very strong relationship ($r = .503$) between men and women who agreed that men have the right to physically or sexually assault their wives and men who supported violent extremism.

Somewhat surprisingly, analysis shows that the relationship between gender regressive views, especially attitudes to violence against women, and support for violent extremism is even stronger for Bangladeshi women than Bangladeshi men. Hostile sexist views in Bangladeshi women were strongly and positively correlated with support for violent extremism ($r = .582$).

126 Focus group discussion with young women (046) in Bangladesh: Joypurhat, November 2018

127 Focus group discussion with young women (049b) in Bangladesh: Dhaka Independent University, November 2018

5.4

VEILING AND DRESS

Veiling can be enforced through social pressure and (the threat of) violence

Veiling (or *hijab/hizab*) and/or dressing modestly and/or *purdah* was important to both men and women participants in several different ways; as a way of being a Bangladeshi or expressing cultural identity, as a part of being a Muslim woman and adhering to the related criteria of behaviour, and as a way of ensuring safety while in public spaces. Women's rights activists pointed to the growing pressure to veil, citing the movement of migrant workers between Bangladesh and the Middle East as one factor in its popularity.¹²⁸ The increasing role of political Islam in Bangladeshi politics, resulting in de-secularization was cited as another.¹²⁹ Relatedly, hegemonic femininity was understood to be behaviourally driven and related to being "obedient", being soft-natured, religiously minded and also following the rules of *purdah* (relating to both dress and behaviour).¹³⁰ This includes: "Islamic dress code of women that is, *purdah*), and should not talk with any male to whom her relation is unauthorised by the norm of Islam".¹³¹ Some of the young men in the study also articulated that not abiding by these rules was the reason some women faced insecurity or harassment.¹³² Some participants repeated the common myth that a lack of veiling may incite men to commit sexual violence:

*If a woman dresses modestly then no one will disturb her or even look at her. In Bangladesh modesty is preferred. According to Islamic rules woman have no provision to wear open dress. Suppose in Bangladesh if anyone dress like the women dress in the USA there is a chance of rape.*¹³³

There were some differences in how concerns regarding dress and behaviour of women were addressed by male and female participants. 'Dress' was considered as a major cause for increased sexual harassment by male participants and some female participants also considered women and girls need to dress properly following religious and social values. A significant number of participants suggested that women must dress in a certain way (not "Western") and women who go outside will be gossiped about.¹³⁴ Threats of sexual and gender-based violence accompany this policing of the public sphere. Several men told us that if women went outside without covering up, they would be considered targets of rape.¹³⁵

Veiling can make women targets of violence

Wearing a veil is also politicised and related to persecution and counter terrorism strategies. Women described not veiling or wearing a hijab after a terrorist incident in order to avoid difficult/violent situations. For example, after the Ramu incident¹³⁶ in 2012 one woman spoke about her family's reaction: "After the "Ramu" incident my

128 Focus group discussion with a women's rights activist (o21) in Bangladesh: Dhaka, February 2019

129 Focus group discussion with a women's rights activist (o22) in Bangladesh: Dhaka, February 2019

130 Focus group discussion with married women (o36) in Bangladesh: Satkhira, November 2018

131 Focus group discussion with young men (o34) in Bangladesh: Satkhira, November 2018

132 Focus group discussion with young men (o59) in Bangladesh: Kushtia, Islamic University, November 2018

133 Focus group discussion with young men (o34) in Bangladesh: Satkhira, November 2018

134 Focus group discussion with young women (o46) in Bangladesh: Joypurhat, November 2018

135 Focus group discussion with young men (o34) in Bangladesh: Satkhira, November 2018

136 The Ramu incident here refers to attacks on Buddhist places of worship as well as homes in 2012 in the area of Ramu (District of Cox's Bazar). The violence occurred in retaliation to an alleged desecration of a Koran by member of the Buddhist community, which turned out to be false.

mother requested me not to wear any Hizab. After some day's police captured those people who had beard. That time my mother again requested me to quit Hizab (Hijab)".¹³⁷ Women disclosed stories of insecurity or harassment, as well as stories where the presence of women meant that police were less likely to approach a group of youth.

*When my friend had no driving license, he told me [a young woman] to sit beside him. I replied, 'why would I sit there?' he replied that police usually do not check if a lady is sitting in the car. Indeed, if police come to check us, we told them we are female, so please don't do that. Then they will leave us alone, without any hesitation.*¹³⁸

137 Focus group discussion with young women (049b) in Bangladesh: Dhaka Independent University, November 2018

138 Focus group discussion with young women (053) in Bangladesh: Dhaka Independent University Dhaka, November 2018

5.5

RECRUITMENT

Corruption and unemployment fuels resentment and incentivises extremist participation

Many of the responses to questions regarding recruitment and the vulnerability of young people focused on joblessness and other frustrations that stemmed from unemployment. However, participants also noted that vulnerability to recruitment messaging may not always be a socio-economic issue, as there are cases where wealthy individuals have committed extremist violence in Bangladesh. In 2018, this frustration led to the Quota reform movement, which demanded an end to public service employment for selected groups according to quotas.¹³⁹ This reform movement was mentioned by a number of research participants at universities, who explained that the majority of the student body had been supportive of the reforms,¹⁴⁰ but also that they felt frustration at the reaction to their movement.¹⁴¹ As such, frustration relating to access to jobs is an area that inspires both grievances against the government as well as political organising to voice these grievances.

We see frustration increasing in the society. The student dreams for a good job after completing the study but in the job market they found enormous corruption. That makes the young generation frustrated.”¹⁴²

Participants thought those seen to be missing out were predominantly young men, although women suffer a far greater rate of exclusion from

paid employment in Bangladesh. A wider issue in Bangladesh also relates to difficulties in finding work post-education, and the corruption that has led to these difficulties. In one FGD, a parent highlighted the fact that many young men could not access work because of demands of bribes during the interview: “My son is educated but till did not get any job. He goes for the interviews and then there is a demand of bribe about twenty lac (~USD \$23,810)”.¹⁴³ Conversely, this frustration can stem from unmet expectations of demands, needs or expectations of the state, and so is not solely related to joblessness. As one young man phrased it: “The highly educated can also be terrorists. If the government cannot satisfy their demands, they will take revenge”.¹⁴⁴

Participants also mentioned ideology and false beliefs as part of a repertoire for recruitment, generally saying that people with strong religious beliefs are targeted, then brainwashed with false ideas about religion, “partial analysis” and violence.¹⁴⁵ Most participants were adamant that a violent *interpretation* of religion that created terrorism, rather than religion itself. A key concern was that acts of terrorism harm the country itself, but also give Islam a bad name by association. Participants said: “There are both positive and negative sides of religion, but the extremists impose, in negativity more”,¹⁴⁶ or, they explained that extremism occurs when there is both a lack of understanding of religious teachings, as well as other forces at play, such as this young woman from Dhaka:

139 The quotas in question involve appointments for 56% of entry-level positions in government jobs. The quota means that those roles are allocated thus: 30% to children and grandchildren of freedom fighters from the Bangladesh Liberation War (1971), 10% for women, 10% to those coming from under-developed districts, 5% for ethnic minorities/indigenous communities and 1% for people with disabilities. The quota reform movement, which began in Dhaka University, asked for a reduction of the quota to 10% overall.

140 Focus group discussion with young women (062) in Bangladesh: Kushtia, Islamic University, November 2018

141 Focus group discussion with young men (055) in Bangladesh: Kushtia, Islamic University, November 2018

142 Focus group discussion with young women (057) in Bangladesh: Kushtia, Islamic University, November 2018

143 Focus group discussion with young men (042) in Bangladesh: Joypurhat, November 2018

144 Focus group discussion with young men (034) in Bangladesh: Satkhira, November 2018

145 Focus group discussion with young men (059) in Bangladesh: Kushtia, Islamic University, November 2018

146 Focus group discussion with young women (049b) in Bangladesh: Dhaka Independent University, November 2018

*There are misinterpretations, fanatic attitude, and improper knowledge on religion. Because of religious illiteracy from childhood, people are easily misled into militancy. Incidents we saw recently were an organized act of brainwashing. These boys were recruited for fulfilling others' goals.*¹⁴⁷

Transnational politics was linked to extremist recruitment within a larger national and transnational context by some focus group participants¹⁴⁸ and to actors such as intelligence agencies, politicians, international governments. Participants in several research sites expressed that 'violent extremism' has a strong linkage with politics and some of them strongly suggested that recent growth of ISIS or increased radical Islam is part of 'geo-politics'. A significant number of male participants consider 'media' as a major cause for the rise of violent extremism.

Violent messaging used to increase support for violent extremism is common

Social media was identified as linked to violent extremism. This connection was made clear in the survey results, even with on average low internet use in Bangladesh, especially among women (UN Women 2018). Nearly a third of men (28 per cent) and 40 per cent of women reported seeing content inciting violent jihad often or extremely often (see table 32).¹⁴⁹

Digital space was also reported as being used to spread political messaging, religious intolerance, and extremism, including posts from Hefazat-E-Islam, focus group participants said. As one participant explained, "The uses of social media is increasing, [intolerant/violent messaging] incident is also increasing. These are communicated by social media

all the time and there is a regular brain wash".¹⁵⁰ Messaging about religion and behavioural norms were common and included discussions in social media about 'haram' behaviour. In one example a participant noted seeing comments explain that it was "haram to eat sweets from the Hindus during Puja (Hindu Ritual) and haram from the Muslim to go on Puja".¹⁵¹ Another explained that "there are some content which provoke religious extreme thoughts".¹⁵²

Social media content was also understood by participants to have an impact on the general feeling of a community and able to incite reactions from people within the community. One participant gave the example of content that showed experiences of Rohingya people: "some old videos are made viral in time of occurrence of an event like repression of Rohingya in Myanmar. Such posting ignites mass anger".¹⁵³ Another stated that videos can be vague but still incite anger, "Sometimes we found that unknown community just attacked the Muslim, or they broke the idols et cetera. That turned into riots".¹⁵⁴ The reporting on the suffering of the Muslim Rohingya refugees and war victims was used to increase support for violent extremist groups in Indonesia.

Women's use of the internet is policed

In FGDs, participants raised concerns relating to the use of social media or digital spaces. Participants described the frequent use of mobile phones and of various social media platforms. The sentiment that social media contained a great deal of fake news was widespread. As one participant explained, "Yes that happens; they spread fake stories and provide edited photos to make the story believable. Sometimes because of this we have unrest

147 Focus group discussion with young men (049c) in Bangladesh: Dhaka Independent University, November 2018

148 Focus group discussion with young men (049c) in Bangladesh: Dhaka Independent University, November 2018

149 Q77. How often have you seen social media content (eg. Post, tweets, videos, etc.) inciting violent jihad?

150 Focus group discussion with young women (054) in Bangladesh: Dhaka Independent University, November 2018

151 Focus group discussion with young women (038) in Bangladesh: Satkhira, November 2018

152 Focus group discussion with young women (049) in Bangladesh: Kushtia, Islamic University, November 2018

153 Focus group discussion with young men (059) in Bangladesh: Kushtia, Islamic University, November 2018

154 Focus group discussion with young women (061) in Bangladesh: Dhaka Independent University, November 2018

TABLE 32:

Q77. How often have you seen social media content (e.g. posts, tweets, videos, etc.) inciting violent jihad? Three countries

Q77	Country and Gender											
	Bangladesh				Indonesia				Philippines			
	Male	Female	Other	Total	Male	Female	Other	Total	Male	Female	Other	Total
Never	32%	25%	9%	28%	12%	8%		10%	17%	17%		17%
1	15%	11%		13%	16%	12%	100%	14%	17%	16%	100%	16%
2	15%	10%	27%	13%	15%	13%		14%	20%	26%		23%
3	11%	14%	18%	13%	21%	26%		23%	25%	23%		24%
4	8%	11%	9%	9%	21%	24%		23%	13%	11%		12%
Extremely often	20%	29%	36%	24%	15%	16%		16%	9%	8%		9%

situation.”¹⁵⁵ The use of social media is also gender-specific, and some participants explained the gender norms behind this disparity: “a girl does not get a smart phone if it is not that much emergency, whereas a boy gets it very easily. Family does not allow a girl to use gadgets to restrict them from having affairs”, a finding backed up in empirical studies (UN Women 2018).¹⁵⁶ Another participant tells a chilling anecdote, blaming social media and technology for male sexual violence rather than men’s behaviour and gender norms:

A girl from a poor family died five days ago in our area, as a result of mobile phone she had her fate like this. The girl was called by her so-called boyfriend to Satkhira for medical check-up. The doctor was not available in the chamber then a group of boys took her, and she was gang raped and then killed. We don’t know whether the poor father have managed to file any case. She was brutally

*tortured; those boys must have taken drugs before acting. That woman had a child. See what kind of thing ‘mobile’ is!*¹⁵⁷

Attitudes to social media were mixed, and often negative. Many were suspicious of the sexual freedom and licentiousness associated with social media. Some participants made remarks regarding the use of mobile phones and social media to talk to members of the opposite sex.¹⁵⁸ Some participants also noted that Facebook was a way for individuals and groups to share religious ideology that promotes more conservative gender norms, including relating to dress codes and veiling. Further, young women also noted the use of social media to intimidate or blackmail using photographs, explaining: “We know that some people spread bad pictures on the internet and sometimes blackmail others,”¹⁵⁹ or “You will definitely see it in social media, there is always harassment of girls there.”¹⁶⁰

155 Focus group discussion with young men (052) in Bangladesh: Dhaka Independent University, November 2018

156 Focus group discussion with young men (059) in Bangladesh: Kushtia, Islamic University, November 2018

157 Focus group discussion with young men in Community Action Group (037) in Bangladesh Satkhira, November 2018

158 Women only focus group discussion (036) in Bangladesh: Satkhira, November 2018

159 Women only focus group discussion (047) in Bangladesh: Joypurhat, November 2018

160 Focus group discussion with young women (049) in Bangladesh: Kushtia, Islamic University, November 2018

5.6

EDUCATION AND SOCIO-ECONOMIC FACTORS

Recruitment happens simultaneously among the impoverished and the educated middle class

The question of socio-economic background and origin (urban vs rural) as it impacts the vulnerability to recruitment into extremist groups had mixed responses. Young women discussed how students who had come from non-urban areas were more likely to be vulnerable: “Students came from outside Dhaka get involved in the fundamental political activity. And then the whole student community get the blame for it”.¹⁶¹ Or, “[I]n the educated society, [extremism] has decreased but recently in the rural area religious extremism has increased”.¹⁶² This shows an assumption held by some that the desire for incomes and jobs are pull factors that may impact young, poorer, students. This view was reiterated by a key interviewee from a rural research site in Satkhira, who stated that: “young boys who live outside home for study or any other purpose have a chance to get recruited by getting attached to an extremist group”.¹⁶³

Madrassa boarding schools were perceived as likely sites of recruitment, given their religious and conservative outlooks. *Madrassa* also become sites where more conservative modes of behaviour are taught, implemented or progressed. Significantly, female enrolments in secondary school *madrassa* has doubled since the 1990s, reaching gender parity a decade ago (Asadulla, Chaudhury, and Rashed 2009). *Purdah* is

enforced in most *madrassas* (Asadulla, Chaudhury, and Rashed 2009). When students were asked to compare the experience of female students at *madrassas* versus general college (who were now studying at the same university), they noted clear differences: “They aren’t open-minded like us”, “They are more conservative” and “Usually girls have reservations from their family. They keep themselves restricted and do not hang around and meet with other[s] that much”;¹⁶⁴ or even that *madrassa* education system has “some defects”.¹⁶⁵ The research also shows the understanding that distance from family, such as in the *madrassa* boarding school model, can lead to problems, both in behaviour as well as vulnerability to recruitment. The social and political implications of increasing education in the privatized and religious school sector are under researched.

On the other hand, in other discussions, students were asked their thoughts on the July 2016 attack in Dhaka (the Holey Artisan Bakery attack), in which the attackers were from wealthy families and had all had access to higher education, including in some Western institutions (one studied at Monash University’s Malaysia campus).¹⁶⁶ One participant mentioned a dual track system in the violent extremist groups: “The leaders usually do not get involved directly in such (violent) assignments. They achieve their interests through using those boys”.¹⁶⁷

Recruitment to extremist groups happens among the middle classes at universities, as one female student put it: “The fundamentalists are everywhere; both in public and private universities”.¹⁶⁸ A woman’s rights expert noted

161 Focus group discussion with young women (049b) in Bangladesh: Dhaka Independent University, November 2018

162 Focus group discussion with young men (059) in Bangladesh: Kushtia, Islamic University, November 2018

163 Key interview with a man and a woman, NGO workers (019) Bangladesh: Satkhira, November 2018

164 Focus group discussion with young women (058) in Bangladesh: Kushtia, Islamic University, November 2018

165 Focus group discussion with young men (060) in Bangladesh: Kushtia Islamic University, November 2018

166 Focus group discussion with young women (053) in Bangladesh: Dhaka Independent University Dhaka, November 2018

167 Focus group discussion with young men (051) in Bangladesh: Dhaka Independent University Dhaka, November 2018

168 Focus group discussion with young men (049c) in Bangladesh: Dhaka Independent University, November 2018

that extremist and fundamentalist groups like Tablighi Jamaat target educated women, in universities and urban areas.¹⁶⁹ One student pointed out how the pressure of university life could affect recruitment. He said:

Frustrated pupils before the SSC exam become afraid of the exam and tend towards religion. Then they take any word of a person with religious appearance as true. By this way they become hypnotized. Once someone is involved then s/he cannot stop, even if they aware of their wrong doings. They become locked in to 'kill or to be killed'.¹⁷⁰

Even though recruitment can be focussed on elite or secular education institutions, there is a degree to which *madrassa* education plausibly forms a malleable ideological base for the Islamist political movement. As Griffiths and Hasan (2015: 235) point out, the deregulation of the education sector during the military dictatorship meant reactionary forces have run “people’s *madrassas*” for decades in Bangladesh. They argue that the Islamist movement “Hefazat enjoys the support of millions of believers thanks to the control it exerts over private Qur’anic schools [*Quomi madrassas*] in Bangladesh.”

Education is a site where gender norms are politicised, including by extremist groups

Education also came up frequently as a site of contestation around gender norms, both in terms of its alleged impact on changing gender norms (like child marriage), as well as its importance in gender equality efforts. Participants, especially younger participants, recognise these changing norms and link them to girls’ education. One young man said:

In my experience, ten years ago, most people’s expectations were that a woman should stay at home and take care of the family. But things

have changed now. On average, eighty per cent of the female population is working outside [sic]¹⁷¹. Female education is much improved. Many girls in our area go to other cities for study. So, you can say the tradition has changed.¹⁷²

The statement below highlights this, as well as the understanding present of the connection between gender-regressive ideologies and the mobilisation around gender ideology:

To me, if women are deprived from getting education and developing skills, men can dominate them easily. We cannot deny that there are some forces which try to create violence by pointing disagreement their view about the woman’s participation in the development process.¹⁷³

Education does not address all aspects of gender inequality. For instance, education was viewed to decrease girls’ vulnerability to FGM, dowry, child marriage and honour killings, but this is not borne out in the data. Survey results from the Bangladesh sample, however, showed that there is no relationship between support for these forms of violence against girls and a person’s education.¹⁷⁴

Moreover, education level does not affect support for the gender division of labour. Field research shows that while education for girls/young women is seen as a positive by most participants, working outside the home is not. This is shaped by several forces, including the expectations of a wife’s role after marriage, as well as the expectation that a husband should be able to provide all that his wife and family needs. A significant number of young men did not want their wives to work. They justified this by referring to wives’ care obligations, to religious roles and expectations, and to women’s safety from sexual and gender-based violence.

169 Key interview with a women’s rights expert (021) in Bangladesh: Dhaka, February 2019

170 Focus group discussion with young men (059) in Bangladesh: Kushtia, Islamic University, November 2018

171 Official labour force participation rates for women over 15 in Bangladesh has risen over the past decade, but remains at only 33.07% (2017) <https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SL.TL.F.CACT.FE.ZS?locations=BD>

172 Focus group discussion with young men (059) in Bangladesh: Kushtia, Islamic University, November 2018

173 Focus group discussion with young men (059) in Bangladesh: Kushtia, Islamic University, November 2018

174 The correlation between education and support for harmful practices was $r = -0.1211^*$ for men and $r = -0.1051^*$ in Bangladesh

*I want an educated girl because an educated mother can build an educated society and they do not quarrel on small issues. I want a girl who will take care of my parents. She will be educated but it's not necessary that she will have to do a job.*¹⁷⁵

*Some disagree about the job of women from the Islamic religious point of views. There are some restrictions in the Muslim society.*¹⁷⁶

*My mother is working woman and I see her to face many problems regarding security. So, I think my wife should not have a job.*¹⁷⁷

One women's rights activist interviewed by the research team raised the paradox of women's empowerment and attempts to support women's

access to employment in the face of religious fundamentalism and associated gender roles. The participant lamented the gap between the reliance on women's labour in Bangladesh economic development and the pressure placed on women to subscribe to extremist gender norms:

*When women are moving forward, the state is enjoying the outcomes of that forward movement but it will not take the responsibility to address the challenges women are facing. If women in Bangladesh believed that that should remain inside their homes and do not go for income, then the GDP would never have increased... The main challenge of development sector is to work with marginalized women who are facing religious extremism.*¹⁷⁸

175 Focus group discussion with young men (033) in Bangladesh: Satkhira, November 2018

176 Focus group discussion with young men (041) in Bangladesh: Joypurhat, November 2018

177 Focus group discussion with young men (052) in Bangladesh: Dhaka Independent University, November 2018

178 Key interview with a women's rights expert (022) in Bangladesh: Dhaka, February 2019

5.7

ROLES OF PARENTS

The discussion of the role of parents' centres on the gender division of labour and tied closely to ideal archetypes of men as father and women as mothers: fathers are breadwinners for their families and women as providers of care. The overwhelming majority of participants in focus group discussions and interviews upheld traditional gender roles. Mothers provide care within the household more than fathers because of traditional roles, but also as fathers are away from the children more due to working outside the home, including as migrant workers.

Most participants emphasised the need for men to provide for their families and support their children in several ways: "A good father works for his children's education. A good father takes care of his family".¹⁷⁹ Some articulated that an important aspect of being a good father was financial support – particularly for students who study away from their families and rely on money sent from their families during their studies. For instance, one young man said:

*In the old generation, fathers were not aware about education, but now fathers have become conscious about education. A significant change has come about the importance of education, 'an illiterate father wants to make his son educated'. For example, I work as a construction labour, but I want my son to get educated.*¹⁸⁰

This highlights the role of a good father is one that is aspirational in terms of socio-economic mobility for his children. One young woman also discussed warmly how her older brother had helped her attend university.¹⁸¹

Mothers and fathers are alternatively romanticised as frontline preventers, or demonised as vectors of violent extremism

The role of mothers, and the threat to hegemonic femininity as complementary and subordinate to husbands, is an issue that is heavily contested and politicised. Some participants expressed concern at the changing nature of families and the increase in women working outside the home, as well as the decline of elderly patrilineal parents living with their sons and their wives. As one participant stated: "The family role is decreasing because of the nuclear family. Parents do not provide enough time to their children. Kids are raised by maid servants. The scope to learn good things from family has declined".¹⁸² These views rely on traditional and essentialised understandings of the roles that men and women play in families and communities, situating women as natural carers, as innately concerned with domestic work and domestic management. Participants who discussed these roles situated women's roles in traditional cultural practices: "Usually mother takes care of the household activities and it is a social tradition. This is the family culture in the society."¹⁸³ While this means that women may, and likely do, play a role in

179 Focus group discussion with young men (043) in Bangladesh Joypurhat, November 2018

180 Focus group discussion with young men (034) in Bangladesh: Satkhira, November 2018

181 Focus group discussion with young women (057) in Bangladesh: Kushtia, Islamic University, November 2018

182 Focus group discussion with young men (052) in Bangladesh: Dhaka Independent University, November 2018

183 Focus group discussion with young women (049b) in Bangladesh: Dhaka Independent University, November 2018

early detection of warning signs, and prevention of radicalisation of children, it is important that this role not be assumed.

The gender division of labour is seen as fixed, intergenerational, and is a significant part of how the family or community organises itself. As one participant stated: “Women do the things that fit them. We have seen these from generations. I do what I have seen my mother used to do and my daughter will accordingly follow me. Also, there are instructions in the religion”.¹⁸⁴ These traditional roles, are of course, those promoted by extremist organizations such as Jemaat-i-Islami (Shehabuddin 2008, Kabeer 1991). Other participants pushed back against this idea and saw education to challenge traditional roles: “We think differently, we do not want our daughter to only cook and take care of the family. If we let them marry at a young age than they would have been busy with household work”.¹⁸⁵

A few participants also raised the role of mothers and fathers in ensuring their children do not become involved in violence or violent extremism, a discussion that was couched both in terms of positive influence as well as laying blame with parents. In the same discussion, one participant stated that “Now the mothers restrict their son from involving in violence, they are conscious more,” while another claimed that “A child get all the learning from a father, they follow the way of their father. If the father gets in quarrels and violence eventually, the child will follow that way. A father is a teacher to a son”.¹⁸⁶ Similarly, some participants also considered ideals of gender equality to come from the family:

*Families can teach them that men and women are equal. Imagine that from his childhood, a boy was shown that girls are similar him, told that, whatever you want to do, girls also can. Just respect her! I think it comes from the family.*¹⁸⁷

184 Focus group discussion with young women (040) in Bangladesh: Joypurhat, November 2018

185 Focus group discussion with young men (034) in Bangladesh: Satkhira, November 2018

186 Focus group discussion with young men (034) in Bangladesh: Satkhira, November 2018

187 Focus group discussion with young women (050) in Bangladesh: Dhaka Independent University, November 2018



COUNTRY ANALYSIS:
INDONESIA

The overwhelming majority of focus group participants in Indonesia had not encountered what they perceived as violent extremism in their own lives. In reference to the bombings and extremist violence in recent years, participants found these extremely negative. Most people agreed that violent extremism was antithetical to religion, and those committing violence misunderstood or perverted religion.

In the 2018 survey, Indonesian women were worried in slightly higher numbers (67 per cent) than men (63 per cent) were. Again, like the cases of Bangladesh and the Philippines, there have been notable political movements in Indonesia based on political Islam, with visions for an Islamic state in Indonesia (Rahman Alamsyah and Hadiz 2017). Many contemporary groups need contextualisation within these older political movements. At the same time, religion was identified as being present within the spheres of intolerance, radicalism, fundamentalism, extremism, and violent extremism.

One person's defence of a community is another person's act of intolerance

Like the sections above, in Indonesia definitions of extremism and violent extremism varied greatly. From the qualitative data, it was apparent that one person's defence of a community is another person's act of intolerance. Intolerance and extremism were something that 'others' do. Several people misunderstood intolerance. A few participants revealed acts of intolerance they or their community had committed. For instance, a male community member in Klaten revealed they forcibly barricaded a fundamentalist married couple (she wore a *niqab*) inside their home and stopped them renting a house in their community.¹⁸⁸

In isolated cases, control and monitoring of "aberrant groups" such as the Ahmadiyya, could be seen to

be the promotion of tolerance, even when it took muscular forms, including coercion or control of minority groups. In one exceptional case, to prevent extremism, the same men in Klaten claimed using a megaphone during prayers, enabling everyone outside the mosque to hear the "correct" version of religion, had been a good strategy.¹⁸⁹ In Depok, in proximity to sites known for religious intolerance, a male village leader said "new residents'" "unwise" proselytization of Christianity had been seen by some, including his leadership group to have caused "problems". The male village leader countered proselytization by questioning and supervising newcomers to avoid any conflicts.¹⁹⁰

Similarly, a few students in Cirebon saw intolerance as stemming from other religions. A female member of an Islamist student group turned the questions about intolerance and extremism around, suggesting that Christian proselytization was problematic, and ought to be met with greater Islamization.¹⁹¹ One young man, also in Cirebon, blamed not Christianity, but democracy for intolerance. In his view, establishing the "Caliphate system" would create tolerance.¹⁹²

188 Men only focus group discussion (023) in Indonesia: Klaten, October 2018

189 Men only focus group discussion (023) in Indonesia: Klaten, October 2018

190 Men only focus group discussion (007) in Indonesia: Depok, October 2018

191 Women only focus group discussion (015) Indonesia: Cirebon, October 2018

192 Men only focus group discussion (014) Indonesia: Cirebon, October 2018

6.1

MALE LEADERSHIP AND GENDER RELATIONS

The ideology of male leadership in the public sphere was significant across all communities in Indonesia, with some important exceptions and changes. The ideology of male authority means that men should make decisions on behalf of communities, while women are not suited, because of their gender, for this role.

The views on women's leadership split along gender lines. In men-only focus group discussions, many men voiced the opinion that leadership was a prerogative of men. Men in Depok took a particularly hard line, saying, "We are not willing to have female leader as long as the men are still around".¹⁹³ In Klaten, however, women's leadership of the public sphere was accepted, in part because Klaten has had a woman Regent since 2017.

Men stereotyped women broadly as having fewer skills and talents for leadership in focus group discussions. At the same time, some men did admit that individual women had leadership skills. They would support their sisters and daughters, even though "men are more capable".¹⁹⁴ If they did support female leadership, often men did so on the proviso that women were very qualified.¹⁹⁵

In focus group discussions, the preference for male leadership in the public sphere was justified by referring to stereotypes of women as emotionally unstable and men as logical. Perhaps surprisingly, a majority of women across all four sites consistently supported the idea of women as too emotional for leadership.¹⁹⁶ Even if women are skilled and talented leaders, "no matter how smart women are, they rely more on their

feelings".¹⁹⁷ One woman gave the example that she prefers working for men because men have fewer contrary opinions that "end up in a conflict. Working with women is tenses".¹⁹⁸

Men and women referred to religion to justify the prerogative of male political leadership (a hostile sexist view). One man in Klaten stated, "I would prefer male leaders. Because religion teaches us that men are leaders. In fact, no prophets are female. Thus, it is better if men are leaders".¹⁹⁹ Women expressed this view less often. In line with greater participation of women in the public in Klaten, female religious leaders were able to preach to male audiences in Klaten. Some religious women referred directly to religion as forbidding female leadership. One female member of a religious discussion group (*majelis taklim*) in Cirebon elaborated on the reasoning:

It is not permitted. As long as the men are available, women should not hold leadership positions. Women can only lead if they lead women. Women cannot lead men. Sermons should be delivered by men since the voice of women is aurat (naked/genitalia). Women should only give sermons to women, so that their sermon will not result in fitnah (slander/sedition/seduction).²⁰⁰

193 Men only focus group discussion (007) in Indonesia: Depok, October 2018

194 Men only focus group discussion (010) in Indonesia Depok, October 2018

195 Men only focus group discussion (023) in Indonesia: Klaten, October 2018

196 Women only focus group discussion (012) in Indonesia Cirebon, female members of Nahdlatul Ulama – October 2018

197 Women only focus group discussion (019) Indonesia: Klaten, October 2018

198 Focus group discussion with members of the women's youth wing of Nahdlatul Ulama (012) Indonesia: Cirebon, a, October 2018

199 Men only focus group discussion (023) in Indonesia: Klaten, October 2018

200 Key interview with a female undergraduate student (007) in Indonesia: Cirebon, October 2018

Thus, in the ideology this woman is describing, female leadership exposes women's "nakedness" to men, and this creates a sin.

The doctrine of male leadership can be utilised violent extremists

The doctrine of male leadership has a bearing on extremism and violent extremism for two reasons. First, it was plausibly stated by several participants that wives of violent extremist husbands feel compelled to support their husbands in acts of intolerance or violence. Second, male household leadership is an ideology promoted by many groups: fundamentalist, extremist, and violent extremist groups. In particular, as we unpack below, male leadership is seen by violent extremist groups to counteract a Western ideal of liberalism and secularism associated with women's rights. Finally, disobedience to male leadership could be part of a repertoire justifying domestic violence, including in extremist households, as explained below in the section on violence against women.

In focus groups, the ideal of male leadership of the household was even more widely supported than male leadership of the public sphere. With very few exceptions, men overwhelmingly supported the notion of male household leadership. On questions regarding household leadership and decision-making, responses were weighted heavily towards men and husbands. This is also reflected in the 1974 Indonesian Marriage Law, article 31 which stipulates that men are the head of the household, and women are the housewife (Republic of Indonesia 1974).

Wifely obedience is the notion that women ought to obey husbands. Overall, women in focus group discussions agreed that they ought to ask for a husband's permission in general, especially when women wished to travel or work outside the home. Some women argued that in their families, it was more a case of a courtesy, of notifying husbands, and a smaller number said that men also must ask for their wives' permission to travel.

Male leadership and wifely obedience are promoted by violent extremists online

Drawing on the analysis of scraping text from online material in extremist websites explicitly promotes an idea of male leadership of the household, cognate with what scholars have termed Indonesian "Fatherism" ("*Bapakisme*") (Suryakusuma 2011). In websites, "*pria*" (man) was commonly paired with "*pemimpin*" (leader) and "*keluarganya*" (his family). Word pairs like this confirm relational aspects of gender: men and masculinity are always defined in relation to the feminine and non-masculine (Hutchings 2008). Likewise, another article states that Allah has given men mental and physical advantages over women and thus men should be leaders over women, encouraging women to submit to their husbands (Voa-Islam.com 2015).

In the online space, frequently occurring word pairs on extremist websites for the terms women and wife point to a concern with a woman's role as a housewife, pious and modest dress, masculine protection, rights, and the notion of wifely duties. Overall, the women-specific sections of extremist websites feature content promoting conservative views of women's roles and a strict gender division of labour. For instance, one article entitled "Three Occupations for Women that Men Cannot Compete In" The article then lists the three occupations as being a servant of Allah, being a good wife for their husbands, and being a good mother—all very traditional roles for women (Voa-Islam.com 2014). Another article lists the characteristics of a good wife, most of which revolve around prioritising the wishes of the husband. The article also advocates husband's strict control over wives' movements, such as only leaving the house with the permission of the husband, and for women to enforce a strict gender division of labour, that is, to never neglect childcare duties, nor make the husband do women's tasks such as washing dishes and clothes (Voa-Islam. 2014b).²⁰¹

A significant number of women participants in focus group discussions justified wifely obedience in terms of religious doctrine. This was expressed in the form, "men are heaven for women", meaning that a wife needed to ensure her husband's pleasure (*Ridho/Ridha*) in order to

201 "Let's Support the ISIS Movement," "Idealise and revere the husband"

enter heaven. Interestingly, in FGDs, the term ‘head of the household’ was used interchangeably with *‘imam’*, which is an Islamic term for religious leader. Fewer men and women justified male supremacy on legal grounds (“as stated in the family registration card”) or biological grounds. Religious justification for women’s subordination was also (re)produced in the online extremist space. In online extremist sources, wife was commonly paired with words related to the Prophet Muhammad and associated with expected roles and behaviour, such as *“pasangan”* (spouse), *“tugas”* (duties), and *“sholihah”* (devout). Traditional wifely roles are justified by referring to the Prophet Muhammad, especially to Prophet Muhammad’s wife Aisyah, a hero to many Sunni Muslims.

Online, analysis of extremist websites shows Islamist groups are concerned with marriage and controlling young women’s sexuality. The notion of virginal purity is also cognate with a focus in Islamist circles on early or child marriage. In the online space, child marriage is condoned in an article on the website Panjimas, which argues against the Indonesian state banning child marriage (“*nikah muda*”). The authors consider the ban on child marriage a capitulation to foreign and globalized lifestyles, arguing instead that early marriage is the way to achieve happiness (Panjimas.com 2018).²⁰² The implications of wifely obedience have a strong bearing on women entering extremist organisations or committing violent extremist acts, as discussed in following section on women’s roles.

Male participants in focus group discussions referred to a doctrine of a wife’s religious duty of obedience to husbands. As a male participant from Cirebon put it: “Kaffah (perfection) in Islam is for the wife to obey the husband. The wife will enter heaven if she does so”.²⁰³ This obedience was not limited to the Muslim majority; one Christian Indonesian woman from Medan said,

“according to the bible, women have to obey her husband with certain limitations”.²⁰⁴ Religion provided a narrative justifying women’s subordination. One woman thought that a woman being the head of the family would be sinful: “That would be sinful, because it would lead to a perception that I am the one that provides for the family. Others would assume I am arrogant and impolite”.²⁰⁵ Thus, in cases where women earned more money than men, a religious justification could be used to reinforce male authority, as many participants suggested, “In Islam, men are indeed leaders”.²⁰⁶

There was widespread evidence in focus groups of changing gender roles—chiefly regarding women’s paid employment.²⁰⁷ Because earning a cash income was a condition of family leadership, many women said that if women earned income, they would be considered to have equal leadership of the household, especially if a husband was sick.²⁰⁸ A significant number of women expressed the same view that if women earned more money than their husbands did, they would be (joint) household leaders. Women generally suggested that although men were symbolically and sometimes economically, the head of the family, decision making ought to be a joint process.²⁰⁹ Younger men and women also supported a joint decision-making model in greater numbers.

Male protection, breadwinner and soldiering masculinities are deployed by violent extremists

Some participants were realistic about male household leadership as providing male protection. One participant in a focus group in Depok suggested, “When you have a husband, no one would dare harass you. People would be more careful with you if you have a husband. If you are a widow, or you’re not

202 “Virginitly Auction vs Young Marriage”

203 Men only focus group discussion (014) Indonesia: Cirebon, October 2018

204 Discussion with moderate, female undergraduate students (024) in Indonesia: Medan, October 2018

205 Focus group discussion with married women (009) in Indonesia, Depok, October 2018

206 Men only focus group discussion (014) Indonesia: Cirebon, October 2018


207 Focus group discussion with young male progressives (028) in Indonesia: Medan, October 2018

208 Women only focus group discussion (020) in Indonesia: Klaten, October 2018

209 Women only focus group discussion (012) in Indonesia Cirebon, female members of Nahdlatul Ulama, October 2018

GRAPH 2:

Q37. Men should be willing to sacrifice their own well-being in order to provide financially for the women in their lives.



married, people underestimate you. So, the important thing is to have a life partner.”²¹⁰ As well as providing materially, men ought to provide physical security: “men are the protectors of their families” and “Men protect their families. I really felt it after my husband died.” The tension between the idea of men as physical protectors, and women experiencing domestic violence or insecurity in the home was dismissed by some female members of a religious discussion group: “So I think, the saying that women are afraid of their husbands [in situations of domestic violence] is not true. Maybe she just doesn’t want confrontations. But there are limits set by husbands”.²¹¹

However, there was deep anxiety about these changing gender roles among nearly all groups of participants. Although women were challenging the notion of male leadership by pointing out

that women provided and protected families, a significant number of men (and one or two women) insisted on male leadership on the household even if women earned more money. Unsurprisingly, older male community leaders in Depok expressed a view that it was good that women were gaining benefits through paid work, as long as the men remain the head of the family, as it is an inappropriate role for women.²¹²

The need for men to provide for families is a social imperative in Indonesia. In the survey, 58 per cent of people agreed that men should be willing to sacrifice their own well-being in order to provide financially for the women in their lives (see graph 2).²¹³ The strength of the imperative likely fuels financial motivations for men to join violent extremist or extremist groups who seek to provide financial incentives to members.

210 Focus group discussion with married women (009) in Indonesia, Depok, October 2018

211 Focus group discussion with women in a women only koranic discussion group (025) in Indonesia: Medan, October 2018

212 Men only focus group discussion (010) in Indonesia Depok, October 2018

213 Q37 Men should be willing to sacrifice their own well-being in order to provide financially for the women in their lives.

There were variations of masculinity present in focus group discussions, but the dominant ideal was of a breadwinner masculinity, with a few participants referring to a soldiering or pious masculinity. As discussed above, the doctrine of male leadership was the main marker of an “ideal man”. According to one male participant, egoism was valued in men - as it allows them to be leaders of women in the household: “husbands sometimes have to be more selfish/egoistic”.²¹⁴ Too much egoism vis-à-vis other (male) community members was undesirable. An ideal man “can interact with the community disregarding his social socio-economic background. For instance, someone who is head of the community who demands too much respect [isn’t ideal]”.²¹⁵

Being able to provide for a family was considered a key marker of masculinity: A good man was one who “can lead his family into a better condition”.²¹⁶ Most importantly, male leadership was justified by referring to men’s roles as breadwinners. Most people in FGD FGDs considered the leader of the family—whom they often referred to as the “*imam*”—to be the person who earns income: “When a man marries and decides to take a person under his care (his wife), therefore he has the responsibility to lead and become the head of his family”.²¹⁷ In

other words, authority overlapped with the ideal and actual gender division of labour.

In research, “ideal” men could vary greatly, from fighters, to caring husbands, to those with a certain motorbike. Soldiering masculinities were relevant in the Indonesian case, with a reference to religious soldiers. In the analysis of online material, the focus on religious, soldiering masculinities was visible. On the extremist websites, the word fighter co-occurs with words describing current global conflicts. Fighter is paired with words such as “*Suriah*” (Syria), “*ISIS*” “*rezim*” (regime), “*Assad*”, “*serangan*” (attack), “*Aleppo*”, “*militer*” (military), “*penjara*” (prison), “*revolusi*” (revolution), “*roket*” (rocket), and “*Hamas*”.

In one focus group discussion, militarised masculinities did get mentioned. Perhaps exceptionally, one young man said that an “ideal man “is macho” in line with the Prophet’s image: “It is depicted that the Prophet had a six pack. The Prophet also beat people wrestling”.²¹⁸ He continued by saying that male jihadi fighters are not an ideal model of masculinity, “the example for macho is not Abu Jandal (an infamous member of al Qaeda and veteran mujahedeen) but the Prophet”.²¹⁹ Another man refuted the idea that a soldiering masculinity was valued, while still acknowledging the existence of soldiering models of masculinity: “A man needs to be a gentleman, not like Rambo”.²²⁰

214 Men only focus group discussion (007) in Indonesia: Depok, October 2018

215 Men only focus group discussion (023) in Indonesia: Klaten, October 2018

216 Men only focus group discussion (023) in Indonesia: Klaten, October 2018

217 Men only focus group discussion (023) in Indonesia: Klaten, October 2018

218 Men only focus group discussion (014) Indonesia: Cirebon, October 2018

219 Men only focus group discussion (014) Indonesia: Cirebon, October 2018

220 Men only focus group discussion (023) in Indonesia: Klaten, October 2018

6.2

WOMEN'S EXTREMIST PARTICIPATION

The first point regarding women's roles and connected to the above discussion of the ideology of male authority, is that a number of participants in focus groups thought women's obedience to violent extremist husbands was a reason for women's support of violent extremist groups. Simply put, for many people in focus groups, wives ought to obey husbands in nearly all circumstances: "Wives must obey their husbands, no matter the circumstances; men are the head of their family".²²¹ This has important implications for women's roles in violent extremist groups.

Yet in the survey, respondents were divided as to whether women joined extremist groups willingly or because of force. 43 per cent of respondents thought women who joined violent extremist groups were not forced to, and 31 per cent thought women were indeed forced to join by male authority figures (see table 33).²²²

In the qualitative data in focus groups, people explored this notion in depth. Significantly, in focus groups, women argued that if a man was violent to his wife, wifely obedience was no longer required under religious doctrine.²²³ One young man suggested that women join violent extremist groups "due to over-obedience towards the husband".²²⁴ Referring to the case of the Surabaya family bombings, a significant number of participants agreed that the woman suicide bomber could have been obeying her husband, "forced to do what she did",²²⁵ and possibly subject to a longer-term indoctrination from her husband.²²⁶ Another participant said:

If the wife considered that everything that the husband said must be obeyed, then such incident could indeed happen. I have no deep understanding about religion. Suicide is a heavy sin. It is possible that the wife thought that the husband was right, and so they did the bombing²²⁷

The second point is that this doctrine of wifely obedience as a route to heaven, or "men are heaven for women" is a key part of extremist gender ideology, as seen in the online space on extremist websites (Muslimah 2012 and Arrahmah.Id 2016). Thus, rather than posing a strict dichotomy between women violent extremists as dupes of men or empowered agents, the qualitative material points to the ambivalence inhering in women's roles. In other words, for some women, obedience can equal empowerment.

Given the ideological force behind the notion of wifely obedience to husbands, it is plausible that for some women undertaking divine obedience to a husband will empower a woman religiously. Being an obedient wife at the same time as taking up armed struggle

221 Men only focus group discussion (007) in Indonesia: Depok, October 2018

222 Q48 "When women join a violent extremist group, it is because they are forced or pressured by male family members or their religious leader." There were no large gender differences between these two groups of survey respondents on this question.

223 Focus group discussion with women in a women only koranic discussion group (025) in Indonesia: Medan, October 2018

224 Focus group discussion with young male university students (030) in Indonesia: Medan, October 2018

225 Discussion with moderate, female undergraduate students (024) in Indonesia: Medan, October 2018

226 Focus group discussion with women in a women only koranic discussion group (025) in Indonesia: Medan, October 2018

227 Discussion with moderate, female undergraduate students (024) in Indonesia: Medan, October 2018

TABLE 33:

Q 48. When women join a violent extremist group, it is because they are forced or pressured by male family members. Three countries

Q48	Country and Gender											
	Bangladesh				Indonesia				Philippines			
	Male	Female	Other	Total	Male	Female	Other	Total	Male	Female	Other	Total
Strongly disagree	19%	24%	9%	21%	32%	25%		28%	20%	23%		22%
2	15%	18%		16%	13%	16%		15%	16%	20%		18%
3	21%	18%	18%	19%	23%	29%		26%	33%	32%	100%	33%
4	17%	18%	18%	17%	20%	18%	100%	19%	20%	14%		17%
Strongly agree	29%	22%	55%	26%	12%	13%		12%	11%	11%		11%

is still empowering, a view reflected in the online materials. In this narrative, there is no contradiction between obedience and empowerment. The idea of gender complementary having society wide salience and being mobilized ideologically by extremist groups adds support for Nuraniyah’s argument that Indonesian women violent extremists conform to gender regressive norms once inside violent extremist groups (Nuraniyah 2018, 17).

On a more positive note, a significant number of women in focus group discussions said if a husband was a terrorist, a wife no longer needed to obey: “There is a boundary of obeying the husband. Husbands can be said to be half-absolute to follow, but what must be understood is whether the husband’s actions are relevant or not with Islamic values”.²²⁸ Others said, “Harming other people is not good. Even though husbands lead their families, but they need to lead to a better path in accordance to religious teachings. No religion would ever allow us to harm other people. On the contrary all religion teaches us about love and tolerance”.²²⁹

Women overseas workers are a source of anxiety; financing extremist groups is supported by many

A significant number of women members of violent extremist groups in Nuraniyah’s (2018) sample were overseas domestic workers. These women provide important economic resources to groups and are in a good position to network across borders. They often use funds to support fighters. The survey material indicated a significant support for women acting as fundraisers in this way. While women violent extremists may be shocking, women’s monetary support for “just causes” was accepted by many in Indonesia. In response to the statement: “I respect these women who sent money to support these fighters. Women can’t fight, but they can help support fighters in these areas”, 40 per cent of respondents agreed or strongly agreed, and women (45 per cent) supported the statement more strongly than men did (36 per cent), a very significant gender difference.²³⁰ Moreover, the strong support for financing violent extremist groups across all three countries (Bangladesh 42 per cent; Indonesia 40 per cent; the

228 Women only focus group discussion (015) in Indonesia: Cirebon, October 2018

229 Women only focus group discussion (019) Indonesia: Klaten, October 2018

230 Q 43. I respect these women who sent money to support these fighters. Women can’t fight, but they can help support the fighters in these areas. How much do you agree with the statement?

Philippines 44 per cent) points to broad support base, willing to donate to the cause (see table 34).

Returning to analysis of online material, women overseas domestic workers (“Tenaga Kerja Wanita” TKW) are a hot-button issue for mainstream and extremist news sources alike. Extremist website Panjimas reported a rally by the Indonesian Council of Ulama protesting women migrant workers in same sex relationships and marriages (Panjimas.com 2015).²³¹ Voaislam.com featured a campaign against sending women migrant workers overseas and exposing them to abuse, exploitation or the death penalty.

The article “Stop sending migrant workers, restore the rights of women”, written by a female member of Hizbut Tahrir’s women’s wing blames the migrant worker exploitation on the fact that men are not given a living wage to support families, necessitating women’s work outside the home. The author proposes that the establishment of an Islamic Caliphate will guarantee basic needs of families. The article argues this will enable women’s rights in accordance with their “nature” because the state would forbid women from working and ignoring their obligations as a wife and mother (Voa-Islam.com 2015b).²³²

TABLE 34:

Q 43. I respect these women who sent money to support these fighters. Women can’t fight, but they can help support the fighters in these areas: Three countries

Q48	Country and Gender											
	Bangladesh				Indonesia				Philippines			
	Male	Female	Other	Total	Male	Female	Other	Total	Male	Female	Other	Total
Strongly disagree	19%	25%		22%	19%	15%		17%	16%	15%		16%
2	10%	16%	27%	13%	13%	8%		10%	12%	13%		13%
3	24%	21%	9%	22%	32%	32%		32%	28%	27%	100%	27%
4	16%	13%	18%	14%	21%	27%	100%	24%	25%	23%		24%
Strongly agree	31%	25%	45%	28%	15%	18%		17%	18%	22%		20%

231 “The MUI Asks the Government to Act Firmly on TKW same sex marriage”

232 “ Stop sending migrant workers, restore women’s rights”

6.3

VEILING AND DRESS

Higher degrees of covering up and veiling, such as wearing a niqab, were identified as markers of conservative religious identity. Many participants in focus groups identified veiling with a *niqab* as a signifier of belonging to a fundamentalist or extremist group.²³³ There appears to be pressure in extremist groups for women to wear a veil. For example, a mother of a violent extremist in Cirebon said that the “youth prayer sessions often talk about women’s *aurat* (naked/genitals)”.²³⁴ University staff referred to increasing fundamentalism manifesting around pressure to wear a veil, stating there was increasing gender segregation and that some of their students were forced to wear a *hijab* by their peers, and forced to display their religious identity.²³⁵

Extremist websites also heavily promote women’s veiling and modest dress.

Conversely, it was documented in focus groups that pressure from parents on their daughters not to veil was also common. Young women in conservative or Islamist student organisations in Cirebon emotionally described social pressure from their parents and family members not to wear a *niqab*, as people would think they were “terrorists” or “unmarriageable”. Indeed, people suggested that those wearing a *niqab* were “a bit fanatic, or radical”. Women in Klaten reported being a bit scared and

worrying about saying the wrong thing. Another woman added, “Women wearing chador are not always real Muslims. Rather, some of them just wear a chador to commit crimes”.²³⁶

Sexual harassment was cited by focus group discussions as a powerful reason to wear a *niqab*. For one student from Cirebon, “The veil makes her feel safe because she was no longer harassed by men”.²³⁷ Another student added that while she was wearing a *hijab*, she was harassed by a motorcycle taxi driver. But now she’s wearing a *niqab*, no one harasses her.²³⁸

233 Women only focus group discussion (018) in Indonesia: Klaten, October 2018

234 K1008-F_Indonesia Cirebon -- Mother worried about a radicalised child – October 2018

235 Mixed gender focus group discussion with professionals (026) in Indonesia: Medan, October 2018

236 Women only focus group discussion (018) in Indonesia: Klaten, October 2018

237 Women only focus group discussion (017) in Indonesia: Cirebon, October 2018

238 Women only focus group discussion (017) in Indonesia: Cirebon, October 2018

6.4


VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN AND EXTREMIST VIOLENCE

Attitudes to violence against women in Indonesian are mixed. In our research, women in focus groups did not agree with domestic violence, even while a minority supported it using religious justification.

In a countrywide survey, 69 per cent of Indonesians sampled disagree with husbands using physical force against wives in arguments.²³⁹ Further, 64 per cent of people thought that violence between married couples cannot be excused.²⁴⁰ At the same time, women disagreed with male violence more strongly, while men's answers tended to spread more evenly. While 77 per cent of Indonesian women surveyed disagreed with husband's using physical force, fewer men (63 per cent) disagreed with the proposition.

The greatest gender disparities arose in marital rape, where 72 per cent of women strongly disagreed with a man's right to force his wife to have sex as part of the marriage contract, compared to only 57 per cent of men strongly disagreeing with a husband's right to sex. Indeed, while 41 per cent of Indonesian men said husbands were not allowed to force their wives to have sex, (13 per cent) agreed that "the marriage contract generally entitles a husband to have sexual relations with his wife, even if she does not want to" (see table 35).²⁴¹

GRAPH 3:
Indonesia: Attitudes to Violence Against Women



239 Q.69. A husband would be entitled to use physical force if his wife argues with him, or refuses to obey him

240 Q.64. Physical force between couples can be excused if it results from people getting so angry that they temporarily lose control

241 Q.72. The marriage contract generally entitles a husband to have sexual relations with his wife, even if she does not want to.

TABLE 35:

Q74. The marriage contract generally entitles a husband to have sexual relations with his wife, even if she does not want to. Three countries

Q74	Country and Gender											
	Bangladesh				Indonesia				Philippines			
	Male	Female	Other	Total	Male	Female	Other	Total	Male	Female	Other	Total
Strongly disagree	51%	56%		53%	57%	72%		64%	55%	76%		66%
2	12%	10%		11%	14%	10%	100%	12%	7%	4%		6%
3	14%	14%	10%	14%	16%	7%		12%	17%	10%		14%
4	8%	8%	20%	8%	7%	6%		7%	13%	6%	100%	10%
Strongly agree	15%	11%	70%	14%	6%	5%		5%	7%	3%		5%

Religion can be used as part of a repertoire used to justify control or domestic violence

The doctrine of male leadership has important implications for the intersection of private violence and extremist violence. One woman, with a critical perspective, described in a focus group how a case of how religious extremism was part of a repertoire used by a husband to justify controlling behaviour. She said:

My younger sibling used to be normal, but now she obeys her husband who prohibits her from going out without a hijab. He doesn't allow birth control, so my sister had to take it behind his back. His teachings are too fanatic. If a female family member dies, only women can attend the funeral, not even the male family members can attend. Immunization is not allowed. If her in-laws are visiting, then she is required to wear hijab. But if she visits me, she takes off the hijab. Honestly, she doesn't agree with her husband's teachings, but she follows him anyway.²⁴²

In field research (focus groups and key interviews) and comparable to similar views cited in Bangladesh, several

women and men used religion to justify men's violence towards women in the home. One female member of an Islamist group said that domestic violence is not permitted, except in certain circumstances...

...unless the wife is disobedient. However, it is not permitted to hurt the wife straight away since there are steps. First the wife must be told off, however if the wife remains disobedient and it is in the context of obedience to religion, a husband can hit his wife, but he cannot hit the wife on the face and the hit must be done slowly, and the husband must contain his anger.²⁴³

Likewise, one older woman member of a religious discussion group in Medan said, "We need to see the cause of the domestic violence. Because it is allowed according to religion. If the wife cannot be told, then she can be hit, but not excessively".²⁴⁴ Worryingly, a religious woman running a domestic violence victim support service expressed the opinion that women use domestic violence accusations to gain advantage in divorce. She said, "Domestic violence is related to economic problems. The wife wants a divorce but has no money; [if there is a domestic violence case] she will be assisted to get a divorce free of charge".²⁴⁵

242 Women only focus group discussion (019) Indonesia: Klaten, October 2018

243 Key interview with a female, Islamist student (007) in Indonesia, October 2018

244 Focus group discussion with women in a women only koranic discussion group (025) in Indonesia: Medan, October 2018

245 Women only focus group discussion (012) in Indonesia Cirebon, female members of Nahdlatul Ulama, October 2018

TABLE 36:

Q30. Many women are seeking special favours, such as preferential treatment or alimony after divorce that favour them over men, under the guise of asking for “equality”

Q30	Country and Gender											
	Bangladesh				Indonesia				Philippines			
	Male	Female	Other	Total	Male	Female	Other	Total	Male	Female	Other	Total
Strongly disagree	16%	31%	9%	23%	12%	20%		16%	7%	10%		9%
2	16%	14%	18%	15%	14%	21%		17%	12%	18%		15%
3	25%	21%		23%	30%	29%		29%	34%	34%	100%	34%
4	18%	17%	36%	18%	24%	19%	100%	22%	29%	23%		26%
Strongly agree	26%	17%	36%	22%	21%	11%		16%	18%	15%		17%

In the survey research, this anti-woman’s rights sentiment, however, is reasonably widespread with 45 per cent of men and 30 per cent of women agreeing that many women are actually seeking special favours, such as preferential treatment or alimony after divorce that favours them over men, under the guise of asking for “equality” (see table 36).²⁴⁶

Sexism and support for violence against women, especially among women, are correlated with support for violent extremism

Correlations from the countrywide survey extend and strengthen the empirical connection between gender regressive views and violent extremism. For Indonesian men, there was a weak to moderate relationship between having hostile sexist views (as defined in the annex), and support for violent extremism ($r = .251$). Relatedly, the biggest predictor of supporting violent extremism was support for violence against women. There was a very strong relationship ($r = .551$) between men and women who agreed that men have the right to physically or sexually assault their wives and men who supported violent extremism.

Somewhat surprisingly, analysis shows that the

relationship between gender regressive views, especially attitudes to violence against women, and support for violent extremism is even stronger for Indonesian women than Indonesian men. Hostile sexist views in Indonesian women were strongly and positively correlated with support for violent extremism ($r = .469$). Mirroring results for Indonesian men, there was an even stronger relationship between women condoning violence against women and support for violent extremism ($r = .592$).

These two findings support our hypotheses that hostile sexism and support for violence against women are strongly connected to support for violent extremism.

A final area of women’s roles in supporting and preventing violent extremism is in political action. One university lecturer described how Christian women acted as human shields and de-escalated a religious conflict, and another incident wherein a church group was not given permission to establish a place of worship. She said:

*The Front Pembela Islam (FPI) attacked the church group while they were praying. There was a conflict. The men of the church retaliated. The women then made human-shield and sang religious songs, holding the men back from retaliation so there would be no bloodshed.*²⁴⁷

This shows women’s important roles in mediating and in de-escalating violence.

²⁴⁶ Q30. Many women are seeking special favours, such as preferential treatment or alimony after divorce that favour them over men, under the guise of asking for “equality”

²⁴⁷ Mixed gender focus group discussion with professionals (o26) in Indonesia: Medan, October 2018

6.5

RECRUITMENT

Gender regressive politics plays a role in helping recruit people to extremist and violent extremist groups. Survey analysis indicates a baseline of gender regressive attitudes in the community, and the FGDs indicate ambivalence and resistance to changing gender roles. Focus group participants mentioned domestic violence in each of the sites, although there were no criminal proceedings, or even separations or divorce. Finally, qualitative analysis of websites associated with extremists and violent extremists denied that gender-based violence was widespread and condoned forms of gender inequitable and violent practices such as child marriage, polygamy, and FGM.

Feminism (*feminisme*) is portrayed on extremist websites as rooted in capitalism and cause of moral decay

Articles on the website Panjimas, for instance, suggest that the figures on violence against women are doubtful, and that Indonesian feminists are wrong to seek the solution in feminism (Panjimas.com 2018b).²⁴⁸ In these sites, the prevalence of sexual violence is blamed on secular, democratic, and Western-inspired systems, such as “The Secular System only Insults the Honour of Women” (Panjimas.com 2018c). This article argues that the absence of religion within the daily lives of people in Indonesia has led to a moral decay, which in turn has led to the rise in sexual assaults. An article in Voaislam takes a similar stance, and argues that the secular and capitalist system in Indonesia has led to the lack of Islamic education and ease of access to pornography and drugs, which in turn has increase the number of sexual assaults (Voa-Islam.com 2016).²⁴⁹

Significantly, there is a strong anti-feminist sentiment in violent extremist websites. Firstly, equality between men and women is maligned (Panjimas.com 2015b).²⁵⁰

Secondly, gender and feminism are portrayed as concepts foreign to Indonesia and Islam, used by invaders (colonialists, capitalists). The association of women’s rights movements with foreigners and outsiders is negative, and according to the logic of defence of the religion against outsiders, feminism and gender are threats. The words gender and feminism and equality are often paired with “*kapitalis*” (capitalism), “*kolonialis*” (colonialism), “*multikultur*” (multiculturalism), “*sekuler*” (secular), and “*liberalisme*” (liberalism) (see table 37). Feminism and secularism are seen as corrupting influences. An article on Voaislam discusses how secularism is a “*racun*” (poison) in the minds of mothers, making them think their child is a burden, not a gift (Panjimas.com 2018d).²⁵¹ Voa-Islam exhorts readers to “Save Women from Feminism and Capitalism” by resisting the Indonesian government’s focus on women’s economic empowerment, seen as a materialist endeavour (Voa-Islam.com 2018).²⁵² Material on the website suggests that women ought not to use Instagram, go to restaurants or tourist attractions because it makes women ignore their obligations to worship, take care of the house, educate children, and spread the word of God (Voa-Islam 2018b).²⁵³ The discussion of equality centres on how ‘Western’ notions

248 “Equality that Does Not Guarantee Women’s Security and Glory”

249 “Women’s Sexual Violence: Real Proof of Non-Application of Islam Kaffah”

250 “Muslim Women Facing Modern World Challenges”

251 “Death of Mother’s Fitrah in the Grip of Secularism”

252 “Save women from feminism and capitalism”

253 “These are the 6 Female Invaders in the Modern Era”

TABLE 37:
Top word pairs for “feminism” on extremist websites²⁵⁴

Rank	Muslimdaily	Panjimas	Voalslam
1	feminisme (4 mentions) feminism	intelektual (7 mentions) intellectual	diperjuangkan (3 mentions) be championed by
2	lesbianisme (4 mentions) lesbianism	neokolonialis (6 mentions) neo-colonialism	intelektual (2 mentions) intellectual
3	liberaslime (4 mentions) liberalism	kapitalis (3 mentions) capitalism	digaungkan (2 mentions) launch
4	-	memperjuangkan (2 mentions) championing	diperkosa (2 mentions) rape
5	-	pengatur (2 mentions) regulator	berpakaian (2 mentions) dress
6	-	sekuler (2 mentions) secular	kolonialis (2 mentions)

of gender equality are not effective and against religious teachings (Voa-Islam.com 2018b). The sites seek to equate feminism with capitalism and colonialism. Indeed, one article on Panjimas blames feminism, and the oppression of women, on capitalism (Panjimas.com 2018e).²⁵⁵ Feminism as part of the “capitalist system” is blamed for the high levels of women migrant workers exposed to insecurity (Panjimas.com 2018f).²⁵⁶

In place of feminism, extremist groups promote ‘gender complementarity’

In place of women’s empowerment in a feminist model, extremist groups’ websites promote gender complementarity, which holds that men and women have complementary, fixed roles with men typically the head of the family or household, the income earner and protector and women as the one who takes care of the household work and the emotional care of its members. At the same time, gender complementarity has widespread social salience. Most participants are supportive of / acknowledge sexist gender ideology and

or gender complementarity. For instance, a few younger women also upheld the idea of men’s household leadership. For instance, a female student from Medan, a member of an Islamic student organization, criticized her mother’s insistence on independence in decision-making. Her fellow focus groups discussion participants disagreed with her when she said:

Gender equality exists in our society. However, it should not lead to a situation where women dominate men. Women must stay in her role as a mother, but also contribute to society. A woman must be able to give her opinion, so long as that opinion is positive.

For example, in my family, my mother told me that my father cannot restrict her because she provided more money for the family. That is a condescending view. It is not very good. Women can express themselves, but they must not harass men.²⁵⁷

It is plausible that religious fundamentalist and extremist groups tap into existing gender bias by projecting “equal but different” roles for women in order to mobilise both men and women to their cause. In the online space, women-specific sources

254 As described in the methodology section, frequent word pairs describe the words that occur most frequently with a word of interest such as, “feminism”

255 “Feminism and the Reality for Ladies”

256 “Ladies, Your Career Is Not Only World-Wide”

257 Focus group discussion with female students (029) in Indonesia: Medan, October 2018

TABLE 38:

Q47. Men join violent extremist groups because these groups support ideas like women should be obedient to their husbands, and, women should prioritise their families, not paid work

Q47	Country and Gender											
	Bangladesh				Indonesia				Philippines			
	Male	Female	Other	Total	Male	Female	Other	Total	Male	Female	Other	Total
Strongly disagree	26%	31%	18%	28%	31%	37%		34%	30%	35%		32%
2	19%	17%	18%	18%	14%	18%		16%	19%	19%	100%	19%
3	21%	22%	18%	22%	23%	22%		22%	25%	27%		26%
4	13%	15%		14%	14%	12%		13%	18%	12%		15%
Strongly agree	21%	16%	45%	19%	17%	11%	100%	14%	9%	7%		8%

are more likely to describe the “struggle” in the context of women’s rights, albeit being dismissive of any non-Islamic efforts. This suggests that while extremist groups do project a conservative view of women’s roles, they cannot afford to be openly hostile to women or the women’s movement. Thus, content on websites promotes gender relations that are complementary rather than openly hostile. This is a crucial finding, as it shows that extremist groups online must use different strategies to recruit women and engage their support.

It is also plausible that for a minority of people, gender regressive ideology motivates them to join an extremist group.

However, in the survey, half of people surveyed (50 per cent) disagreed with the statement that: “Men join violent extremist groups because these groups

support ideas like ‘women should be obedient to their husbands and women should prioritise their families, not paid work” (see table 38). On the other hand, a significant minority of people (27 per cent) agreed that regressive gender ideology did motivate men to join violent extremist groups.

Significantly, men recognized the attraction of gender regressive ideology in greater numbers. More men (32 per cent) than women (23 per cent) thought regressive gender ideology motivated men to join violent extremist groups.²⁵⁸ Half of people (44 per cent) worried about religious fundamentalism affecting women’s right to work and voice their opinions but 28 per cent of people were not concerned that religious fundamentalism would affect women’s rights (see table 39).²⁵⁹ Women (48 per cent) were more worried than men (40 per cent) were about religious fundamentalism affecting women’s rights.

258 Q47. “Men join violent extremist groups because these groups support ideas like women should be obedient to their husbands, and, women should prioritise their families, not paid work”

259 Q54. I am afraid that religious fundamentalism will impede women’s rights (e.g. ability to work, voicing their opinion in public).

TABLE 39:

Q54. I am afraid that religious fundamentalism will impede women’s rights (e.g. ability to work, voicing their opinion in public)

Q54	Country and Gender											
	Bangladesh				Indonesia				Philippines			
	Male	Female	Other	Total	Male	Female	Other	Total	Male	Female	Other	Total
Strongly disagree	26%	21%	18%	24%	17%	11%		14%	9%	9%		9%
2	13%	15%	9%	14%	16%	13%	100%	14%	15%	11%	100%	13%
3	22%	21%	18%	21%	28%	27%		27%	34%	34%		34%
4	15%	14%	18%	15%	22%	25%		23%	26%	26%		26%
Strongly agree	24%	30%	36%	27%	18%	24%		21%	16%	19%		18%

Extremist groups promote practices that harm women and girls online and offline

One last aspect of gender regressive ideology as a possible recruitment factor is extremist groups’ support for practices that harm women: polygamy and FGM, and more generalised support of and practice of polygamy and FGM. In the first place, rates of polygamy are quite low in Indonesia. The great majority of participants in focus group discussions did not support polygamy, although many knew someone in a polygamous relationship. There was tension in focus groups, however, between the idea that a male household head ought to decide on polygamy, and the notion that it was a woman’s choice.²⁶⁰ Women in the microfinance groups believed that their earning power gave them more power to refuse polygamy.²⁶¹

According to some participants in focus group discussions, Islamist and extremist organisations endorse polygamy. A female student from Cirebon stated: “The teaching in LDK (university student

association) is that polygamy is allowed. I, however, do not agree with polygamy”.²⁶² Religion, again, was used to justify the practice, as part of the Sunnah (the life and deeds of the Prophet Muhammed). Again, a woman from Cirebon said, “There is a Hadith which states that women who are available for polygamy will go to heaven. If, as a woman, we cannot get pregnant, then, yes, the husband can be polygamous”.²⁶³

Polygamy has been an on-going concern of both Islamist groups in Indonesia (van Wichelen 2009) and ISIS (Lahoud 2018). In the online space, as shown in Table 34 below, the word “*poligami*” (polygamy/more than one wife) is often paired with “*perkawinan*” (marriage), “*praktik*” (practice), “*pro*” (pro), and “*mapan*” (established) “*hak*” (right/the right), suggesting that discussions involve justifying the right to practice polygamy. An article in KDI argues that anyone (referring to a politician) who is against polygamy is ultimately going against the teachings of the Quran and cannot be considered a Muslim (KDIweb.wordpress.com 2014).²⁶⁴ Similarly, an article in women-specific Panjimas describes how an Indonesian actor and singer has come to change

260 Women only focus group discussion (012) in Indonesia Cirebon, female members of Nahdlatul Ulama, October 2018

261 Focus group discussion with women in a microfinance group (011) Indonesia: Depok, October 2018

262 Women only focus group discussion (015) in Indonesia: Cirebon, October 2018

263 Women only focus group discussion (017) in Indonesia: Cirebon, October 2018

264 “This Thaghut Servant Denies Polygamy”

TABLE 40:
Top word pairs for “Poligami” (polygamy)

Rank	Arrahman	Panjimas	Voalslam
1	mapan (2 mentions) well established	praktik (5 mentions) practice	raperda (7 mentions) Bill of legislation
2	kidul (2 mentions) key	dewi (4 mentions) goddess	pro (6 mentions) professional
3	wonosari (2 mentions) school	cowok (3 mentions) guy	pamekasan (6 mentions) coercion
4	muslimah (2 mentions) muslim woman	gue (3 mentions) stylish/cool	berpoligami (6 mentions) to practice polygamy (vb)
5	-	memeriksa (2 mentions) check out	kontra (5 mentions) contra
6	-	validitas (2 mentions) to validate	wahyu (4 mentions) revelation
7	-	mulia (2 mentions) noble (adj)	dilaksanakan (4 mentions) implement
8	-	ikhlas (2 mentions) sincerely	menyakiti (4 mentions) hurting
9	-	perancis (2 mentions) francis	syaikh (4 mentions) sheik
10	-	chou (2 mentions) cabbage	diperbincangkan (4 mentions) discussion
11	-	kalo (2 mentions) although	praktik (4 mentions) practice
12	-	lilin (2 mentions) candle	monogami (4 mentions) monogamy
13	-	bokap (2 mentions) abdominal pressure	-

TABLE 41:
Q78. Parents are entitled to circumcise their female children: Three countries

Q78	Country and Gender											
	Bangladesh				Indonesia				Philippines			
	Male	Female	Other	Total	Male	Female	Other	Total	Male	Female	Other	Total
Strongly disagree	48%	53%	18%	50%	28%	27%	100%	28%	36%	54%		45%
2	11%	10%		10%	13%	15%		14%	13%	12%	100%	12%
3	17%	15%		16%	28%	28%		28%	26%	19%		22%
4	8%	10%	27%	9%	12%	14%		13%	13%	8%		11%
Strongly agree	17%	13%	55%	16%	19%	16%		17%	12%	8%		10%

her mind about polygamy. According to the authors, the actor now says that to oppose polygamy is to oppose Allah (Panjimas.com 2015c).²⁶⁵ Other articles in Panjimas describe how women’s mobilisation against legalised polygamy in India is part of an anti-Islam agenda (Panjimas.com 2015g).²⁶⁶ An article in Voalslam outlines the necessary steps one needs to take to prepare themselves for a polygamous relationship (Voa-Islam.com 2018c).²⁶⁷

Islamist and extremist organisations also endorse FGM in their websites, in a context, however, where around half of Indonesian women have undergone FGM (UN Women 2018).

In the survey, around one third of women (30 per cent) and men (31 per cent) support parents’ rights to circumcise their female children (see table 41).

Support for FGM features in Indonesian extremist websites. Within the women-specific section of Panjimas, the word “*Khitan*” was paired with “*disabdakan*” (be said) and “*haruskah*” (should), as well as words describing male and female genitalia, such as “*kulup*” (foreskin) and “*klitoris*” (clitoris). These word pairs suggest that discussion both justifies and describes the practice. This is seen in the article “*Khitan Wanita, Haruskah?*” (Female Circumcision, Must You Do It?) (Panjimas.com 2015). The article argues that the Hadith (traditions or sayings of Prophet Muhammad) overwhelming supports FGM and that it is in fact mandatory. This article also briefly outlines when and how it is to be carried out. Another article quotes Egyptian doctors saying that FGM increases a husband’s pleasure and prevents cancer in men and women (Voa-Islam.com 2013). Finally, an article on the general audience section of Voalslam calls a UN vote in 2012 to ban

FGM worldwide a “nonsense opinion” of “liberals”. Notably, the Indonesia Ulama Council also supported overturning the ban on FGM (PRI.org 2015).

During the fieldwork in Cirebon, one young woman admitted to having had FGM performed at an Islamic boarding school. It was part of the school’s tradition, she said:

If we’re being honest, I resisted it, but I was forced to undergo it eventually by the school authority, as those who are not cut cannot be a student there. The process comprised a scraping of the inside part of the vagina. Apart from the fact it hurt, I could not tell what happened (inside).

TABLE 42:
Top word pairs for “*khitan*” (circumcision)

Rank	Panjimas
1	kulup (5 mentions) men’s foreskin
2	disabdakan (3 mentions)
3	klitoris (3 mentions) clitoris
4	haruskah (2 mentions) should
5	mengkhitani (2 mentions) to circumcise
6	amalan (2 mentions) practice
7	klitorisnya (2 mentions) the clitoris’
8	bahwasannya (2 mentions) truly
9	kuku (2 mentions) nail
10	istinja (2 mentions) cleaning after urinating or defecating

265 “Dewi Sandra: Opposing Polygamy means Opposing God”

266 “Polygamy Is Blamed, Ulama and Indian Muslim Leaders Suspect Islamophobia Agenda Ahead of Election.”

267 “Polygamy, Can It Really Be a Solution?” This mirrors material in the Islamic State women-specific online magazine Dabiq, where articles featured advice to women about how to live in polygamous relationships (Lahoud 2018).

6.6

EDUCATION

Universities are a site for mobilization both for and against extremism and violent extremism. Mobilization occurs in a context of vibrant religious student movements in various political and ideological streams. Parts of the student movement comprise Islamist youth cadres, which manifest in political activism, religious activities, and in pop culture (Saefullah 2017). Focus groups explained that students joined religious communities and cadres, forming campus communities with radical and intolerant views.

At base, gender ideologies of campus Islamist organizations promote traditional roles for men and women. Broadly, these groups condemn “secularism, pluralism, and liberalism” (Saat 2005). Moreover, these *-isms* are associated with the women’s movement. Large numbers of students are involved with university youth cadres, and while whether they are considered to be moderate or extremist varies according to participants, everyone agrees that there are large numbers of student members.²⁶⁸ Islamists target first year students with free food and campus activities.²⁶⁹ Some participants suggested that a mosque provides a meeting place to avoid going to classes.²⁷⁰

Participants in focus group discussions drew attention to the overlap of campus Islamists and political Islam. One male participant described how campus religious “are often affiliated with political parties. They even lead people’s opinion in order to gain political support over a decision. For example, many student organizations participated in demonstrations against Ahok, and campaigned for his impeachment”.²⁷⁸ All of the major reactionary forces recruit using youth cadres in the universities, DDII, Tarbiyah (PKS), Jemaat Tablighi, and Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI). HTI were seen by some as

“confrontational” during demonstrations, and “intense” in their missionary efforts.²⁷²

The overlap between youth cadres and party politics is significant, given the significant overlap between fundamentalism, radicalism and violent extremism in Indonesia (True and Eddyono 2017). Describing recruitment to campus Islamist organisations is also significant to our research, given Nuraniyah’s (2018) findings that most women in her study of Indonesian women members of IS had first joined a “gateway group” including, but not limited to PKS and HTI.

Campus based extremist groups target women students

According to focus group discussions, HTI and the PKS student-based organisation, Tarbiyah, deploy similar recruitment processes with ‘levels’ of commitment. It starts with recruitment to a cadre of LDK (*Lembaga Dakwah Kampus* – the organisation of campus proselytising), progressing to mentoring and Koranic recitation held once a week, then discussions about *dakwah* and *jihad*. There are campaigns held on campus to join the political party, PKS. The teachings are informed by the Koran and to the Sunnah (the

268 Mixed gender focus group discussion (016) in Indonesia: Cirebon, October 2018

269 Mixed gender focus group discussion (016) in Indonesia: Cirebon, October 2018

270 Women only focus group discussion (015) in Indonesia: Cirebon, October 2018

271 Focus group discussion with young male progressives (028) in Indonesia: Medan, October 2018

271 Focus group discussion with young male progressives (028) in Indonesia: Medan, October 2018

272 Women only focus group discussion (012) in Indonesia Cirebon, female members of Nahdlatul Ulama, October 2018. Tarbiyah is an Indonesia campus network organisation, somewhat based on the Muslim Brotherhood. Tarbiyah aims for a more political role for Islam in Indonesia, and has links to the PKS (Machmudi 2006).

deeds of Prophet Mohammad), and Hasan Albana's interpretations [the founder of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood].²⁷³

Extremist group HTI targets women students and professionals explicitly and has been particularly successful among women students. Nawab suggests that maybe more than half of HTIs members are women (Nawab 2018, 101). This is supported but not confirmed by our qualitative data, wherein young women participants were targeted and joined conservative and Islamist groups on campus (The Jakarta Post 2018).

Analysts Hadiz and Rahman Alamsya note that in Indonesia, violent extremists appeal to concrete social circumstances—social displacements, socio-economic and systemic marginalization (Rahman Alamsyah and Hadiz 2017, 69). Notably absent from such analysis, however, is the role that gender inequalities and grievances might play in motivations, recruitment and mobilization of women to violent extremist groups. Studies of Indonesian women who had been in violent extremist or fundamentalist groups told researchers desire for political change motivated them (Marcoes 2015, Nuraniyah 2018). Like men were, these women were propelled by a sense of injustice in concrete social circumstance, including the inability to mitigate high levels of poverty Indonesia (Marcoes 2015).

Extremist groups tap into specific gender injustices to appeal to women. In the women-specific sections of the website Voaislam, the term fighter is most commonly paired with words like “Kartini” and “Raden” (the most famous Indonesian champion of women's rights), and “emansipasi” (emancipation). The struggle here is not global conflicts, but of women's rights. Interestingly however, Voaislam articles that feature this combination of word pairings try to paint the Indonesian national hero of the colonial era, Kartini, as a devout Muslim woman, whose image has been hijacked to make it seem like she was a champion of women's rights (Voa-Islam.

com 2017).²⁷⁴ Interestingly then, extremists re-deploy the language of feminist struggle to their cause of “Dakwah” (missionary work), creating a more devout society.

Inside campus extremist groups, “gender rules” increase as women progress in the organisation

Once recruited, we suggest that women are incorporated in a gendered manner into HTI. Very significantly, as women are promoted in the group structure, there is a pattern of increasing gender regressive ideology and practice – “gender rules”. For example, one woman in a FDG in Cirebon described her recruitment to a group she described as radical because of their anti-Christian stance, their strict gender segregation, and their doctrine of “just religious war” (*jihad fī sabīlillāh*) and of “religious pre-marital celibacy” (*jomblo fī sabīlillāh*). During the initial meetings on campus, extremist groups hold events on topics such as the “role of women at home, how to be good wives, etc.”²⁷⁵ The groups invite select women to lead a Koranic recitation. Some women then might become a cadre of a radical group. Following this kind of process, one participant in a focus group described how she was appointed to a leadership position in the state university's mosque. At this point, gender segregation was strictly enforced, and control over her increased. The group condemned her taking philosophy as a subject. In “Basic Leadership Training”, the emphasis was on gender regressive practices. She described how:

*Basic Leadership Training relates to the rules that shall be implemented between men and women, such as not allowing handshakes between men and women, and how to dress appropriately. When there is a study group involving men and women there will nonetheless be a separation between them. Even looking at the shadows of a different gender through their clothing is prohibited.*²⁷⁶

273 Women only focus group discussion (015) in Indonesia: Cirebon, October 2018

274 “The Mystery of the Dream of Kartini”

275 Mixed gender focus group discussion (016) in Indonesia: Cirebon, October 2018

276 Mixed gender focus group discussion (016) in Indonesia: Cirebon, October 2018

Thus, as women enter the campus Islamist organization, they acquire more prestige and responsibility, at the same time as they are subject to stricter application of the gender rules. For instance, starting with forbidding handshaking between men and women, then dating, then spatial gender segregation takes place. Finally, even observing someone from the opposite sex closely are forbidden. There is little space in campus religious organisations for women’s leadership, although women make up a significant number of the regular members. Again, the ideology of male authority is strong in campus religious organisations. One young Javanese woman described how in even in her Islamic religious organization, considered by many to be a moderate organisation, women never become the leaders [...], and men make all the decisions. She also said they decided which activities would take place, “If the men do not approve, then there is no activity”.²⁷⁷ Another female sociology undergraduate said male chauvinism was the reason for her leaving her Islamist organisation. She recalled:

Every time I had an opinion or did work, it was not appreciated. I was only allowed to work behind the scenes. Men made the decisions and public appearances. This is not in line with the Islam that I believe. The final straw came during an intellectual dispute with another member, where I was yelled by the chairman who said, “What do women know about these things?!”²⁷⁸

An additional aspect of gendered recruitment and mobilisation to Islamist groups is the overlap with an emergent youth premarital celibacy movement that promotes arranged marriages. Research participants noted that the “*fissabilillah* singles movement” is “trending” in Cirebon. The basic concept of this movement is that one must not be any romantic relationship with the opposite sex before marriage. Adherents and promoters justify this by saying that dating is not permitted in Islam. Rather than dating, members find partners through Taaruf (arranged marriage between families).²⁷⁹

277 Discussion with moderate, female undergraduate students (o24) in Indonesia: Medan, October 2018. Respondent A is a student majoring in sociology

278 Discussion with moderate, female undergraduate students (o24) in Indonesia: Medan, October 2018. Respondent B is also a student majoring in sociology

279 Mixed gender focus group discussion (o16) in Indonesia: Cirebon, October 2018

6.7

ROLE OF PARENTS

Several participants expected a disciplinarian father, as the undisputed head of the family, would be key part to preventing violent extremism. A woman participant in Depok suggested, “Men are still the head of the family. Because most children are more obedient to their fathers. Fathers are the role model”.²⁸⁰ A male participant in Depok also linked preventing violent extremism to wifely obedience: “Mothers have a greater influence in educating children. However, wives must obey their husbands, so it means that husbands have control over, and are responsible for, their children. Thus, husbands have bigger role in preventing children from being involved with extremism or terrorism”.²⁸¹

Analysis of Indonesian survey responses showed overwhelmingly support for “strong fathers” in households, with most participants though that strong fathers were important (27 per cent) or extremely important (59 per cent) to the importance of strong fathers.²⁸² However, like our other case studies, even greater numbers of people strongly supported the notion of having a “caring father”, with 74 per cent naming a caring father as extremely important (16 per cent saying it was “important”).²⁸³ Men and women both supported strong and caring fathers to the same degree.

In line with other research, many survey respondents felt that mothers were the key part of preventing violent extremism. Indonesian survey respondents thought that strong and caring mothers were very important to households. Specifically, 48 per cent of respondents thought strong mothers were extremely important. However, more people (80 per cent) thought caring mothers were extremely important. Women supported the notion of strong mothers (85 per cent) more than men (76 per cent), while slightly

more men supported the notion of caring mother (90 per cent) than women (94 per cent).²⁸⁴

Decisively, 86 per cent of Indonesian respondents agreed or strongly agreed that mothers can watch for signs that a son might join a violent extremist group with no gender difference in the responses. When asked whether a strong father would stop his children becoming extremists, support was likewise strong; however, this view was stronger among men (72 per cent) than women (61 per cent). Similar to the 2017 results many respondents felt that mothers were more involved in their children’s lives, and children were more likely to confide in their mothers (True et al. 2019). Several religious figures and religious people suggested that the “mother is the first madrassah”, teaching her children the right version of religion.²⁸⁵

One participant was a mother to a child who had joined a Wahabi-related fundamentalist group. She said that her son’s righteous and angry behaviour in public was difficult and made her uncomfortable.

280 Focus group discussion with married women (009) in Indonesia, Depok, October 2018

281 Men only focus group discussion (007) in Indonesia: Depok, October 2018

282 Q 58. How important is it to have a strong father in a household?

283 Q 60. How important is it to have a caring father in the household?

284 Q 59. How important is it to have a strong mother in a household?; Q 62. How important is it to have a caring mother in a household?

285 Women only focus group discussion (017) in Indonesia: Cirebon, October 2018

Within the home, she preferred not to challenge him directly: she “didn’t say too much”. She described her attempts to reach out to him:

I have been triggered into a debate once with my child. And the more I debated, the more my child became quiet and sought answers elsewhere. That’s why I don’t want to engage in debates. [For example], I tried learning to recite Khosidah poetry, and he got upset because he sees it as singing. I want him to be more open and not get upset easily.²⁸⁶

However, it is crucial to recognise that mothers and fathers can also support extremist groups. In the online space, extremist groups have recognized this. For example, an article on VoalIslam was entitled “*Untuk Semua Bunda, Jadikanlah Rumahmu Sebagai Madrasah Syuhada*” (For All Mothers, Turn Your House into a Madrasah for Martyrs). The article urges all mothers to teach their children the Quran so that they can become a mujahid and “syahid” (martyr) (Voa-Islam.com 2014). Thus, recruitment and drumming up support targets women as mothers of potential fighters.

286 Key Interview with a woman in Cirebon (008) Indonesia: Cirebon – October 2018

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APPENDIX A:

PRIMARY SOURCES

The Philippines

Source Reference	Gender	Site	Notes
FGDo64-F_Philippines Basilan	Women	Basilan	Young women
FGDo65-F_Philippines Basilan	Women	Basilan	
FGDo66-F_Philippines Basilan	Women	Basilan	
FGDo67-M_Philippines Basilan	Men	Basilan	
FGDo68-M_Philippines Basilan	Men	Basilan	
FGDo69-Mixed_Philippines Basilan	Mixed	Basilan	
FGDo70-Mixed_Philippines Basilan	Mixed	Basilan	
FGDo71-Mixed_Philippines Zamboanga	Mixed	Zamboanga	
FGDo72-Mixed-Philippines Zamboanga	Mixed	Zamboanga	Members of civil society
FGDo73-M_Philippines Zamboanga -- older men interreligious group	Men	Zamboanga	
FGDo74-F_Philippines Zamboanga	Women	Zamboanga	Older women, graduate level education
FGDo75-Mixed_Philippines Zamboanga	Mixed	Zamboanga	LGBTIQ
FGDo76-Mixed_Philippines Zamboanga-	Men	Zamboanga	Security Sector workers
FGDo77-F_Philippines Zamboanga	Women	Zamboanga	
FGDo78-M_Philippines Zamboanga --	Men	Zamboanga	Young men
FGDo79-Mixed_Philippines Lanao	Men	Lanao del Sur	Victims and participants in the Marawi siege
FGDo80 – Mixed_Philippines Lanao + Marawi	Mixed	Lanao del Sur	
FGDo80-F_Philippines Lanao	Women	Lanao del Sur	Young women
FGDo81-F_Philippines Lanao	Women	Lanao del Sur	Mothers

Source Reference	Gender	Site	Notes
FGDo82-F_Philippines Lanao --	Women	Lanao del Sur	Women professionals
FGDo82-Mixed_Philippines Lanao	Mixed	Lanao del Sur	Youth
FGDo83-Mixed_Philippines Lanao	Mixed	Lanao del Sur	
FGDo84-M_Philippines Lanao	Men	Lanao del Sur	
FGDo85-M_Philippines Lanao	Men	Lanao del Sur	
FGDo86-Mixed_Philippines Maguindanao	Mixed	Maguindanao	Youth
FGDo87-F_Philippines Maguindanao --	Women	Maguindanao	Young women Muslims
FGDo88-F_Philippines Maguindanao	Women	Maguindanao	Mothers
FGDo89-M_Philippines Maguindanao	Men	Maguindanao	Fathers
FGDo90-Mixed_Philippines Maguindanao	Mixed	Maguindanao	Youth
FGDo91-Mixed Philippines Maguindanao	Mixed	Maguindanao	
FGDo92-Mixed_Philippines Maguindanao	Mixed	Maguindanao	
FGDo93-Mixed_Philippines Maguindanao	Mixed	Maguindanao	
FGDo94-Mixed_Philippines Maguindanao	Mixed	Maguindanao	
KIIo10-M_Philippines Maguindanao	Man	Maguindanao	Religious Leader
KIIo11-F_Philippines Zamboanga	Woman	Zamboanga	Moro Woman Leader
KIIo12-M_Philippines Zamboanga	Man	Zamboanga	Male Ulama
KIIo13-F_Philippines Basilan	Woman	Basilan	Implementer and teacher
KIIo14-F_Philippines Basilan	Woman	Basilan	Implementer
KIIo15-F_Philippines Basilan	Woman	Basilan	Implementer
KIIo16-F_Philippines Lanao	Woman	Lanao del Sur	Youth Leader
KIIo17-F_Philippines Lanao	Woman	Lanao del Sur	Female victim of IS in Marawi Siege
OBSoo1_Philippines Basilan	Mixed	Basilan	Gender + Entrepreneurship training with local middle-class leaders
OBSoo2_Philippines Basilan	Mixed	Basilan	Gender + Entrepreneurship training with local middle-class leaders

Source Reference	Gender	Site	Notes
OBS003_Philippines Basilan	Mixed	Basilan	Gender + Entrepreneurship training with local middle-class leaders
OBS004_Philippines Basilan	Mixed	Basilan	Microfinance Training prospective clients
OBS005_Philippines Basilan	Mixed	Basilan	Microfinance Training prospective clients
OBS006_Philippines Basilan	Mixed	Basilan	Notes on KIIs with Implementers TMI
OBS007_Philippines Basilan	Mixed	Basilan	Notes on Basilan program TMI
OBS008_Philippines	NA		Research Report

Bangladesh

Source Reference	Gender	Site	Notes
FGDo32-M_Bangladesh Satkhira	Men	Satkhira	Young Men
FGDo33-M_Bangladesh Satkhira	Men	Satkhira	Young Men
FGDo34-M_Bangladesh Satkhira	Men	Satkhira	Young Men
FGDo35-F_Bangladesh Satkhira	Women	Satkhira	Young Women
FGDo36-F_Bangladesh Satkhira --	Women	Satkhira	Married Women
FGDo37-M_Bangladesh Satkhira --	Mixed	Satkhira	Community Action Group
FGDo38-F_Bangladesh Satkhira	Women	Satkhira	Married Women
FGDo39-M_Bangladesh Satkhira	Men	Satkhira	Young Men
FGDo40-F_Bangladesh Joypurhat	Women	Joypurhat	Young Women
FGDo41-M_Bangladesh Joypurhat	Men	Joypurhat	Young Men
FGDo42-M_Bangladesh Joypurhat	Men	Joypurhat	Young Men
FGDo43-M_Bangladesh Joypurhat	Men	Joypurhat	Young Men
FGDo44-M_Bangladesh Joypurhat	Men	Joypurhat	Young Men
FGDo45-F_Bangladesh Joypurhat	Women	Joypurhat	Young Women
FGDo46-F_Bangladesh Joypurhat	Women	Joypurhat	Young Women

Source Reference	Gender	Site	Notes
FGDo47-F_Bangladesh Joypurhat	Women	Joypurhat	Young Women
FGDo48-M_Bangladesh Joypurhat	Mixed	Joypurhat	Community Action Group
FGDo49a – F Bangladesh Kushtia	Women	Kushtia	Young women at the Islamic University
FGDo49b – F Bangladesh Kushtia	Women	Kushtia	Young women at the Islamic University
FGDo49c -M Bangladesh Kushtia	Men	Kushtia	Young men at the Islamic University
FGDo49-d Bangladesh Kushtia	Women	Kushtia	Young women at the Islamic University
FGDo49 e Bangladesh Kushtia	Men	Kushtia	Young men at the Islamic University
FGDo50-F_Bangladesh Kushtia	Women	Kushtia	Young women at the Islamic University
FGDo51-M_Bangladesh Kushtia	Men	Kushtia	Young men at the Islamic University
FGDo52-M_Bangladesh Kushtia	Men	Kushtia	Young men at the Islamic University
FGDo53-F_Bangladesh Kushtia	Women	Kushtia	Young women at the Islamic University
FGDo54-F_Bangladesh Dhaka	Women	Dhaka	Young women at the Independent University
FGDo55-M_Bangladesh Dhaka	Men	Dhaka	Young men at the Independent University
FGDo56-M_Bangladesh Dhaka	Men	Dhaka	Young men at the Independent University
FGDo57-F_Bangladesh Dhaka	Women	Dhaka	Young women at the Independent University
FGDo58-F_Bangladesh Dhaka	Women	Dhaka	Young women at the Independent University
FGDo59-M_Bangladesh Dhaka	Men	Dhaka	Young men at the Independent University
FGDo60-M_Bangladesh Dhaka	Men	Dhaka	Young men at the Independent University
FGDo61-F_Bangladesh Dhaka	Women	Dhaka	Young women at the Independent University
FGDo62-F_Bangladesh Dhaka	Women	Dhaka	Young women at the Independent University

Source Reference	Gender	Site	Notes
FGDo63-F_Bangladesh Dhaka	Women	Dhaka	Young women at the Independent University
KIIo19-mixed_Bangladesh Satkhira	Mixed	Satkhira	Five Participants: Program participants and BRAC Managers
KIIo20-F_Bangladesh Satkhira	Women	Satkhira	Two Participants: Program participants and BRAC Managers
KIIo21-F Bangladesh Dhaka	Women	Dhaka	Women's Rights Activist
KIIo22-F Bangladesh Dhaka	Women	Dhaka	Women's Rights Activist
KIIo23-F Bangladesh Dhaka	Women	Dhaka	Women's Rights Activist
KIIo24-F Bangladesh Dhaka	Women	Dhaka	Women's Rights Activist
KIIo25-F Bangladesh Dhaka	Women	Dhaka	Women's Rights Activist
OBSo14-F_Bangladesh Satkhira	Women	Satkhira	Woman member of Palli Shamaj
OBSo15-F_Bangladesh Satkhira	Women	Satkhira	Woman member of Palli Shamaj
OBSo16-F_Bangladesh Satkhira	Women	Satkhira	Woman member of Palli Shamaj
OBSo17-F_Bangladesh Satkhira	Women	Satkhira	Woman member of Palli Shamaj
OBSo18-F_Bangladesh Satkhira	Women	Satkhira	Community Action Group (CAG) meeting
OBSo19-F_Bangladesh Joypurhat	Women	Joypurhat	Women members of Palli Shamaj who were working in agriculture
OBSo20-F_Bangladesh Joypurhat	Women	Joypurhat	Woman member of Palli Shamaj
OBSo21-F_Bangladesh Joypurhat	Women	Joypurhat	Women members of Palli Shamaj who were working in agriculture
OBSo22-F_Bangladesh Joypurhat	Women	Joypurhat	Interactive Popular Theatre (IPT) Show
OBSo23-F_Bangladesh Joypurhat	Women	Joypurhat	Harmony Fair
OBSo24-F_Bangladesh Joypurhat	Women	Joypurhat	Community Action Group (CAG) meeting

Indonesia

Source Reference	Gender	Site	Notes
FGD007-M_Indonesia Depok	Men	Depok	
FGD008-F_Indonesia Depok	Women	Depok	Microfinance Group
FGD009-F_Indonesia Depok	Women	Depok	Microfinance Group
FGD010-M_Indonesia Depok	Men	Depok	
FGD011-F_Indonesia Depok	Women	Depok	Microfinance Group
FGD012-F_Indonesia Cirebon	Women	Cirebon	
FGD014-M_Indonesia Cirebon	Men	Cirebon	
FGD015-F_Indonesia Cirebon	Women	Cirebon	
FGD016_Indonesia Cirebon	Mixed	Cirebon	
FGD017-F_Indonesia Cirebon	Women	Cirebon	
FGD018-F_Indonesia Klaten	Women	Klaten	Microfinance Group
FGD019-F_Indonesia Klaten	Women	Klaten	Microfinance Group
FGD020-F_Indo Klaten	Women	Klaten	Microfinance Group
FGD021-F_Indonesia Klaten	Women	Klaten	Microfinance Group
FGD022-F_Indonesia Klaten	Women	Klaten	
FGD023-M_Indonesia Klaten	Men	Klaten	
FGD024-F_Indonesia Medan	Women	Medan	Moderate students
FGD025-F_Indonesia Medan	Women	Medan	Religious discussion group
FGD026- Mixed_Indonesia Medan	Mixed	Medan	
FGD027-M_Indonesia Medan	Men	Medan	Older men
FGD028-M_Indonesia Medan	Men	Medan	Young male Progressives
FGD029-F_Indonesia Medan	Women	Medan	Female students Muslim and Christian
FGD030-M_Indonesia Medan	Men	Medan	Young Male Students
KII001-F_Indonesia Klaten	Woman	Klaten	Microfinance Group Leader
KII002-F_Indonesia Klaten	Women	Klaten	Implementers

Source Reference	Gender	Site	Notes
KI1003-F_ Indonesia Depok	Women	Depok	Implementers
KI1004-M_ Indonesia Depok_	Man	Depok	Implementers
KI1005_ Indonesia Depok One woman, One man	Mixed	Depok	Implementers
KI1006-F_ Indonesia Cirebon	Woman	Cirebon	Female Muslim Leader
KI1007-F_ Indonesia Cirebon	Woman	Cirebon	Female Islamist Student
KI1008-F_ Indonesia Cirebon	Woman	Cirebon	Mother worried about a radicalised child
KI1009-M_ Indonesia Cirebon	Men	Cirebon	Male Islamic Boarding Schools (Pesantren) workers
OBS010_ Indonesia Depok	Women	Depok	Microfinance group meeting
OBS011_ Indonesia Depok	Women	Depok	Microfinance group meeting
OBS012_ Indonesia Klaten	Women	Klaten	Microfinance coordination meeting
OBS012_ Indonesia Klaten	Women	Klaten	Fish Festival and statue inauguration

GLOSSARY

Term	Translation
Toril	Religious Boarding Schools
Imam	Islamic Religious Term For Religious Leader
Madrassa	Religious School
Ushra	A Study Circle
Haram	Profane/ Proscribed
Purdah	Veil
Niqab	Veil
Aurat	Naked/Genitalia
Majelis Taklim	Religious Discussion Group
Fitnah	Slander/Sedition/Seduction
Ridho/Ridha	Pleasure
Nikah Muda	Early Marriage (Child Marriage)
Liqa	Recitation
Dakwah	Proselytization
Taaruf	Arranged Marriage Between Families
Khosidah	Poetry

APPENDIX B:

SURVEY SCALES

Hostile Sexism Scale

- Q24.** Women seek to gain power by getting control over men.
- Q26.** Women exaggerate problems they have with looking after the family
- Q27.** Women are too easily offended
- Q28.** Women's rights activists are seeking for women to have more power than men
- Q29.** Many women interpret innocent remarks or acts as sexual harassment
- Q30.** Many women are actually seeking special favours, such as preferential treatment or alimony after divorce that favour them over men, under the guise of asking for "equality"
- Q31.** It is generally safer not to trust women too much
- Q32.** I am sure I get a raw deal from women in my life.

Benevolent Sexism Scale

- Q33.** When I am in a group consisting of equal numbers of men and women and a woman dominates the conversation I feel uncomfortable.
- Q34.** The political leadership of a community should be largely in the hands of men
- Q35.** The religious leadership of a community should be largely in the hands of men
- Q36.** Every man ought to have a woman whom he adores
- Q37.** Men should be willing to sacrifice their own well-being in order to provide financially for the women in their lives
- Q38.** Women tend to have a superior moral sensibility than men
- Q39.** Women need a male guardian to ensure their safety and protection
- Q40.** Women need a male guardian to protect their honour

Supporting Violence Against Women Scale

- Q 64.** Physical force between couples can be excused if it results from people getting so angry that they temporarily lose control
- Q 69.** A husband would be entitled to use physical force if his wife argues with him, or refuses to obey him
- Q 70.** A husband would be entitled to use physical force if she doesn't keep up with domestic chores, including looking after the children appropriately
- Q 71.** A husband would be entitled to use physical force if she goes out without telling him
- Q 72.** The marriage contract generally entitles a husband to have sexual relations with his wife, even if she does not want to
- Q 73.** A husband is entitled to use physical force if his wife refuses to have sex with him
- Q 79.** If a daughter has a relationship with an unsuitable man, her father or brother is entitled to use physical force/ violence to punish her for bringing dishonour on the family

Items measuring support for practices that harm women and girls

- Q 68.** Women should always tell their husbands when they are going out
- Q 75.** A father is entitled to receive a bride-price for his daughter
- Q 76.** A father is entitled to marry his daughter to a man of his choosing, even if his daughter is under 16 years old
- Q 78.** Parents are entitled to circumcise their female children

APPENDIX C:

SURVEY QUESTIONS

Q2	What is your age (in years)?	Q24	Women seek to gain power by getting control over men.
Q3	What is your gender? - Selected Choice	Q26	Women exaggerate problems they have with looking after the family.
Q3_1	What is your gender? - Other	Q27	Women are too easily offended.
Q4	What is your highest level of education?	Q28	Women's rights activists are seeking for women to have more power than men.
Q5	What is your religion? - Selected Choice	Q29	Many women interpret innocent remarks or acts as sexual harassment.
Q5_1	What is your religion? - Other	Q30	Many women are actually seeking special favors, such as preferential treatment or alimony after divorce that favor them over men, under the guise of asking for
Q6	In general, how religious do you consider yourself to be?	Q31	It is generally safer not to trust women too much.
Q7	What kind of social media do you use? Select as many as apply. - Selected Choice	Q32	I am sure I get a raw deal from women in my life.
Q7_1	What kind of social media do you use? Select as many as apply. - Other	Q33	When I am in a group consisting of equal numbers of men and women and a woman dominates the conversation I feel uncomfortable.
Q8	How often have you seen intolerant content posted in social media?	Q34	The political leadership of a community should be largely in the hands of men.
Q9	How often have you seen social media content (e.g. posts, tweets, videos, etc.) inciting religious violence towards religious minorities?	Q35	The religious leadership of a community should be largely in the hands of men.
Q10	How often have you seen social media content (e.g. posts, tweets, videos, etc.) inciting religious violence towards ethnic minorities?	Q36	Every man ought to have a woman whom he adores.
Q11	How often have you seen social media content (e.g. posts, tweets, videos, etc.) inciting religious violence towards women and girls?	Q37	Men should be willing to sacrifice their own well-being in order to provide financially for the women in their lives.
Q77	How often have you seen social media content (e.g. posts, tweets, videos, etc.) inciting violent jihad?	Q38	Women tend to have a superior moral sensibility than men.
Q12	How often have you seen violent extremist groups trying to recruit members through social media?	Q39	Women need a male guardian to ensure their safety and protection.
Q16	Strong personality	Q40	Women need a male guardian to protect their honour.
Q17	Dominant	Q41	In a previous meeting in the community, we asked about her views on changing gender roles in the household. She said: I think women should manage the home and be responsible for raising the children. When we start joining politics, that just provokes men. How much do you agree with statement?
Q18	Assertive		
Q19	Defend own beliefs		
Q21	Forceful		
Q22	Aggressive		

- Q42** Another woman, had a different view to []. She said: Women joining politics: That's good. Women know how to manage households and families, and have education now to manage the country. How much do you agree with [] statement?
-
- Q43** [] told us at a community meeting that some women working overseas sent money to groups fighting in Marawi and Syria. [] told us: I respect these women who sent money to support these fighters. Women can't fight, but they can help support the fighters in these areas. How much do you agree with [] statement?
-
- Q46** If groups are fighting for their religious ideals and way of life, they are justified in using violence, even if it breaks the law and injures civilians.
-
- Q47** Men join violent extremist groups because these groups support ideas like women should be obedient to their husbands, and, women should prioritise their families, not paid work.
-
- Q48** When women join a violent extremist group, it is because they are forced or pressured by male family members or their religious leader.
-
- Q49** When women join a violent extremist group, it is because they feel empowered to support what they see as a "just cause"
-
- Q50** Young men join extremist groups to pay dowry, bride-price or to cover similar expenses associated with weddings and marriage.
-
- Q53** I am worried about intolerance in my community.
-
- Q54** I am afraid that religious fundamentalism will impede women's rights (e.g. ability to work, voicing their opinion in public).
-
- Q55** I am worried about violent extremism in my country.
-
- Q58** How important is it to have a strong father in a household?
-
- Q60** How important is it to have a caring father in the household?
-
- Q59** How important is it to have a strong mother in a household?
-
- Q62** How important is it to have a caring mother in a household?
-
- Q63** A number of people suggested that the presence of a strong father in the household would prevent his children from joining VE groups. For instance, [] told us: If a father is strong, and rules his family well, then his children won't disobey him and join a violent extremist group. How much do you agree with this statement?
-
- Q63** Another group pointed towards the importance of having a caring mother in the household. For instance, [] told us: Caring mothers know where their children are, and can watch for signs a son might join a violent extremist group. How much do you agree with this statement?
-
- Q64** Physical force between couples can be excused if it results from people getting so angry that they temporarily lose control
-
- Q67** Most women could leave a violent relationship if they really wanted to
-
- Q68** Women should always tell their husbands when they are going out
-
- Q69** A husband would be entitled to use physical force if his wife argues with him, or refuses to obey him.
-
- Q70** A husband would be entitled to use physical force if she doesn't keep up with domestic chores, including looking after the children appropriately.
-
- Q71** A husband would be entitled to use physical force if she goes out without telling him.
-
- Q72** The marriage contract generally entitles a husband to have sexual relations with his wife, even if she does not want to.
-
- Q73** A husband is entitled to use physical force if his wife refuses to have sex with him.
-
- Q74** The marriage contract generally entitles a husband to have sexual relations with his wife, even if she does not want to
-
- Q75** A father is entitled to receive a bride-price for his daughter.
-
- Q76** A father is entitled to marry his daughter to a man of his choosing, even if his daughter is under 16 years old.
-
- Q77** Parents are entitled to circumcise their male children.
-
- Q78** Parents are entitled to circumcise their female children.
-
- Q79** If a daughter has a relationship with an unsuitable man, her father or brother is entitled to use physical force/violence to punish her for bringing dishonour on the family.
-

APPENDIX D:

CORRELATION TABLES

Bangladesh									
	Hostile Sexism Scale	Benevolent Sexism Scale	Support for Violent Extremism	Supporting Violence Against Women	Coercive and Control	Male Leader	Education	Religiosity	Age
Hostile Sexism Scale	1								
	944								
Benevolent Sexism Scale	0.7003*	1							
	878	927							
Support for Violent Extremism	0.4524*	0.3833*	1						
	931	917	991						
Supporting Violence Against Women	0.5799*	0.4812*	0.5032*	1					
	880	872	925	934					
Coercive and Control	0.4851*	0.4710*	0.4437*	0.7156*	1				
	891	880	941	902	950				
Male Leader	0.6141*	0.8275*	0.3393*	0.4909*	0.4256*	1			
	921	927	961	905	919	974			
Education	0.0746*	0.0514	-0.0212	-0.0851*	-0.1083*	0.016	1		
	939	920	984	927	943	967	1002		
Religiosity	0.1456*	0.2334*	0.0887*	0.1066*	0.0910*	0.2162*	0.0519	1	
	940	924	986	930	946	970	998	1004	
Age	0.0102	0.0049	-0.0169	0.0064	-0.0231	-0.0224	0.0992*	-0.0661*	1
	937	920	984	927	944	967	996	998	1002

*indicates statistically significant scores

Indonesia

	Hostile Sexism Scale	Benevolent Sexism Scale	Support for Violent Extremism	Supporting Violence Against Women	Coercive and Control	Male Leader	Education	Religiosity	Age
Hostile Sexism Scale	1								
	972								
Benevolent Sexism Scale	0.5082*	1							
	937	979							
Support for Violent Extremism	0.3613*	0.1706*	1						
	967	973	1014						
Supporting Violence Against Women	0.4433*	0.3042*	0.5667*	1					
	936	939	973	977					
Coercive and Control	0.2783*	0.3558*	0.3286*	0.6001*	1				
	943	948	980	954	984				
Male Leader	0.4223*	0.7990*	0.1637*	0.3232*	0.3148*	1			
	960	979	1000	965	972	1006			
Education	0.0359	-0.0501	0.0163	-0.045	-0.0097	-0.0645*	1		
	970	978	1012	975	982	1004	1018		
Religiosity	0.0961*	0.1257*	0.1644*	0.1185*	0.1741*	0.0938*	0.2272*	1	
	971	978	1013	976	983	1005	1017	1019	
Age	-0.037	0.0107	-0.057	-0.0014	-0.026	0.021	0.2673*	0.1817*	1
	968	975	1010	973	980	1002	1014	1015	1016

* indicates statistically significant scores

Philippines

	Hostile Sexism Scale	Benevolent Sexism Scale	Support for Violent Extremism	Supporting Violence Against Women	Coercive and Control	Male Leader	Education	Religiosity	Age
Hostile Sexism Scale	1								
	937								
Benevolent Sexism Scale	0.5766*	1							
	886	950							
Support for Violent Extremism	0.3325*	0.3086*	1						
	933	947	1013						
Supporting Violence Against Women	0.4460*	0.3767*	0.5061*	1					
	891	900	955	959					
Coercive and Control	0.4200*	0.4314*	0.4717*	0.8212*	1				
	906	920	977	933	981				
Male Leader	0.4758*	0.7707*	0.2653*	0.4136*	0.3933*	1			
	918	950	987	935	958	991			
Education	-0.0206	0.0044	-0.0541	-0.1299*	-0.1045*	-0.0392	1		
	933	946	1009	957	977	987	1015		
Religiosity	0.1238*	0.2170*	0.0927*	0.1464*	0.1523*	0.1607*	0.1288*	1	
	935	948	1011	956	978	989	1013	1016	
Age	-0.0537	0.0346	-0.0788*	-0.1099*	-0.0778*	0.0437	0.1450*	0.0477	1
	930	943	1005	950	972	983	1006	1008	1010

* indicates statistically significant scores

Bangladesh -Male

	Hostile Sexism Scale	Benevolent Sexism Scale	Support for Violent Extremism	Supporting Violence Against Women	Coercive and Control	Male Leader	Education	Religiosity	Age
Hostile Sexism Scale	1								
	474								
Benevolent Sexism Scale	0.6427*	1							
	440	462							
Support for Violent Extremism	0.3167*	0.2439*	1						
	467	457	496						
Supporting Violence Against Women	0.4381*	0.3427*	0.3469*	1					
	434	424	455	459					
Coercive and Control	0.3961*	0.3093*	0.3010*	0.6367*	1				
	448	439	473	445	478				
Male Leader	0.5351*	0.7780*	0.2268*	0.3973*	0.3280*	1			
	461	462	477	440	458	484			
Education	0.0801	0.1241*	-0.009	-0.1196*	-0.1211*	0.059	1		
	474	461	495	458	477	483	505		
Religiosity	0.1805*	0.2610*	0.1153*	0.1305*	0.0874	0.2325*	0.0936*	1	
	472	461	493	457	476	482	502	503	
Age	-0.0229	-0.0409	-0.0877	-0.0592	-0.0659	-0.0457	0.2276*	-0.0954*	1
	468	456	490	453	473	478	499	497	500

* indicates statistically significant scores

Bangladesh -Female

	Hostile Sexism Scale	Benevolent Sexism Scale	Support for Violent Extremism	Supporting Violence Against Women	Coercive and Control	Male Leader	Education	Religiosity	Age
Hostile Sexism Scale	1								
	437								
Benevolent Sexism Scale	0.7195*	1							
	407	432							
Support for Violent Extremism	0.5829*	0.5002*	1						
	432	428	461						
Supporting Violence Against Women	0.6777*	0.5717*	0.6412*	1					
	415	416	438	442					
Coercive and Control	0.5485*	0.5814*	0.5798*	0.7790*	1				
	410	409	435	425	438				
Male Leader	0.6726*	0.8861*	0.4351*	0.5509*	0.5076*	1			
	427	432	450	432	427	455			
Education	0.0257	-0.0413	-0.0401	-0.0833	-0.1051*	-0.0507	1		
	435	429	458	439	435	452	465		
Religiosity	0.1240*	0.2231*	0.0674	0.0684	0.0759	0.1979*	0.0204	1	
	436	431	460	441	437	454	464	467	
Age	0.0272	0.0358	0.0181	0.0328	0.0164	-0.019	-0.0194	-0.0352	
	437	432	461	442	438	455	465	467	468

*indicates statistically significant scores

Indonesia - Male

	Hostile Sexism Scale	Benevolent Sexism Scale	Support for Violent Extremism	Supporting Violence Against Women	Coercive and Control	Male Leader	Education	Religiosity	Age
Hostile Sexism Scale	1								
	489								
Benevolent Sexism Scale	0.4536*	1							
	474	494							
Support for Violent Extremism	0.2512*	0.0473	1						
	486	490	509						
Supporting Violence Against Women	0.3318*	0.2093*	0.5516*	1					
	469	472	485	488					
Coercive and Control	0.2104*	0.2790*	0.2995*	0.5445*	1				
	472	476	488	477	491				
Male Leader	0.3618*	0.8002*	0.0656	0.2406*	0.2180*	1			
	483	494	502	483	486	506			
Education	0.0205	-0.0942*	-0.0101	-0.1266*	-0.067	-0.0724	1		
	489	494	509	488	491	506	513		
Religiosity	0.0616	0.0672	0.0383	0.0502	0.1636*	0.0511	0.2240*	1	
	489	494	509	488	491	506	513	513	
Age	-0.0748	0.0035	-0.073	-0.0392	-0.0335	0.038	0.2949*	0.1752*	1
	486	491	506	485	488	503	510	510	510

* indicates statistically significant scores

Indonesia - Female

	Hostile Sexism Scale	Benevolent Sexism Scale	Support for Violent Extremism	Supporting Violence Against Women	Coercive and Control	Male Leader	Education	Religiosity	Age
Hostile Sexism Scale	1								
	479								
Benevolent Sexism Scale	0.5433*	1							
	459	479							
Support for Violent Extremism	0.4687*	0.2896*	1						
	477	477	499						
Supporting Violence Against Women	0.5185*	0.3700*	0.5923*	1					
	464	463	484	485					
Coercive and Control	0.3285*	0.4189*	0.3530*	0.6473*	1				
	467	466	486	473	487				
Male Leader	0.4504*	0.7910*	0.2562*	0.3662*	0.3977*	1			
	473	479	492	478	480	494			
Education	0.1239*	0.0563	0.0625	0.1068*	0.0708	0.0166	1		
	477	478	497	483	485	492	499		
Religiosity	0.1599*	0.2123*	0.3078*	0.2224*	0.2014*	0.1703*	0.2092*	1	
	479	479	499	485	487	494	499	501	
Age	-0.0193	0.016	-0.0327	0.0271	-0.0194	0.002	0.2528*	0.1995*	1
	478	478	498	484	486	493	498	500	500

* indicates statistically significant scores

Philippines - Male

	Hostile Sexism Scale	Benevolent Sexism Scale	Support for Violent Extremism	Supporting Violence Against Women	Coercive and Control	Male Leader	Education	Religiosity	Age
Hostile Sexism Scale	1								
	458								
Benevolent Sexism Scale	0.5712*	1							
	437	475							
Support for Violent Extremism	0.3130*	0.2837*	1						
	455	473	503						
Supporting Violence Against Women	0.3994*	0.2779*	0.5273*	1					
	438	454	478	482					
Coercive and Control	0.3862*	0.3705*	0.5218*	0.8207*	1				
	441	456	481	467	485				
Male Leader	0.4661*	0.7646*	0.2740*	0.3463*	0.3305*	1			
	452	475	494	474	477	497			
Education	0.0465	0.0714	-0.0814	-0.1311*	-0.1039*	-0.0018	1		
	458	475	503	482	485	497	508		
Religiosity	0.1979*	0.2657*	0.1504*	0.1957*	0.2278*	0.2255*	0.1276*	1	
	457	474	502	480	483	496	506	506	
Age	-0.0794	0.0385	-0.1126*	-0.1814*	-0.1285*	0.0104	0.1548*	0.0091	1
	455	472	499	477	480	493	503	502	503

*indicates statistically significant scores

Philippines - Female

	Hostile Sexism Scale	Benevolent Sexism Scale	Support for Violent Extremism	Supporting Violence Against Women	Coercive and Control	Male Leader	Education	Religiosity	Age
Hostile Sexism Scale	1								
	479								
Benevolent Sexism Scale	0.5594*	1							
	449	475							
Support for Violent Extremism	0.3268*	0.3139*	1						
	478	474	509						
Supporting Violence Against Women	0.4493*	0.4460*	0.4599*	1					
	453	446	476	476					
Coercive and Control	0.4195*	0.4665*	0.3918*	0.8049*	1				
	465	464	495	465	495				
Male Leader	0.4401*	0.7671*	0.2223*	0.4181*	0.4040*	1			
	466	475	493	461	481	494			
Education	-0.0675	-0.0436	0.0073	-0.0867	-0.0697	-0.0295	1		
	475	471	505	474	491	490	506		
Religiosity	0.0423	0.1655*	0.0193	0.0861	0.0499	0.0918*	0.1325*	1	
	478	474	508	475	494	493	506	509	
Age	-0.0432	0.0173	-0.0508	-0.0426	-0.0333	0.0611	0.1530*	0.1051*	1
	475	471	505	472	491	490	502	505	506

* indicates statistically significant scores

At Monash University, the research team was led by Professor Jacqui True and consisted of Dr. Melissa Johnson, Dr. Eleanor Gordon, Ms. Yasmin Chilmeran and Ms. Yolanda Riveros-Morales at the Centre for Gender, Peace and Security (Monash GPS) who each have expertise in gender, peace, conflict and qualitative and quantitative community-based research methods. In Bangladesh, the research team from Bangladesh was led by Ms. Nazmun Nahar (country team leader); in Indonesia, the research team was led by Dr. Sri Eddyono (country team leader) and Devita Putri, Rizky Septiana Widyaningtyas from Gadjah Mada University (GMU); and in the Philippines, the research team was led by Josephine Perez (country team leader), and Beverly Orozco (Ateneo de Manila University). Copy-editing was provided by Sara Phillips. This project has ethics approval through the Monash University Human Research Ethics Committee (Monash University Human Ethics Research Approval 2017-7344-14240) and followed the guidelines and protocols set out by this Committee. The views expressed in this publication are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily represent the views of UN Women, the United Nations or any of its affiliated organizations.



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